The Ontology and Ethics of Money. by Suzuki, Hidenori
THE ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS OF MONEY
by Hidenori SUZUKI 
(M-Phil in economics)
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Lancaster University
Centre for Philosophy,






INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11003568
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract
This thesis aims to explore the ontology and the normative nature of money.
Part 1 aims to provide a philosophical and methodological toolbox with which to 
consider the ontology of money and the boundary between market and non-market 
spheres. From a Critical Realist perspective, it blocks the slide into two problems of 
reductionism. The positivist perspective, on the one hand, reduces objects to their 
empirical existence and seeks to quantify them. The Post-structuralist perspective, on 
the other hand, reduces objects to our discourses and ignores their extra-discursive 
nature. The Critical Realist can avoid reducing commensurability into either a mere 
empirical existence or a mere social construction. Whether things are marketable or 
not is partly a matter of extra-discursive facts and partly of discursive institutional 
facts. A market boundary, a separation between the marketable and the non- 
marketable goods, exists not only for us, but also in virtue of the nature both of money 
and of non-monetary goods. The ontology of money matters to the morality of money.
Part 2 aims to provide an ethical approach from which to consider normative debates 
about money. From the perspective of an Aristotelian virtue ethics, it criticises the 
moral instrumentalist view of money — i.e. the view that money is simply a tool and 
hence that it is pointless to argue about morality of money as such — and the 
Smithian virtue-based justification of money, which holds that whilst the society may 
subsist without a positive virtue of beneficence, it cannot subsist without a negative 
virtue of justice promoted by money. From an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, it 
defends the importance and possibility of altruistic gift giving from both practical 
indifference and theoretical skepticism. Finally, it explores the possibility of a ‘virtue- 
based utopianism’ in contrast with an ‘evotopianism’ based on a consequentialist 
ethical perspective.
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CHAPTER 0: INTRODUCTION
Money is, unarguably, central to the operation of capitalist economies. Despite our 
preoccupation with measuring various aspects of money (e.g. money supply) and 
attempting to discover its association with other economic variables (e.g. inflation), 
we seem to be no closer nowadays to an understanding of exactly what money is or 
how money ‘works’ than half a century ago. As Schumpeter put matters in 1954, 
‘[t]here is no denying that views on money are as difficult to describe as are shifting 
clouds’ (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 289). Ingham notes that economic thought is 
marked by a history of interrelated disputes involving divergent conceptions of the 
nature of money (Ingham, 1999, p. 105), some of the key ones are listed here. Money 
has been considered as:
• a precious metal (e.g. gold, silver).
• a commodity with objective qualities (e.g. value, stability of value, portability, 
indestructibility, homogeneity, divisibility, cognizability).
• a functional entity (e.g. medium of exchange, measurement of value, means of 
payment, store of value).
• a tool.
• a veil covering the ‘real’ economy.
• a numeraire.
• a creature of the state.
• a creature of trust.
• a commodity with (inter-)subjective qualities (e.g. saleability, scarcity, utility, 
evaluation by tastes, preferences and wants).
• a social institution.
• information.
In one sense, not understanding money properly does not matter: we can go about our 
daily monetary practices without knowing what money is. In another sense, however, 
this does matter: monetary theory and policy, concerning the Euro or local currencies 
for instance, must be based on some understanding of what money is. If not, it is 
highly likely that theory and policy will be misguided.
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Moreover, whilst we are aware of many of the advantages of living in a monetised 
socio-economic system, without a more sophisticated understanding on money, we 
are likely to miss the disadvantages that seem to come with money. And this brings us 
to the twin aims of this thesis. This thesis aims to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding on money via an ontological enquiry; 1 and then to use this 
understanding as a base from which to explore some of the disadvantages, specifically, 
the ethical problems that money appears to generate.
0.1 Why Ontology?
Whilst the history of monetary theory has deployed various conceptions of the nature 
of money, it has generally developed around two dimensions: the material or the 
symbolic. Ontology has, for many years, tended to be overlooked and has often been 
eclipsed by its relative epistemology. This has, almost inevitably, led to ontological 
confusion right across the spectrum of social science in general and in the analysis of 
money in particular. Ontological confusion has encouraged the practice of collapsing 
one dimension into the other so that whatever money is it is either entirely material or 
entirely symbolic. We need to avoid this.
With few (important) exceptions, most of those who have focused on the material 
dimension have treated money solely as a concrete, tangible entity. From this 
perspective, money is intrinsically valuable and is rendered valuable due to the innate 
properties that it possesses. In the second dimension, most of those who have focused 
on the symbolic dimension have treated money as a conceptual, nominal entity. From 
this perspective, money is extrinsically valuable and is rendered valuable due to what 
it promotes, how it is used or what context it resides in.
While a (crude) materialist view of money always had its critics, it came under 
particular fire when convertibility to gold was abandoned and new forms of money,
1 Ontology is the philosophical investigation about nature of being or existence.
2 Dodd implies that money is information, and claims that information, which defines feature of 
monetary networks, is ‘neither material nor symbolic but something other; an other which cannot be 
grasped within the language of economics, nor indeed within any language which derives its structure 
from the dualism of the material and the symbolic, of concepts and the reality they are supposed to 
depict’ (Dodd, 1994, pp. 157-8). Although this thesis accepts some of Dodd’s claims, it attempts to 
figure out what this ‘something other’ actually is.
3 Epistemology is the philosophical investigation about knowledge of being or existence and about how 
knowledge of being is obtained.
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such as credit cards and e-money, emerged. Developments like these triggered an 
over-reaction: if money can no longer considered to be ju st material, then perhaps it is 
just symbolic. Hayek is but one thinker who takes this view, writing: ‘Money is 
money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks 
they are’ (Hayek, 1949, p. 60). That is, something can be money if and because it is 
regarded as money. Physical properties are not only unimportant, they also tell us 
nothing about moneyness, rather, people’s belief, recognition, patterned behaviours or 
purposive action make something money. This chimes nicely with developments in 
Post-structuralist thought, which comes to see money as just ‘discourse’ and because 
of this, ends up as a crude idealist view of money.4
Now, in order to avoid the twin evils of crude materialism and crude idealism, we 
need a sophisticated ontology, one that can properly deal with both material and 
symbolic dimensions of money without reduction. This is where Critical Realism 
comes in. Over the last few years, Critical Realist thinkers (Fairclough, Jessop and 
Sayer, 2002) have been developing what we might call a social ontology with a 
concept of discourse. Thus, Critical Realism has an ontology that is sophisticated 
enough to deal with both material/extra-discursive and symbolic/discursive.
0.2 Why Ethics?
Money’s morality has generally been argued from the following ethical perspectives: 
consequentialist ethics and deontological ethics. Consequentialist ethics concern the 
state o f affairs we should or should not bring about. From this view, it follows that 
money’s morality can be judged in terms of the goodness and badness of a state o f  
affairs it promotes. Deontological ethics, in contrast, concern the actions we should or 
should not perform. From this view, it follows that money’s morality can be judged in 
term of rightness and wrongness of how to use it. However, a number of recent 
consequentialist and deontological approaches involve, what I call, a moral 
instrumentalist view on money (i.e. the view that it is pointless to argue about morality 
of money as such since money is merely a tool), and discourage us from arguing 
about morality of money in terms of the ontological nature of money.
4 Or postmodernist, although for ease I shall refer to both as Post-structuralist.
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Utilitarian consequentialists consider that money is just a tool for maximising our 
utility, and therefore it is pointless to argue about money’s morality as such, just as it 
is pointless to do about the morality of any other tool such as a hammer. This view, 
however, leaves out the possibility that the ontological status of money itself is 
incompatible with our ethical behaviour and human virtue. By assuming utility 
maximisation as our ultimate aim, it reduces any kinds of moral value into a super­
value, namely utility. From this view, it follows that money is consequentially 
compatible with our ethical behaviour and human virtue, because it is a tool for 
maximising the super-value. This view, however, is value-monistic, wherein there 
exists only one end and all actions are means to it. It misguides us into considering 
that all other values, including moral values, are reducible to the super-value, utility.
In contrast, American pragmatists develop a deontological ethics and consider that 
money does not have any meaning outside of particular uses in particular contexts 
because its social meaning is created through use — i.e. there is no such thing as 
‘universally representational properties of money’. This view, however, leaves out the 
possibility that the ontological status of money itself influences the acts of moral 
agents. Starting from a rejection of the attempt to identify ‘universally 
representational properties of money’, it reduces money’s meaning, which includes 
morality, into its uses and usages in contexts. From this view, it follows that money’s 
morality can and ought to be a matter of its users and usages in contexts, not the 
ontological natures of money as such. If money were no more than meaning created 
through people’s use, however, money would have different meanings only by 
depending on how people treat it. While it appears to be value-pluralistic and 
emancipatory, it can easily flip into moral relativism: money can be either good or 
bad only by depending on right or wrong usage.
Now, in order to avoid these moral instrumentalist views, we need a more 
sophisticated perspective of ethics that holds a view that the ontology of money 
matters to the ethics of money. This is where Aristotelian virtue ethics come in. Virtue 
ethics concern what kind of person we ought to be. From this view, it follows that 
money’s morality can be judged in terms of the goodness or badness of what it leads 
us to be. A morally instrumentalist view on money can be avoided from an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. Firstly because, unlike utilitarian
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consequentialist ethics, virtue ethics does not reduce the realisation of human virtue 
(i.e. intrinsic value) into a good state of affair (i.e. extrinsic value). Secondly because, 
unlike the pragmatist approach of deontological ethics, virtue ethics can ontologically 
investigate the compatibility between essences of money and the excellence of human 
virtue.
0.3 Format
Chapter 1 embarks on the ontological enquiry by developing a Critical Realist 
perspective on discourse. This necessitates an engagement with Post-structuralism 
and the strong social constructionist ontology which often implies that there is no 
extra-discursive dimension to reality and hence no distinction between discourse and 
non or extra-discourse. In this case, it necessitates an engagement with the claim that 
money is entirely discourse and the collapse of money into discourse. Critical Realism 
holds a non-reductionist distinction between the discursive and the extra-discursive. 
Because of this, it is useful in exploring the way in which discourse figures within, 
and partly constitutes money.
Chapter 2 turns to consider issues that are more recognisably ‘economic’ in nature 
that is, it deals with issues such as measurement, comparability, cardinality, ordinality, 
quantification, and standardisation. What is unique, however, is that it deals with 
these issues in a way that augments the previous Critical Realist analysis of discourse. 
It explores the way money becomes the universal measure of values by its ability to 
render incommensurable items commensurable, and does this by treating 
commensuration not as a purely physical process, but as a discursive process. The 
chapter, effectively, builds a Critical Realist perspective on discourse from which to 
consider money.
Chapter 3 considers the market boundary, that is, the boundary that separates 
marketable from non-marketable items. First, it draws on Walzer’s idea of ‘blocked 
exchanges’, that is, situations where things cannot and/or should not be traded for 
money. It also draws on Andre’s developments on ‘blocked exchanges’ where she 
considers not only what cannot be bought and sold, but also what could, but really 
ought not to be bought and sold. Second, it considers cases where certain social 
relations and value commitments, which are themselves actually constituted by our
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refusal to put a price upon them. Third, it considers a Critical Realist meta-theory as a 
perspective for exploring the ontology of a market boundary. It also examines how the 
market and the non-market spheres can co-exist, despite the fact that the market 
sphere tends to either invade or corrupt into the non-market sphere in a certain context. 
Finally, it tackles some skepticism and criticism that has been levelled against the idea 
that ontology can be useful in determining a market boundary.
The chapter 4 and 5 explore the ways in which money itself may be incompatible with 
our ethical behaviour and human virtue, from the perspective of an Aristotelian virtue 
ethic. Chapter 4 critically examines a morally instrumentalist view o f money (i.e. the 
view that it is pointless to argue about morality of money since money is merely a 
tool). First, it introduces three ethical perspectives that provide a basis for the specific 
purpose of examining the morality of money — i.e. consequentialism, deontological 
ethics and virtue ethics. We explore that a number of recent consequentialist and 
deontological approaches which have involved a morally instrumentalist view o f 
money. Second, it elaborates an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics to 
demonstrate that moral instrumentalism can be avoided. Third, it criticises Radin’s 
rejection of Marxist theory as a misreading, in order to demonstrate that moral 
instrumentalism can be avoided. And finally, it puts an Aristotelian virtue ethics 
perspective to work critically assessing some well-known attempts to justify money 
(i.e. money promotes equality and justice).
Chapter 5 critically examines a Smithian virtue-based justification o f money (i.e. 
whilst the society may subsist without a positive virtue of beneficence, it cannot 
subsist without a negative virtue of justice promoted by money). Through a 
comparison with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, it aims to explore the ways 
in which Smithian virtue ethics rather impede the possible excellence of human 
virtues. First, we consider the Aristotle’s account of ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’. For 
Aristotle, virtue is a mean between two extremes (i.e. excess and deficiency). He 
claims the possibility and desirability of reciprocation as a synthesis of the qualitative 
nature of persons and the quantitative nature of things. Second, we consider Smith’s 
account of ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’. Smith divides virtue into two kinds — i.e. a positive 
virtue (i.e. beneficence) and negative virtue (i.e. justice). Smith aims to persuade us to 
moderate our expectations of positive virtue and to prioritise negative virtue. Third,
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we summarise the contrast between Aristotle’s and Smith’s virtue ethics in respect of 
their different conceptions of virtue and justice. Aristotle considers that friendship is 
more basic than justice for people’s association in their community, whereas Smith 
considers that justice is more basic than friendship for the subsistence of the society. 
And finally, we put an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective to work critically 
assessing some Smithian attempts to justify money (i.e. money promotes 
independence and freedom).
Chapter 6 considers altruistic gift giving as a non-market activity to realise the 
excellence of human virtue. It defends the importance and possibility of altruistic gift 
giving from both practical indifference and theoretical skepticism. First, we consider 
Gregory’s distinction between commodity exchange and gift exchange. According to 
Gregory’s concept of gift exchange, the giver is taken to have ‘some kind of 
superiority (e.g. political control, power, status, prestige)’ over the receiver. Second, 
we examine the ways in which the act of giving involves different kinds of social 
relations — i.e. domination, instrumental reciprocity and mutuality. We show that gift 
giving does not exclude the possibility of non-reciprocal mutuality in gift giving of 
the kind described by Titmuss, in which the giver is supposed to make no obligation 
for return to the receiver. And finally, we consider recent skepticism about, and 
criticism of, altruistic gift giving, and develop a response to these skeptical moves 
from a perspective of a particular egalitarian mutualist form of Aristotelian virtue 
ethics.
The chapter 7 considers the ways in which we can be less dependent on money in a 
virtuous society. It does this by drawing upon Aristotelian virtue ethics developed in 
the previous chapters, which are concerned with what kind of person we ought and 
ought not to be. It explores the possibility of an Aristotelian ‘virtue-based utopianism’ 
and contrasts this with Hodgson’s ‘evotopianism’, which is based on the ethical 
perspective of consequentialism, which is concerned with what state of affairs we 
ought and ought not to bring about. The debate between these two notions of utopia is 
conducted, in three stages, via an ontological enquiry. First, we consider Meikle’s 
work to see how different ontological views on human beings, history and money 
make a difference to their utopianism. Second, we consider Hodgson’s ‘evotopia’. 
While Hodgson partly constitutes his ‘evotopian thinking’ by criticising Marx’s
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‘teleological’ and ‘deterministic’ conception of history, the criticism does not fully 
work because Hodgson’s criticism of Marx seems to be based upon a 
misinterpretation of Marx. And finally, we explore the possibility of Aristotelian 
‘virtue-based utopianism’, through Hess’s account of human beings, history, money 
and utopia.
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This chapter aims to argue that money has both material or extra-discursive and 
symbolic or discursive dimensions, and both need to be understood if we are to 
understand money. Many of the traditional problems in attempts to understand money 
stem from the inability to capture both of these dimensions. Maintaining both these 
dimensions is virtually impossible from a Post-structuralist perspective because it 
lacks an ontology capable of dealing with material/extra-discursive phenomena. In 
order to overcome this problem, I turn to Critical Realism because its ontology is 
sophisticated enough to deal with both material or extra-discursive and symbolic or 
discursive phenomena.5 Because discourse is central to this chapter, and because the 
term is used differently by Post-structuralists and Critical Realists, I will use the term 
discourse (italicised) for Critical Realist usage, and ‘discourse’ (in inverted commas) 
for Post-structuralist usage.6
From my Critical Realist perspective, I consider money to be partly discursive, in the 
sense that money requires discourse in order to be money, although I resist the 
temptation to collapse money into ‘discourse’. Although many things can be money, 
money always requires a material or physical presence or host (e.g. metal, paper, 
plastic). Although money is constituted partly by being regarded and(or) used as 
money, it is also constituted partly by being an appropriate material or physical entity. 
Money is not only symbolic, something intelligible or recognisable as money by being 
constituted within discursive practices, but also material, something physical that can 
have causal impact outside discursive practices. In short, money is partly discursive 
and partly extra-discursive.
5 Underpinning all these questions is the issue of ontology. This thesis is not interested in 
epistemological issues, such as defining something which can be readily identified as money or 
identifying something which meets the criteria of a pre-existing definition of money (Dodd, 1994, p. 
xxi), but in ontological issues, such as exploring many kinds of discursive nature figure within and 
partly constitute money.
6 Nellhaus, for instance, claims a Critical Realist view on discourse with a sympathy to the Post­
structuralist: He argues, on the one hand, that ‘Post-structuralist critiques (such as Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985) rightly emphasize the significance of discursive articulation and the political valence of struggles 
over meanings’ (Nellhaus, 1998, p. 21). But he is, on the other hand, skeptical about their dismissing 
the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices (Nellhaus, 1998, p. 16). This chapter 
aims to show that these two views fundamentally conflict with each other and to develop this issue so 
that Critical Realists can be separated from Post-structuralists in terms of the different ontologies of 
discourse.
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Approaching money in this way creates obvious problems for economists who are, by 
and large, unfamiliar with concepts like discourse — and associated terms such as 
linguistics and semiosis.7 Yet if is it true that money has both a material and a 
symbolic dimension, which seems undeniable, then economists cannot forever neglect 
money’s symbolic dimension and, by extension, the concepts needed to interrogate 
this dimension. Simply stated: economists must embrace discourse and discourse 
analysis if economists are ever going to understand money.
The chapter proceeds by posing, and answering, three methodological questions:
1. Why discourse and discourse analysis? That is, why do we need the concept of 
discourse in order to investigate the nature of money? How is discourse analysis a 
more appropriate method for investigating the symbolic dimension of money than 
other available methods?
2. What is ‘discourse’? That is, to what does the term ‘discourse’ refer for the Post­
structuralist? Should (and can) we sustain the distinction between discourse and 
extra-discourse?
3. What is discourse? That is, to what does the term discourse refer for the Critical 
Realist? What kind of aspects does money as discourse have? These 
methodological issues pave the way for a Critical Realist explanation of how 
discourse figures within, and partly constitutes money as a social practice without 
collapsing money into ‘discourse’.
These three questions pave the way for explaining how discourse figures within, and 
partly constitutes money as a set of social practices in their articulation with other 
extra-discursive moments.
7 Semiosis is a study of signification (i.e. the study of how and why one thing can mean another). 
Discourse refers to the semiotic elements of social practices in their articulation with other extra- 
discursive moments. I will discuss this further below.
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1.1 Why Discourse?
We need the concept of discourse (italicised) and discourse analysis to investigate the 
nature of money, for three reasons:
The first reason is because money has a symbolic dimension. Whilst it goes without 
saying that money is involved with some sort of ‘symbolism’, we have no single 
agreed theory to explain how money is ‘symbolic’, or in what sense money is 
‘symbolic’. It is not only because money is a complicated object to study, but also 
because there is no consensus on what a ‘symbol’ is, and neither is there a definition 
of the term ‘symbol’. There have been various explanations of this ‘symbolic’ nature 
of money, of which the followings are pivotal:
(1) Money is a numeraire (i.e. a unit of account). It is a conceptual, nominal 
dimension for measuring the magnitude of value in actual, qualitative things.
(2) Money is not intrinsically but extrinsically valuable. A currency, such as a bank 
note, has no final value, but has an instrumental value to get a commodity.
(3) Physical entity stands for a notion. There is no natural connection between the 
physical quality of money (e.g. a metal, a paper, a plastic card) and the ideas it 
represents (e.g. purchasing power, wealth).
(4) Money is not internally powerful but is externally authorised by a certain group or 
organisation (e.g. a community, a retail or central bank, a state).
(5) Money is involved with meaning. It carries various kinds of meaning (e.g. 
economic, political, social, cultural, historical).
To summarise, therefore, money is ‘symbolic’ because it is representational. We 
thereby need semiotics, the study of signs or symbols, in order to investigate the 
symbolic nature of money.
Secondly, we need the concept of discourse, because of its increasing significance in 
‘New Capitalism’ (Fairclough, 2002). Capitalism can be thought of as undergoing a 
two-fold transformation: re-structuring and re-scaling.
Re-structuring refers to shifts in relations between different domains or fields of social 
life, — between the economic field and other fields (e.g. political, medical, 
educational, social, cultural), including ‘colonisation’ of other fields by the economic
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field. For instance, new kinds of medical items are now traded off, or evaluated in 
terms of money in the market society (e.g. blood, human organs, babies, surrogate 
motherhood, human genome information). Money colonises non-monetary domains, 
and increases the range of purchasable items.
Re-scaling refers to shifts in relations between different scales of social life, — 
between social life on a local scale, a national scale, a regional scale, and a global 
scale. For instance, the orthodox form of money on a national scale (e.g. dollar, pound, 
yen) is simultaneously transformed partly into a local scale currency (e.g. LETS, Time 
Dollar) and partly into a regional scale currency (e.g. the Euro).
Moreover, capitalism is also transformed in association with new communication 
technologies. For instance, money is transformed into more symbolic and non- 
substantial form (e.g. credit card, e-money). The new capitalism is commonly grasped 
by terms, such as ‘knowledge-driven’ and ‘information-based’. This implies that it is 
also ‘discourse-driven (or discourse-based)’, because knowledge is produced, 
circulated and consumed as discourse. Discourse analysis then can contribute to 
investigation of those aspects of the transformation of capitalism where discourse 
matters.
Thirdly, if we need the concept of discourse, then we also need some means to 
investigate or analyse it. My preferred option is discourse analysis. From a linguistic 
perspective, discourse analysis arguably, the most appropriate method for 
investigating the symbolic dimension of money than other available methods.
Traditionally, linguistics has focused either on the structural facet of language as a 
closed system of signs in which the value of any sign derives from its relation to other 
signs (e.g. Saussurean Semiology) or on the performative facet of language that is 
constitutive of the social world and of the self (e.g. Anglo-American Pragmatics, 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics). In contrast, discourse analysis entails both views as 
conditions of the possibility of discourse. Let us consider why this might be the case 
by considering three major explorations of money, which have made an attempt to 
deploy a traditional linguistic perspective.
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1.1.1 Saussurean Semiology 
Saussure calls his study of signs ‘semiology’, which has had an enormous influence 
not only on structural linguistics but also on the methodology of the social sciences in 
general. Many have considered money and language as signs from a Saussurean or a 
Post-Saussurean perspective (cf. Baudrillard, 1981; Daly, 1991; Goux, 1994; Rossi- 
Landi, 1974; Thibault, 1997; etc.). There are two kinds of argument here. Money can 
be considered in terms of Saussure’s distinction of langue/parole, and in terms of the 
distinction between the signifier/the signified. Let us proceed carefully through these 
two arguments in turn.
First, semiosis of money has been conducted as a study of langue. Langue is regarded 
as a system of signs, which is prior to actual language use, whereas parole, in contrast, 
is determined as actual language use, such as the production of speech sounds, written 
texts and speech acts. Langue is social — i.e. it is conventional and arbitrary relations 
between signs, whereas parole is individual — i.e. it is designed and intended by 
individuals. Langue is not intentional — i.e. it has no architect, whereas parole is 
intentional — i.e. it has an architect, individual language users. Moreover, langue can 
only be studied via a synchronic perspective. Synchronic linguistics is the study of an 
underlying system of language at a given moment in time. Parole, can only be studied 
via a diachronic perspective. Diachronic linguistics is the study of changing linguistic 
forms over time. According to Saussure, a synchronic study precedes a diachronic one. 
Linguistics is concerned primarily with langue, not parole.
Second, semiosis of money is rooted on a Saussure’s notion of sign (i.e. the pair that 
are the signifier and the signified). The signifier is a sound pattern. It is not actually a 
physical sound, but the hearer’s psychological impression o f a sound. It is a 
representation of our sensory impressions. The signified is a concept or an idea. It is 
not a concrete thing itself, but the language user’s psychological impression o f a thing. 
Saussure’s sign is arbitrary, and excludes extra-linguistic facts, which determine the 
existence of each sign and the relation between a signifier and a signified. For 
instance, the differences amongst the signs, such as ‘horse’, ‘mule’ and ‘donkey’, are 
not determined by the properties of these animals, but is determined in the linguistic 
system. There is no natural connection between an acoustic impression of an utterance 
of ‘horse’ (i.e. the signifier) and a concept of ‘horse’ (i.e. the signified). Instead, they
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trigger one another and spontaneously emerge as ‘a linguistic value’ within a system 
of linguistic values. That is, Saussure’s signs present themselves as elements of a 
system and cannot be identified independently of it. This makes it clear that a 
synchronic study of langue is the primary study, because a study of values is a study 
of the system to which they belong.
Saussurean semiology is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, Saussure’s analytical 
distinction of langue/parole brackets out certain features of money in reality. Potter 
points out that it could perform a purely synchronic analysis upon a phenomenon, 
which has a temporal dimension in reality. He makes an ontological distinction 
between the structure of Saussure’s concept of langue (i.e. an abstraction) and the 
structure of language (i.e. the reality it ‘represents’), and emphasises that the structure 
of langue is not the structure of language. According to Potter:
The model of language — langue — allows us to see the arbitrary aspect of 
the nature of the relationship between signifier and signified in language (that 
is, in real languages). But it also obscures some of the emergent nature of the 
structure of language (real language). This — though it changes, though it 
exists as a real set of relations, though it is no reducible to individual instances 
of communication (i.e. parole) — is certainly not langue’ (Potter, 2001, p. 
186).
That is, Saussurean Semiology obscures the emergent nature of the real structure of 
money at the same time as it enlightens the abstract system of differences.
Secondly, the Saussurean sign, the pair that are the signifier and the signified, does 
not involve a referent or object, and it leaves no room for extra-discursive elements 
within a process of signification. Nellhaus (1998, pp. 1-2) claims that while 
Saussurean Semiology cannot be incorporated into Critical Realism, the same cannot 
be said for Peirce’s semiotics. Nellhaus discovers a resemblance rather between 
Bhaskar’s semiotic triangles and Peirce’s philosophy of signs, called ‘semiotics’. In 
the Peircean notion of sign, there are two objects: the ‘dynamic object’ (i.e. the object 
of reference in the world) and the ‘immediate object’ (i.e. the object as the referent’s 
representation), and they correspond to Bhaskar’s contrast between the intransitive
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and transitive dimensions of knowledge. While signs are, like Saussurean notion of 
sign, arbitrary, conventional and social, they are not wholly social but instead are 
determined to some degree by extra-discursive, even extra-human realities (ibid., p. 7).
1.1.2 Anglo-American Pragmatics 
Anglo-American pragmatics is closely associated with the speech act theory of Austin 
and Searle. Speech act theory is a study of language as a form of action. Although its 
view of uttering as acting is an important for our concept of discourse, its method 
should be criticised by pointing out its three limitations: (a) individualism, (b) 
inappropriate generalisation of co-operative interaction and (c) belief in the possibility 
of single invented utterances (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 9-10). Let us look at the 
weaknesses of Anglo-American pragmatics, by considering the speech act analysis of 
one of its advocates, namely Hadreas (1989).
Hadreas proposes that ‘the monetary practices may be instructively conceived as cases 
of linguistic commitment’ which can effectively be analysed by Searle’s speech act 
theory (ibid., p. 115). In Hadreas’ view, monetary practices are a subclass of acts of 
acquisition. They are not one-sided and compulsive, but mutual and voluntary acts of 
acquisition, and they are necessarily linguistic. Hadreas considers money as it occurs 
in conversational context, and offers examples of three kinds of conversation designed 
to facilitate the exchange of goods and services: (1) a bartering conversation between 
a shepherd and a cowherd; (2) a commodity money conversation between a medieval 
merchant travelling upon a trade route and a merchant in spices; and (3) a fiat or 
fiduciary money conversation between the manager of a fast-food restaurant and a 
computer salesman. In his view, these monetary conversations are involved with the 
speech act of promise-making, which entails the following two preparatory and one 
essential conditions:
• Preparatory Condition No. 1: a hearer prefers that the speaker would do the act 
promised and the speaker believes that the hearer would prefer it.
• Preparatory Condition No. 2: it is obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that 
the speaker will not do the promised act in the normal course of events.
• The Essential Condition: the speaker intends that the utterance of the promise will 
place him under an obligation to do the promised act.
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Hadreas’ argument is subject to three criticisms. The first criticism refers to his 
individualism. Speech act theory considers action as emanating wholly from the 
individual, and conceptualises it in terms of the strategies adopted by the individual 
speaker to achieve one’s goals or intentions. For instance, bargaining strategies can 
be found in a following situation: The shepherd begins to walk away. “Wait. I  need a 
plow. How about three sheep and a plow for these two cow, ” the cowherd responds. 
Now it is the shepherd’s turn to accept the request, refuse it or counteroffer. These 
utterances imply that individual speakers manipulate language for bargaining and try 
to achieve their position in the supply/demand curve by offering and counteroffering 
one by one. Although people, in certain circumstances, strategically act and use 
conventions involved with monetary contracts, they simply follow the conventions 
without any strategy in other circumstances. Whilst Anglo-American Pragmatics 
acknowledges social practices, it illegitimately reduces them to the strategic creativity 
of individual speakers.
The second criticism relates to an over generalised co-operative interaction: speech 
act theory elevates co-operative interaction between equals into a prototype for social 
interaction in general, rather than seeing it as a form of interaction whose occurrence 
is limited and socially constrained. Hadreas argues that a monetary practice can be 
conceived as a speech act of promise-making, which entails its preparatory condition 
that ‘a hearer prefers that the speaker would do the act promised and the speaker 
believes that the hearer would prefer it’ (ibid., p. 117). That is, any act of monetary 
practice is mutually preferred and has two mutually dependent promises since it is 
involved with reciprocal speech acts between a “hearer” and a “speaker”. Both parties 
prefer the agreement over making or not making an agreement. Hadreas presupposes, 
therefore, that both parties believe that the exchange is a preferable course o f action. 
The exchange is not, however, ‘as harmonious as the classical parable would lead us 
to believe’ (Clarke, 1982, p. 72-7). The exchange is not necessarily between equal 
individuals seeking to satisfy their needs or wants, but is quite often between the 
dominant and the weak in a monopolised market, or between the capitalist and the 
worker in a labour market. Anglo-American Pragmatics only takes into account that a 
single and isolated exchange is a preferable course of action and pays no attention to 
money that appears within, and partly constitutes, uncooperative and unequal 
interactions.
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The third criticism concerns its single invented utterance rather than real extended 
discourse: speech act theory provides a strictly constrained space for investigating the 
independence of language and social context, because pragmatics, in which it is 
rooted, tends to be seen as an additional level of language study which fills in gaps 
left by the more fundamental levels of language study, or ‘linguistic proper’. Let us 
look at following utterances: ‘77/ give you two sheep for those two cows. ” “No, " 
“not interested. ” “Wait. I  need a plow. How about three sheep and a plow for these 
two cow. ” “I  need the plow I  have. I l l  give you three sheep for two cows. " “All right, 
all right. ” “I  need the sheep; these two cows for those three sheep. ” These utterances 
are invented merely for investigating language use separately from social context. 
Moreover, the distinction of three conversations, which Hadreas naively applies his 
speech act analysis to, result from non-historical/non-empirical development of the 
exchange form, from barter exchange, through commodity money exchange, into 
credit money exchange, invented by an individualistic account of classical political 
economics.8 Although he claims that the three conversations are not ‘canonical’ but 
contain ‘typically different linguistic commitments,’ they are not spontaneously made 
in a real life, but artificially designed for analytical convenience.
8 Different interpretations of classical political economics bring about different views on exchange. On 
the one hand, Hadreas has a symmetrical, harmonious and individualistic view on exchange by 
applying his speech act analysis to an individualistic account of classical political economics. As I put 
it, Clarke claims that the exchange relation is essentially symmetrical for classical political economy, in 
a sense that the two parties have commodities that are wanted with each other, and satisfy their needs 
by exchanging them at the rate determined by the amount of labour-time they spend on acquiring them. 
‘Classical political economy was based on this picture of exchange as an essentially private relation of 
barter between individuals' (Clarke, 1982, p. 73). On the other hand, Wennerlind has a rather more 
conventional, autonomous and social view on exchange with his interpretation of classical political 
economists, such as Hume and Smith, as fiducially theorists and practical metallists (Wennerlind, 
2001a; 2001b, pp. 561-3). ‘Hume’s analysis emphasized the importance of money’s ability to 
communicate trust between anonymous individuals, therefore allowing extensive social bonds to 
evolve (Wennerlind, 2001b, p. 562).’ Wennerlind himself admits that the actual historical development 
of capitalism is much more contested and violent than Hume’s explanation of an emergent of a 
promissory note in a harmonious process, by claiming ‘For some, money is not a cooperative but a 
contested social relation’ (ibid., p. 563). But, the latter’s account of classical political economics is 
more helpful for exploring discursive natures of money.
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1.1.3 Gadamerian Hermeneutics 
Horwitz considers the relationship between money and language by weaving together 
the Austrian ‘subjectivist theory of money’ and Georg Simmel’s sociology of money 
with Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics (Horwitz, 1992). He, firstly, introduces the 
Austrian ‘subjectivist theory of money’ (derived mostly from Menger’s view) 
whereby money is the most saleable commodity as a medium of exchange. Suppose 
one comes to the barter-market to get what one wants and others have, in exchange 
for what others want and one has. However, the barter exchange is not always 
successful, because it is hard to make a double coincidence of wants realised at once. 
At the next step, therefore, one intends to get rid of things that one has but one does 
not want and get something more saleable, which can later be exchanged for what one 
ultimately wants. Even though one cannot make a double coincidence of wants 
realised all at once, one can reach to what one really wants via a certain saleable 
commodity. Thus, more and more people start to use the saleable commodity as a 
medium of exchange and a single or very small number of goods emerge as the most 
saleable though that process of exchange, and finally that the most saleable good is 
generally accepted as money.
Horwitz claims that ‘market actors’, in the process of the evolution of money, don't 
merely redistribute existing ‘objective knowledge’, but rather they create ‘subjective 
knowledge’ that did not previously exist. Saleability or scarcity of goods resulting 
from people's wants is not ‘objective information’, but ‘subjective information’, 
which can be discovered and constituted through the actual process of economic 
exchange. ‘Saleability is ultimately determined by the mental processes of market 
actors, and the discovery of degrees of saleability is a process of drawing out and 
interpreting accessible traces of the contextual knowledge of other minds, rather than 
uncovering some objective (outside the human mind) piece of information’ {ibid., p. 
196). According to his view, therefore, money is generated by ‘subjective knowledge’ 
of market actors about saleability, scarcity, preferences and valuations through the 
process of exchange.
Following this view, Horwitz develops his argument with Simmel’s The Philosophy 
o f Money, which owes much to ‘Menger and subjective thought’. Horwitz, firstly, 
pays attention to the way in which money brings people to a social relationship based
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on trust. ‘Money socializes us by enabling to utilise the contextual knowledge of 
others through the trust embodied in monetary exchange’ {ibid., p. 199). Trust here 
means ‘the belief that others equally accept the money commodity as a medium of 
exchange’. Trust is generated by money’s saleability arising out of ‘intersubjectivity.’ 
Horwitz cites a line from Simmel: ‘to believe in someone, without adding or even 
conceiving what it is that one believes about him, is to employ a very subtle and 
profound idiom’ (ibid., p. 200). We need and use the trust to make social bonds since 
we cannot have detailed knowledge of the people or institution in question. Horwitz, 
secondly, mentions an aspect of money as a social institution. ‘[T]he essence of 
money is that it is a tool. Rather than being an end in itself, money is a universal 
means to whatever ends are available in the market’ {ibid., p. 201). He goes on: ‘It is 
not a tool that humans have intentionally invented, but rather one we have stumbled 
across in our efforts to improve our place in the world’ {ibid.). Like another social 
institution, namely language, money is not an artificially made, but a spontaneously 
emerged tool in society.
Now, Horwitz applies a Gadamerian view of language to those two similar themes. 
For Gadamer, language is the medium of experience. It represents shared 
understandings between its users. ‘Like other institutions, language extends the scope 
of our understanding beyond the limit of our senses. Language is a way to make our 
personal knowledge available socially’ {ibid., p. 203). In Gadamer’s view, there is no 
reality outside something, which is understood through language, since all 
understanding is interpretation and all interpretation takes place through your own 
language. ‘For Gadamer, truth is not a matter of corresponding to some extra- 
linguistic “set of facts”, but rather an appreciation of what we can actually understand 
compared to a world where language is non-existent’ {ibid., p. 204). ‘For Gadamer, it 
is language that makes reason possible. How, then, is it possible to theorise and 
criticise that which exists outside of the language that provides knowledge of that 
existence?’ {ibid., p. 206). Horwitz considers the Gadamerian view of language as an 
advance on the Austrians and Simmel. For the Austrians and Simmel, social 
institutions are mirrors of subjective mental process. There is some ultimately 
knowable set of facts, values, tastes etc. that are hidden behind a veil of social 
institutions such as money and language. The purpose of such institutions is to reveal 
the ultimate constituents of these mental processes. For Gadamer, however, there are
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no such ultimate constituents, rather social institutions like money and language co- 
evolve in a way that the idea of ‘thoughts without language’ is a contradiction in 
terms.
The Gadamerian view on language and its appropriation of Austrian’s and Simmel’s 
‘subjective theory of money’, have the following shortcomings:
(a) Horwitz misinterprets both the Austrian and Simmel’s view on money. He 
introduces them simply by stressing the existence of subjective elements (e.g. 
subjective mental process, subjective evaluation, tastes, preferences, wants) and 
does not pay attention to the existence of any objective elements (e.g. quality, 
production process, labour, objective value), which are also central to their 
position.
(b) The Gadamerian notion of reality misleads us by committing the, so called, 
‘epistemic fallacy’: ‘the view that statements about being can be reduced to or 
analysed in terms of statements about knowledge’ (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 36). In the 
Gadamerian view, there is ‘no reality’ outside language, but ‘a world’ where 
language does not exist. Whilst it is plausible to suggest that language makes it 
possible for us to acquire knowledge of the pre-linguistic or non-linguistic world, 
it is implausible to suggest that language makes the world exist. The pre-linguistic 
or non-linguistic world is also real, not in the sense o f its intelligibility, but in the 
sense o f its causal impact.
(c) Horwitz’s interpretation of ‘a subjective theory of money’ commits to the 
epistemic fallacy. He claims that as there are no real communicated thoughts 
outside of language, so there are no real market-relevant wants outside of 
expression in terms of money. Even though money makes it possible for us to 
know the price of what we want to buy, it does not mean that money creates an 
economic want. Besides, it is not the case that there is ‘no reality’ outside of 
expression in terms of money: there are many elements that exist outside of this 
expression (e.g. incommensurable values, ‘market-irrelevant’ values).
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Whilst theses traditional linguistic perspectives inherently have serious shortcomings, 
these shortcomings can be overcome by using a Critical Realist interpretation of
discourse:
(a') The Saussure’s analytical distinction of langue/parole brackets out certain features 
of money in reality. Besides, the Saussurean sign does not involve an object, and it 
leaves no room for extra-discursive element within a process of signification. In 
using the notion of discourse, however, money cannot be reduced into 
synchronic/diachronic dualism because it the possibility of extra-discursive 
moments.
(b') Anglo-American pragmatics has its three limitations, namely individualism, 
inappropriate generalisation of co-operative interaction and belief in the possibility 
of single invented utterance. In using the concept of discourse, we can commit 
ourselves to a more conventional, socially constrained and real extended nature of 
money.
(c') Horwitz has shortcomings of committing the epistemic fallacy and of stressing 
only ‘subjective’ side of money, which can be avoided via discourse.
Let us turn to the Post-structuralist conception of ‘discourse’.
1.2 What is ‘discourse’?
The following section amounts to a Critical Realist interpretation and critique of the 
Post-structuralist perspective on ‘discourse’ (note the inverted commas). That is, it 
employs a Critical Realist perspective in an attempt to tease out what exactly Post­
structuralists refer to when they use the term ‘discourse’.
According to Torfing, it is ‘a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which 
meaning is constantly renegotiated’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 85). From the Post-structuralist 
perspective, there can be no extra-discursive moments outside ‘discourse’, because 
the object is not prior to ‘discourse’ but it is already discursively constituted in order 
to make sense. One important aim of this chapter, however, is to keep alive the 
question, ‘what is not discourse?’9 Against the Post-structuralist view that everything
9 The Post-structuralist does not keep alive the question ‘what is not discourse?’ because they reduce 
everything into theorists’ discourse. Although Post-structuralist economists have had considerable 
arguments on economics and discourse, they are mostly about theoretical discourses. Nevertheless,
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is constituted within ‘discourse’ with no remainder, the chapter maintains the 
distinction between the discursive and the extra-discursive and this paves the way for 
explaining how and why discourse figures within, and partly constitutes money as 
social practices without collapsing money into ‘discourse’.
Differences between Critical Realist and the Post-structuralist perspectives become 
clear when they answer the following questions: Is practice discourse? What kind of 
dualism? What kind of boundary?
1.2.1 Is Practice Discourse?
For Post-structuralists, the notion of ‘discourse’ can be replaced by that of ‘practice’, 
whereas for Critical Realists discourse is not totally identical with practice. For Post­
structuralists, on the one hand, ‘discourse’ and ‘practice’ form a single category, since 
action is inherent in ‘discourse’. Laclau denotes ‘if I’m going there and I open the 
door, on the one hand I want to open the door, on the other this forces me to a material 
act, which is to open the door. The performance of that act is what I call discourse; it 
is not that discourse produces some kind of material effect, but that the material act of 
producing it is what discourse is’ (Laclau and Bhaskar, 1998, p. 13). In short, the 
practical dimension is entirely inherent in the discursive operation. For Critical 
Realists, on the other hand, the notion of discourse cannot be replaced by that of 
practice: practice is partly discursive and partly non-discursive. For instance, when we 
recognise that words can be ‘mere words’, Critical Realists see them in terms of an 
absence of internalisation between the discursive and the other non-discursive 
moments: ‘mere words’ are a divorce between discursive construction of our practice 
and our material practice. It is just in between a (crude) materialist and a (crude) 
idealist views on discourse: (Crude) materialists privilege the extra-discursive 
moment of practice and consider that ‘mere words’ are discourse that has no effect on 
material practices. (Crude) idealists privilege the discursive moment of practice and 
do not even recognise ‘mere words’: what they mean is not either significant or mere 
words, but either successful or unsuccessful wording. Critical Realists, by contrast, do
discourse analysis is necessarily involved with two dimensions: the object as discourse (i.e. practices 
themselves) and discourse about the object (i.e. theories of them). As for money, there are money as 
discourse (i.e. semiotic elements of monetary practices themselves) and discourse about money (i.e. 
theories of monetary practices). This chapter maintains a weak boundary between them, and is 
interested in the former for investigating unexplored natures of money.
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not privilege any one moment, but say rather that ‘mere words’ are a matter of 
discourse not being integrated into the practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, pp. 
28-9).
1.2.2 What Kind of Dualism?
Post-structuralists invoke a dualism of being (i.e. meaningful) and existence (i.e. 
meaningless), which is inherent in our discursive configuration of the object, whereas 
Critical Realists invoke a dualism of the intransitive dimension (i.e. practices 
themselves) and the transitive dimension (i.e. theories of them), which is not inherent 
in discourse.10 Both Post-structuralists and Critical Realists are against a naive 
concept of truth, — i.e. that there is a privileged access to ‘the truth’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 
68) — in the following two senses: both are against naive ‘foundationalism’ — i.e. 
the view that we can have access to the truth because the world is what our concepts 
say it is; both are against naive ‘objectivism’ — i.e. the view that we can have access 
to the truth because there is one-to-one correspondence between an object itself and a 
description about an object. In opposition to the naive concept of truth, Post­
structuralists, on the one hand, claim ‘the whole meaning of the object can never be 
exhausted by discourse’. ‘The discursive’ is not a defined object but rather a 
theoretical horizon (i.e. the boundary that we can see far away but we cannot reach 
since it is not fixed). That is, we are always within the field of an irreducible surplus 
of meaning, which is separated from the meaningless by its frontier that is historically 
changeable and contingent. Critical Realists, on the other hand, assert that all 
knowledge is fallible. ‘[WJhilst realists of course accept that terms exist within 
discourse, their referents may exist outside (our) discourse: discourse and knowledge 
are not merely self-referential — that is why they are fallible/’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 62).
10 Post-structuralists make a distinction between ‘being’ and ‘existence’, and consider that ‘a naked 
existence’ can have its meaning and become ‘a being’ in our discursive configuration. ‘[0]utside of any 
discursive context objects do not have being; they have only existence’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987, p. 
85). This does not mean that the existence of the external world is dependent on our will or thought, but 
rather that the external world must be constitutive of a discursive configuration in order to have some 
meaning (Curry, 2002, p. 124). ‘The mountain would not be any of these things if I were not here; but 
this does not mean that the mountain does not exist. It is because it exists that it can be all these things; 
but none of them follows necessarily from its mere existence. And as a member of a certain community, 
I will never encounter the object in its naked existence -  such a notion is a mere abstraction; rather that 
existence will always be given as articulated within discursive totalities’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987, p. 
85).
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1.2.3 What Kind of Boundary?
Post-structuralists assume the boundary between being and existence as a theoretical 
horizon by being within the field of discursivity, whereas Critical Realists maintain a 
weak boundary between the intransitive and the transitive dimensions, which can be 
overseen by their praxis.
Post-structuralists cut across the discursive/non-discursive distinction in whichever 
senses and instead, keep the boundary between being and existence. 11 The 
being/existence distinction is not a boundary that can be overseen from above, but a 
theoretical horizon that can only be assumed by being within the field of discursivity. 
This follows from a notion that even the discursive/non-discursive distinction can 
only be presupposed by our discursive configuration. Laclau denotes ‘if you say about 
the intransitivity and transitivity of an object a set of things, these things are said on 
the basis of assumptions which are themselves challengeable, and in this sense: the 
very distinction between intransitivity and transitivity is itself transitive’ (Laclau and 
Bhaskar, 1998, p. 13). That is, we cannot get away and free from transitivity in any 
situation.
Critical Realists maintain a weak boundary between the intransitive dimension (i.e. 
practices themselves) and the transitive dimension (i.e. theories of them).12 Critical
11 Post-structuralists reject the discursive/non-discursive distinction through the abandonment of the 
following three distinctions: (a) linguistic/non-linguistic distinction (b) social/natural distinction and (c) 
thought/reality distinction. For Post-structuralists, the discursive/non-discursive distinction is invalid 
whichever senses the distinction refers to, since it does not overlap to the meaningful/meaningless 
distinction, (a) The distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic elements does not overlap with the 
distinction between ‘meaningful’ and ‘non-meaningful’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987, p. 83), since non- 
linguistic action is also meaningful, and therefore discursive, (b) Social/natural distinction does not 
overlap with meaningful/meaningless distinction. Natural facts are also discursive facts: the facts of 
physics, biology or astronomy are also integrated in meaningful totalities constructed by men {ibid., 
p.84). (c) Thought/reality distinction does not overlap with meaningful/meaningless distinction, since 
reality must be constitutive of a discursive configuration in order to have some meaning. ‘The main 
consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the 
thought/reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can 
account for social relations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 110).
12 Even a Post-structuralist, such as Daly, makes a distinction between two dimensions of discourse: 
‘discourse of the economic’ and ‘the discourse on the economic’ (Daly, 1991, p. 94). On the one hand, 
discourse of the economic ‘refers to the historic construction of all identities which attempt to establish 
themselves within the ‘economic’ in a given conjuncture’. On the other hand, discourse on the 
economic ‘refers to all those discursive attempt to conceptually oversee, or domesticate, those 
identities.’ Although Daly agrees on that ‘there is always a division/tension between these two 
discursive spheres’, he thinks that it is unstable since ‘meta-narratives which previously established a
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Realism operates ‘in between’ as it were, a (crude) materialist and a (crude) idealist 
view on discourse13: (Crude) materialists, maintain a strong boundary between 
intransitive and transitive in order to make objective (and naive) truth claims about 
them. For them, there is always one-to-one correspondence between practices 
themselves and theories of them, but there is no feedback and reflection between them. 
(Crude) idealists, maintain no boundary between intransitive and transitive. For them, 
there is nothing else but our different accounts, stories and theories; discourse is, in 
other words, always everywhere as an independent and creative force. Critical 
Realists take a position between those crude views: and maintain a conceptual 
distinction between intransitive and transitive whilst allowing feedback and reflection 
between them.14
Let us finally consider how and why the Critical Realist view on discourse is more 
defensible than the Post-structuralist view on ‘discourse’:
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event 
that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of 
my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constituted in terms of 
‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist 
externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute 
themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, p. 108)
For Post-structuralists, the object as brute and naked existence can by no means be 
encountered: the object is completely constituted as being, not before, but exactly
relative degree of stability’ between two discursive spheres ‘on the basis of universalist notion’, starts 
to ‘crack and disintegrate’.
13 See 3.3 for further arguments on the contrast among three methodological perspectives: the 
Empirical Realist (i.e. crude materialist or objectivist), the Post-structuralist (i.e. crude idealist or 
subjectivist) and The Critical Realist (i.e. a middle standpoint).
14 ‘That which is outside (intransitivity) is never fully out there, and at the same time that which is in 
here (transitivity) is never purely in here, therefore they are constellationally contained within one 
another (yet irreducible) and hence open to being transformed in their relation to one another’ (Curry, 
2002, p. 127).
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when and where its meaning is cognised, identified and formed. However, statements 
about being cannot be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge. 
In other words, discursive practices in a sense o f  their causal impact cannot be 
reduced to those in a sense o f their intelligibility. Even though the extra-discursive 
reality, such as an earthquake and the falling of a brick, is constituted within 
discursive practices in a sense o f their intelligibility, it isn’t the case that it is 
constituted within discursive practices in a sense o f their causal impact (Laclau and 
Bhaskar, 1998, p. 13). It can be assumed, for example, that global warming or the 
destruction of the ozone layer went on long before we had a concept of them. We 
come to the concept of most diseases long after they have had their causal impact. The 
causal processes involved in these environmental changes and diseases go on 
independently of our recognition of those causal processes. Moreover, there can be 
neither mistakes nor inadequate practices, if an earthquake or the falling of a brick is 
constituted in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ by 
depending upon their discursive configurations. For Post-structuralists, the object is 
merely something to be regarded as the object. In other words, the object is merely 
symbolic, something intelligible or recognisable by being constituted within 
discursive practices. In the final part, we will see the Critical Realist view on 
discourse, and how it grasps material and symbolic natures of money.
1.3 What is discourse?
This section considers what discourse refers to from a Critical Realist perspective. 
Fairclough, leading a socio-linguistic research project called Critical Discourse 
Analysis (hereafter CDA), defines discourse as semiotic elements o f social practices 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 38):
Discourse therefore includes language (written and spoken and in combination 
with other semiotics, for example, with music in singing), nonverbal 
communication (facial expressions, body movements, gestures, etc.) and visual 
images (for instance, photographs, film). The concept of discourse can be 
understood as a particular perspective on these various forms of semiosis — it 
sees them as moments of social practices in their articulation with other non- 
discursive moments, {ibid., italics added)
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CDA develops with various concepts of other social theories, such as the dialectical 
view of discourse (cf. Volosinov, Harvey), the view of power as domination (cf. 
Foucault), the concept of hegemony (cf. Gramsci), and the discourse reflexivity (cf. 
Bourdieu, Giddens, Habermas). Critical Realists have recently become increasingly 
aware of the importance of semiosis (cf. Nellhaus, T. 1998; Carter B. and Sealey, A. 
2000). Moreover, the Critical Realist perspective of discourse is currently developed 
with CDA (cf. Fairclough, N., Jessop, B. and Sayer, A. 2002). The CDA concept of 
discourse corresponds to some key notions of Critical Realism, especially the 
Transformational Model of Social Action, hereafter called TMSA.
Discourse cannot be adequately articulated by neoclassical economists with their 
deductivist method under the Empirical Realist ontology because their ontology is 
exhausted by the empirical domain (i.e. experiences and perceptions) and the actual 
domain (i.e. events and actions). However, it can be properly developed through a 
Critical Realist ontology, which has the real or ‘deep’ domain (e.g. mechanisms, 
powers, relations, structures, tendencies). As for money, Ingham criticises mainstream 
economics (i.e. neo-classical economics), which lacks the adequate ontological theory 
of money, and its deductivist and empiricist methodology from a Critical Realist 
perspective (Ingham, 1999). He claims that money can neither be explained from a 
viewpoint of individual calculations of utility as expressed in ‘revealed preferences’ 
nor statistical description of constant ‘actual’ event conjunction. His objective is to 
demonstrate that money is itself a social relation in the sense of the emergent property 
of a configuration of social relations. That is, by starting from the stratified ontology 
of Critical Realism, he claims that money can neither be grasped only as the empirical 
nor the actual, but as the real or ‘deep’. Ingham suggests that money should be 
considered with a concept of discourse, which itself belongs to the real or ‘deep’ 
domain.
Having demonstrated that, unlike Post-structuralism, Critical Realism has an ontology 
that is sophisticated enough to deal with both discursive and extra-discursive 
phenomena, I now employ Critical Realism. The final section of this chapter allows 
us to understand the material and symbolic natures of money via the following key 
features: a dialectic of structure and action as a condition of possibility of discourse; 
an order of discourse, which is the way in which diverse aspects of discourse are
28
networked together; and the dialectic of discourse, which the internal relationship 
between discursive elements and extra-discursive elements without collapsing into 
each other. These anti-reductionist features of discourse pave the way for exploring 
that money is both material and symbolic.
1.3.1 Structure and Action 
Discourse presupposes a dialectic of structure and action (or agency). As we have 
seen, most traditional linguistics focuses either on the structural facet of language or 
on the performative (i.e. action or agency) facet of language. CDA, however, 
considers a dialectic of structure and action as a condition of possibility of discourse. 
Theories and analyses orientated either to structure or to action are incomplete, 
because they are precondition and outcome for each other (Fairclough, 2000, pp. 170- 
1). This CDA concept of discourse corresponds to the principle of TMSA, as follows. 
The social world (e.g. economy) ontologically consists of social structures and agents. 
The structures (e.g. economic institutions, markets, the price mechanism, a 
distribution of income) are only reproduced via human agency (e.g. dealers, produces, 
consumers, employers, employees). The structures cannot exist independently of 
human agents, but they can exist independently of any one human agent. Hence they 
are concept dependent but not concept determined; they are socially constructed but 
not merely socially constructed. There have been two kinds of traditional ontology: 
reificationist and voluntarist. Reification refers to the notion that society exists 
independently of human action. Voluntarism refers to the notion that agents merely 
produce society in their actions. The Dialectical Critical Realist, in contrast, refers to 
the notion that reciprocal causality where agents’ action causes structure, which then 
causes agents’ action and so on. Nothing happens out of nothing. As Fleetwood 
claims, ‘Agents do not create or produce structures ab initio, rather they recreate, 
reproduce and/or transform a set of pre-existing structures. Society continues to exist 
only because agents reproduce and/or transform those structures that they encounter in 
their social actions. Every action performed requires the pre-existence of some social 
structures which agents draw upon in order to initiate that action, an in doing so 
reproduce and/or transform them’ (Fleetwood, 1997, pp. 130-1). For instance, modem 
currencies in the new capitalism did not happen out of nothing, but are reproduced 
and transformed from pre-existing monetary structures. This principle of TMSA, then, 
centres upon the real or ‘deep’ domain, which is the ever-present condition, and the
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continually reproduced and/or transformed outcome, of human agency. Agents, acting 
purposefully or consciously, unconsciously draw upon, and thereby reproduce, 
structures, which govern their actions in daily life.
1.3.2 An Order of Discourse 
It is a mistake to conceive of discourse as referring merely to linguistic or other forms 
of communicative acts because discourse motivates practical acts. And this has 
implications for our social practices that entail using money. Discourse figures in 
three ways in social practices, which constitute analytical categories of genres, 
discourses and styles (Fairclough, 2000; Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002). An order of 
discourse is the way in which diverse genres, discourses and styles are networked 
together.15
Firstly, discourse figures in the social activity, which constitutes genres. Genres are 
diverse ways of acting upon the world. In monetary practices, in saying ‘I promise to 
pay’, we make a promise to pay. It is not the case that we state or describe that we 
make a promise. We can make a promise just by saying what we do. They are called 
performative utterances, the vehicle of the performance of your act, such as ‘I 
apologise,’ ‘I nominate,’ ‘you are fired,’ ‘the meeting is adjourned,’ ‘you are hereby 
sentenced’ etc., in contrast with constative utterances such as statements, predictions, 
hypothesis etc. The speech act of promise making is different from that of prediction. 
Although the prepositional content of the promise is expressed in the future tense (e.g. 
I will pay you tomorrow. Your purchase will be delivered next week, etc.), it is not a 
proposition which is given as true or false. ‘Unlike predictions, scientific or 
commonsensical, where a theory of events allows us to infer some future state, 
promises are fulfilled with through human workings which include the intentions and 
plans of the people involved’ (Hadreas, 1989, p. 118). Both seller and buyer believe 
that the exchange would not occur apart from their action, and both parties therefore 
enter into an obligation by making promise.
Secondly, discourse figures in representations, which constitute discourses. 16 
Discourses are diverse ways of representing the world. The employment of discourses
15 See 2.6 for further arguments on commensuration as discourses, genres and styles.
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is a social practice, which helps to reproduce the material basis of monetary 
institutions. In monetary practices, as Zelizer indicates, we earmark monies — i.e. we 
create distinctions between different monies for different social interactions, and label 
(i.e. allocate) those different monies according to their different meanings or usages. 
According to Zelizer ‘there is no single, uniform, generalised money, but multiple 
monies: people earmark different currencies for many or perhaps all types of social 
interactions, much as they create distinctive languages for different social context’ 
(Zelizer, 1997, pp. 18-9). She asks, ‘[h]ow else, for instance, do we distinguish a bribe 
from a tribute or a donation, a wage from an honorarium, or an allowance from a 
salary? How do we identify ransom, bonuses, tips, damages, or premiums? True, there 
are quantitative differences between these various payments. But surely, the special 
vocabulary conveys much more than different amounts. Detached from its qualitative 
distinctions, the world of money becomes indecipherable’ (ibid., pp. 24-5). Earmarked 
monies are held to be qualitatively different from each other by corresponding to their 
different social interactions, and they are named by special vocabulary. These monies 
become decipherable with the help of qualitatively distinctive languages.
Thirdly, discourse figures in the constitution of identities, which constitutes styles. 
Styles are diverse ways of perceiving and articulating one’s own role. In monetary 
practices, we perceive, articulate and identify ourselves as sellers/buyers, 
creditors/debtors or donor/donee by reproducing certain performative utterances, such 
as I sell it/I buy it, I lend it/I borrow it, or I give it/I take it. Without these styles, we 
cannot identify our own role in a certain monetary relationship, or we cannot even 
identify what kind of monetary relationship we are involved with (e.g. purchasing, 
credit, charity). Moreover, the non-economic field is re-structured or ‘colonised’ by 
the economic field in association with the shift of styles. The shift of non-monetary 
styles to monetary ones appears within the monetary colonisation, and helps making 
more purchasable items. For instance, many kinds of human relationships (e.g. 
doctor-patient, teacher-student, husband-wife, parent-child) are evaluated in terms of 
monetary styles (e.g. seller-buyer, producer-consumer, supplier-demander). Adopting 
monetary styles can even have a positive effect on roles. In cases where status 
differences exist, such as that between doctor and patient, the ‘democratising’ or
16 Note the difference between discourse as an abstract noun, and discourses as a count noun.
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‘levelling’ effect of money can minimise the negative effect of the authority of the 
expert doctor.
1.3.3 The Dialectic of Discourse 
I mentioned above that money has symbolic and material dimensions. I then argued 
that Post-structuralism has problems with extra-discursive entities which, of course, 
included, material phenomena. Critical Realism has no such problems because its 
conception of discourse is more sophisticated. In fact, the Critical Realist conception 
of discourse allows the discursive/symbolic and extra-discursive/material dimensions 
to live in a dialectical relation. As Chiapello and Fairclough argue that discourse 
internalises, and is internalised, by extra-discursive elements without the different 
elements being reduced to each other (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002). This can be 
developed even further by considering the work of Searle.
Although his individualism should be criticised, Searle’s conceptual distinction 
between institutional and brute facts is helpful to consider about the internalisation 
between discursive and extra-discursive elements (Searle, 1998, pp. 143-58):
Suppose I go to a travel agency, and buy a flight ticket to Copenhagen. I pay 
an agent by cheque, with my signature and bank service card as a guarantee. 
I get a ticket and a receipt. These procedures make it possible for me to take 
a flight from Manchester to Copenhagen. What I actually do, however, can 
be described as follows: I go and see a woman at a counter. I make noises 
and she makes noises too. I write some scribbles on a sheet in a small book. I 
give her the sheet. I also give her a small plastic card, but get it returned in a 
minute. She gives me pieces o f paper. We make some noises again. And 
finally, my body flies and moves over the sea from a place in the Southwest 
to a place in the Northeast.
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Let us begin by grouping together two sets of expressions, and labelling them brute 
and institutional facts:
• Institutional facts refer to expressions such as a travel agency, a flight ticket, an 
agent, check, signature, a bank service card, a receipt, Manchester, Copenhagen.
• Brute facts refer to expressions such as a woman, make noises, scribbles, a small 
book, a small plastic card, pieces o f paper, a place in the Southwest, a place in the 
Northeast.
Now let us see how Searle’s distinction between institutional and brute facts 
correspond to our distinction between discursive and extra-discursive elements:
• Discursive elements correspond to institutional facts as they presuppose human 
institutions for their existence.
• Extra-discursive elements correspond to brute facts as they do not presuppose 
human institutions for their existence.
Now, let us elaborate a little further on this dialectical correspondence. We appear to 
have internal relations between institutional facts/discursive elements and brute 
facts/extra-discursive elements. Brute facts/extra-discursive elements require the 
institution of language (i.e. discourse) to be stated or described, but they themselves 
exist independently from it. Institutional facts/discursive elements control and make 
brute facts/extra-discursive elements possible. Neither institutional facts /discursive 
elements nor brute facts/extra-discursive elements can be reduced to one another: they 
internalise one another without collapsing into each other. Although many kinds of 
things can be money, there has to be some material realisation: the institutional and 
discursive reality is built on top of the brute and extra-discursive reality, irrespective 
of what this happens to be — dog’s teeth, woodpecker’s scalp, gold, silver, a piece of 
paper or a bit on a computer disc.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has applied a Critical Realist perspective, with specific emphasis upon 
discourse, to investigate the ontology of money. It has started from the claim that 
money has both material or extra-discursive and symbolic or discursive dimensions 
and both need to be understood if we are to understand money. Maintaining both 
these dimensions is virtually impossible from a Post-structuralist perspective because 
it lacks an ontology capable of dealing with material/extra-discursive phenomena. In 
order to overcome this problem, I turned to Critical Realism because its ontology is 
sophisticated enough to deal with both material or extra-discursive and symbolic or 
discursive phenomena. The material/extra-discursive dimension of money embodies 
value. The material body of the entity we use as money is the embodiment of 
society’s labouring activities. The symbolic/discursive dimension of money allows it 
to reflect value. That is, when we see a coin, for example, we do not see a piece of 
metal, we see an abstract entity, something that reflects or expresses value. Moreover, 
we see value in terms of quantity. As with any symbolic/discursive phenomena, the 
social context is central to the way this process of abstraction operates. Hence, this 
contradiction between discursive and extra-discursive elements is inherent in money: 
money becomes money in this (irreducible) dialectical process of internalisation 
between discursive and extra-discursive elements. The next chapter will explore the 
ways in which money becomes the universal measure of value through the dialectic 
process, by which agents transform values into a commensurable form, which I refer 
to as ‘ commensuration as a discursive process ’.
34
CHAPTER 2: INCOMMENSURABILITY AND COMMENSURATION
2.0 Introduction
Seat on last plane anywhere: £169 
First Class train ticket: £32 
Taxi: £48
Keeping your promises: Priceless.
There are some things money can’t buy.
For everything else, there’s MasterCard.
In this MasterCard’s TV commercial showed in the UK in winter, 2001/2, a 
businessman tries to get back home to keep his promise to celebrate Christmas with 
his daughter. He looks tired of queuing at a counter in a crowded airport, being leaned 
over by the next passenger in a train, and waiting a taxi outside in a freezing night. It 
will not only cost him £249 in total, it will also cost in terms of many kinds of 
unpleasantness and inconvenience. But he is determined to make the journey home 
irrespective of the unpleasantness, inconvenience, time or monetary cost because all 
these costs can be compensated by seeing his daughter’s joyful smile when he opens 
the door.
Whilst the commercial teaches us that keeping this promise is ‘priceless’, it has other 
lessons, so let us consider this simple example in a little more depth. In what respects 
is it impossible to put a price on things? It is impossible to put a price on some things:
(1) Because ethical value cannot be estimated in terms of market value, since there is 
a categorical difference between ethics and economics. The promise is not 
economically, but ethically valuable.
(2) Because we lack a single scale or dimension to measure the value of keeping 
one’s promise and the utility one gets from it.
(3) Because fatherhood is constituted by a refusal to put a price on keeping a promise 
to one’s own daughter, a refusal to treat a promise as a commodity that can be 
bought or sold. I define this below as ‘Constitutive Incommensurability’.
(4) Because the term ‘priceless’ is a metaphorical expression. It is as i f  keeping the 
promise is much more valuable than any amount of money, regardless of whether
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it can actually be priced or not. While the businessman in the commercial appears 
determined to make the journey home no matter how much money it takes, he 
might actually succumb to a cost-benefit analysis and give up going home in 
exchange for £1 million.
Whilst word ‘priceless’ suggests that there are things, which we cannot put a price on, 
it does appear that anything can have a price put upon it in the market. Is the 
distinction between the ‘priceable’ and the ‘priceless’ a mere social construction (i.e. 
merely a discursive matter)? Are both the ‘priceable’ and the ‘priceless’ merely 
metaphorical expressions (i.e. ‘as i f  priceable’ and ‘as i f  priceless’)? Can money buy 
anything and everything? Can anything and everything be exchanged for money?
The answers to these (and other) questions are hidden in the ontology of money: they 
can be answered by exploring the processes, especially discursive processes, in which 
money becomes a universal measure of value. This chapter explores the ways in 
which money becomes the universal measure of value through the dialectic process, 
by which agents transform incommensurable values of items and options into a 
commensurable form, damaging and distorting their original nature. Because this 
process requires a series of discursive processes, I refer to it as a process of 
‘discursive commensuration'.
This process of discursive commensuration is dialectical. Commensuration makes 
money at the same time as money makes commensuration possible:
• To say commensuration makes money means that something is constituted as 
money in the process of discursive commensuration. Money facilitates the 
quantification (i.e. transformation of quality into quantity) and standardisation (i.e. 
transformation of plural dimensions of value into a common scale) of the values of 
heterogeneous items that are exchanged. Quantification and standardisation are 
two aspects of commensuration that reside in money.
• To say money makes commensuration means that the very use of money 
necessarily involves us in the process of discursive commensuration. Once money 
is established and socially accepted as a means of measurement, it encourages
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(and misguides) us into quantifying and standardising the values of items being 
exchanged.
This chapter deals primarily with commensurability and incommensurability, that is, 
with phenomena that are usually considered to be the subject matter of quantitative 
kinds on analysis. Economists are familiar with issues such as ordinality and 
cardinality, measurement, price and value. But this chapter will go on to demonstrate 
that phenomena like commensurability and incommensurability have an inextricably 
qualitative, symbolic, and discursive dimension to them, and economists are 
completely unfamiliar with issues such as these. This chapter will not only show that 
money requires commensuration in order to be money, and that commensuration is a 
discursive process, but I will also use Critical Realist discourse analysis in order to 
show which discursive process are necessary and how they operate to make money.
This chapter poses and answers the following questions:
1. What is commensurability? First, it defines [in]commensurability as an existence 
[a lack] of measurement: two items (i.e. goods, services) or options (i.e. actions 
that an agent can both perform and have an opportunity to perform) are 
[incommensurable if they can[not] be measured. The measurement presupposes 
two kinds of measures (i.e. cardinal or ordinal) and scales (i.e. a single scale or 
plural scales). Accordingly, it defines the following four conceptual categories — 
i.e. ‘strong commensurability’, ‘weak commensurability’, ‘strong comparability’, 
and ‘weak comparability’.
2. Where is incommensurability? By this question, I mean, what is 
incommensurability between? Second, it distinguishes three sources of 
incommensurability involving money — i.e. between values, between money and 
certain social relations or value commitments, and between (theoretical discourses 
— i.e. between theories, meta-theories and/or paradigms. These three sources of 
incommensurability are stratified and irreducible to one another.
3. What is commensuration? Third, it explores the claim that commensuration is a 
social process by which agents transform incommensurable values into a 
commensurable form. It develops the two aspects just noted — i.e. quantification 
and standardisation.
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The fourth and fifth section turn to two writers whose work on money has, in many 
ways, unsurpassed by recent work, perhaps because they were prepared to engage in 
the ontology of money to an extent that almost no-one else has. That is, I draw on the 
work of Aristotle and Marx:
4. Aristotle: it is difficult to follow Aristotle’s arguments in NE V.5 because he 
argues ‘commensurability’ in several different respects. In order to reduce the 
difficulty, we reconsider the question (i.e. commensurability in what respect?).
5. Marx: we consider Marx’s three questions on money and commensuration in the 
chronological order he argued: What is the consequence of commensuration? How 
is commensuration possible? What constitutes commensurability? It is not often 
recognised, but Marx’s work paves the way to explore the discursive nature of 
commensuration.
6. How is commensuration a discursive process? It employs the Critical Realist 
perspective on discourse to explain exactly how and why commensuration is a 
discursive process. This will require a discussion of seven aspects — i.e. dialectics, 
discourses, genres, styles, evaluation, presupposition, and ideology.
2.1 W hat is commensurability?
Two items or options are commensurable if they can, and incommensurable if they 
cannot, be measured. Commensurability, then, rests on the existence of measurement. 
This raises the following two questions:
2.1.1 What kind of measure?
There are two different kinds of measures: cardinal or ordinal. We make a distinction 
between ‘commensurability’ (i.e. an existence of a cardinal measure) and 
‘comparability’ (i.e. an existence of an ordinal measure).17
A cardinal measure presupposes cardinal-value wherein we count degrees of value 
between options or items. Cardinal-value requires judgements like how much more 
valuable is this than that’. Values of options or items are precisely counted or 
‘audited’. Cardinal value requires a cardinal measure with which to count the
17 The term ‘incommensurability’ is often used as synonymous with the term ‘incomparability’ (Chang, 
1997, pp. 1-7). Incomparability is defined as a lack of ordinal measure: two items or options are 
incomparable if they cannot be compared.
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difference between different options or items (e.g. 10, 20, 30 etc.). For example, 20 
units of value are twice as valuable as 10 units degree.
An ordinal measure presupposes ordinal-value: It is an ordering of value between 
options or items. Ordinal-value can be judged like ‘this is more valuable than that’ 
without asking ‘how much more valuable’. Values of options or items are ranked and 
their gap so ranked are not counted or ‘audited.’ This presupposition leads us to 
require an ordinal measure — i.e. a measure that simply ranks the value different 
options or items offer (e.g. 1st 2nd and 3rd etc). For example, the first ranked value does 
not need to be twice as valuable as the second ranked one.
2.1.2 How many scales?
There are two cases for both commensurability and comparability: with a single scale 
or plural scales. We can make a distinction between ‘strong case’ and ‘weak case’.
A single scale presupposes value-monism wherein there exists only one intrinsically 
valuable property and that other values are reducible to this super-value. Different 
kinds of value are to be regarded as instances of just one super-value. Value monism 
requires a single scale or measurement with which to measure the ultimate value.
Plural scales presuppose value-pluralism wherein there exists a number of distinct 
values, such as autonomy, knowledge, justice, equality, beauty etc. which are neither 
reducible to each other nor to some ultimate value such as pleasure. Value-pluralism 
does not reduce plural dimensions of value into a single scale. Value pluralism 
requires plural scales or plural measurements with which to measure plural and 
irreducible values.
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Combinations of cardinal/ordinal measures and single/plural scales deduce the 






(Value-Monism) Strong Commensurability Strong Comparability
Plural Scales 
(V alue-Pluralism) Weak Commensurability Weak Comparability
‘Strong commensurability’ is the notion that all objects and states of affairs possess a 
particular single property, which is considered to be the source of their value, and that 
the amount or degree of that property can be evaluated by a cardinal measure.
‘Weak commensurability’ is the notion that objects and states of affairs possess a 
number of various properties, which are considered to be the source of their values, 
and that those properties can be evaluated by a cardinal measure.
‘Strong comparability’ is a notion that there exists a single comparative term in terms 
of which all objects or states of affairs can be compared. It takes a form of value 
judgement as follows: ‘A is more valuable than B’. The statement affirms that A is 
more valuable than B in a single scale.
‘Weak comparability’ is a notion that there exists plural comparative terms in terms of 
which objects or states of affairs can be compared. It takes a form of value judgement 
as follows: ‘A is more valuable than B in which scale'. The statement leaves a 
possibility that B is more valuable than A in other scales.™
18 The difference between strong and weak comparability can be explained in terms of Geach’s 
distinction between attributive and predicative adjectives (cf. O Neill, 1993, p. 105).
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2.2 Where is incommensurability?
There are three sources of incommensurability involving money: (1)
incommensurability between values,19 (2) ‘constitutive incommensurability’ between 
money and certain social relations or value commitments, and (3) incommensurability 
between (theoretical) discourses.20
2.2.1 Incommensurability between Values 
Incommensurability takes place between values — i.e. between the values of items or 
options. The term ‘value’ refers to the worth of a thing. It is used, typically, to 
describe the positive attributes of phenomena, and each positive expression has a 
corresponding negative meaning called ‘dis-value’ — e.g. prudential value (i.e. good 
or bad), moral value (i.e. right or wrong), logical value (i.e. true and false), aesthetic 
value (i.e. beauty and ugly), religious value (i.e. sacred and profane), economic value 
(i.e. expensive and cheap) and so on.
Some values have strong commensurability, which can be measured by a single and 
cardinal measurement. Others have only weak comparability, which can be measured 
by plural and ordinal measurements. According to Nagel (1987), value 
incommensurability arises from the following five fundamental types of value:
• Obligations', specific obligations, which arise from social relations or roles — e.g. 
obligations as father to one’s children, as husband to one’s wife, as a lecturer to 
one’s students, as a citizen to one’s community, as a nation to one’s country.
• Rights', general rights to do certain things — e.g. rights for vote, etc. — or not to 
be treated in certain ways — e.g. rights no to be exploited, tortured, assaulted etc.
• Utility: consideration of the effects (i.e. benefits or harms) of one’s action on the 
general welfare.
• Perfectionist Ends: the intrinsic value of certain achievements or creations — e.g. 
a scientific discovery, a work of art, a challenge for a world record etc.
• Private Commitments: commitments of one’s own projects or undertakings — e.g. 
climbing Everest, translating Aristotle’s Metaphysics, mastering Bach’s Chaconne.
19 Incommensurability between values is called ‘pluralistic incommensurability’ (D’Agostino, 2000, pp. 
429-31) or ‘value incommensurability’ (Richardson, 1994, pp. 250-70).
20 Incommensurability between theories is called ‘semantic incommensurability’ (D’Agostino, ibid.) or 
‘conceptual incommensurability’ (Richardson, ibid.).
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According to Nagel, these values are irreducible with each other because they have 
different sources. ‘I do not believe that the source of value is unitary — displaying 
apparent multiplicity only in its application to the world. I believe that value has 
fundamentally different kinds of sources, and that they are reflected in the 
classification of values into types. Not all values represent the pursuit of some single 
good in a variety of setting’ (Nagel, 1987, pp. 177-8).
Nagel goes on to claim that these values are motivated by two different perspectives: 
personal (i.e. agent-centred) and impersonal (i.e. outcome-centred) perspectives. On 
the one hand, values such as obligations, rights and private commitments are personal, 
because they have to do with the reasons for the agent to perform or restrain from 
certain actions. On the other hand, values such as utility and perfectionist ends are 
impersonal, because they have to do with the outcome of the action (i.e. the state of 
affairs), which is independent from the nature of action and the reason for it. ‘The two 
motives come from two different points of view, both important, but fundamentally 
irreducible to a common basis’ (ibid., p. 179). These perspectives are 
incommensurable: neither of these different perspectives can be abandoned, neither is 
reducible to the other, neither is reducible to a third perspective.
2.2.2 ‘Constitutive Incommensurability’
Incommensurability can take place between money and certain social relations or 
value commitments, which is called ‘constitutive incommensurability’ (cf. Anderson, 
1993, 1997; Chang, 1997, 2001; Raz, 1986). Suppose a huge amount of money is 
offered to us for ending our friendship with an intimate friend, or for leaving your 
homeland so that a dam can be built upon the land, the following two questions will 
presumably arise: (1) Are the values of friendship (or of love of one’s homeland) and 
of money commensurable? (2) Can (and should) we respond to such an offer by 
taking the money? While the first question also matters, it would be overwhelmed by 
the importance of answering the second question. Many would unhesitatingly accept a 
view that the value of friendship (or of love to homeland) can neither be expressed by 
nor exchanged for the value of money. It is not the case of whether the value of 
money can be judged as bigger or smaller than, or equal as, that of friendship (or of 
love to one’s homeland). It is rather fundamentally incompatible with the nature of
42
friendship (or o f love to one’s homeland) to compare with money as options for 
trading off. As for certain social relations, ‘[p]eople who say, ‘For me money is more 
important than friends’ are neither mistaken nor do they commit a wrong. They are 
simply incapable o f having friends’ (Raz, 1986, p. 353). Friends cease to be friends 
when they are treated as an option for money. That is, the incommensurability 
between money and certain social relations (e.g. family, parent-child, friend) is a 
constitutive feature o f those relationships (e.g. love, friendship). As for certain value 
commitments, in the same way, incommensurability between money and certain value 
commitments (e.g. to lands, forests, streams, fisheries, livelihood) is a constitutive 
feature of those evaluations (e.g. love, respect).
O ’Neill discusses constitutive incommensurability with one of the oldest ‘willingness 
to accept surveys’ in Herodotus’ Histories (O’Neill, 1997; 1998; 2001b): ‘When 
Darius was king o f the Persian empire, he summoned the Greeks who were at his 
court and asked them how much money it would take for them to eat the corpses of 
their fathers. They responded they would not do it for any price. Afterwards, Darius 
summoned some Indians called Kallatiai who do eat their parents and asked in the 
presence o f the Greeks ... for what price they would agree to cremate their dead 
fathers. They cried out loudly and told him to keep still (Herodotus, Histories, 3.38)’. 
The following two points can be read from this story: (1) there are various styles of 
funeral in the world. The Greeks cremate the corpses on the one hand, and the 
Kallatiai eat them on the other. However (2) it is universally refused to trade-off one’s 
dead father. Both the Greeks and the Kallatiai refuse to put a price on changing their 
style of funeral for their fathers. ‘There are certain social relations and evaluative 
commitments that are constituted by a refusal to put a price on them’ (O’Neill, 2001b, 
p. 1866). ‘Social loyalties, for example, to friends and to family, are constituted by a 
refusal to treat them as commodities that can be bought or sold’.21
21 Whether there is constitutive incommensurability matters not only the individual choice but also the 
social policy: ‘When has the Russian government spent enough trying to save its sailors trapped in a 
sunken submarine? How should the Ford Motor Company evaluate competing designs for the Pinto if 
one design saves $100 million but involves a significantly higher probability o f lost lives? Is the wealth 
generated from strip mining the side o f a mountain comparable with the pristine beauty o f that 
mountain?’ If  free speech is constitutively incomparable with money, are objections to campaign 
finance laws based on appeals to the First Amendment misguided?’ (Chang, 2001, pp. 34-5).
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A modem case of constitutive incommensurability can be found in the film ‘Billy 
Elliot’. Billy’s father recognises Billy’s talents for dance, and wants him to take an 
audition for the Royal Ballet School. But he has no income due to the yearlong coal 
miners’ strike. His returning to work for paying Billy’s trip to the audition means 
betraying his fellow strikers. He himself has condemned such ‘traitors’ with other 
‘fellows’. Here is the first constitutive incommensurability, that is, between a wage 
and fellow strikers: the fellowship among striking coal miners is constituted by a 
refusal o f a manager’s offer to work for a low wage. A fellow ceases to be a fellow 
when he treats other fellows as an option for money. Nevertheless, Billy’s father plans 
to go back to work, because he needs the money for Billy, which would lead to him 
losing his fellows, for the very purpose of making Billy’s dream come true. Here is 
the second constitutive incommensurability, that is, between a financial condition and 
love for one’s own child: fatherhood is constituted by the father understanding and 
supporting his child without any conditions. A father ceases to be a real father when 
he makes his son give up his dream in order to avoid financial hardship. That is, 
Billy’s father is urged to choose either taking a role of a fellow striker or a real father. 
What makes this story fascinating is that his fellow strikers dissuade Billy’s father 
from going back to work, by raising the fare for Billy’s journey: the fellows prevent a 
fellow from ceasing to be a fellow. Besides, Billy’s father also raises money by 
putting his dead wife’s accessories in pawn.
2.2.3 Incommensurability between (theoretical) discourses 
There is a form of incommensurability that is not directly associated with the 
ontology of money, but with the epistemology of money —  and other things besides. 
The reason this is worth mentioning is because slippage between ontology and 
epistemology (the epistemic fallacy and the relativism this generates) which is a 
continual Post-structuralist threat, can cause ontological confusion and, in this case, 
about the ontology o f money. We might, because of this, end up confusing money and 
our theories o f money.
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The form of incommensurability I have in mind here is that which can take place 
between competing theories.22 Tomass (2001), for example, observes the possibility 
of incommensurability between rival monetary theories by Mises and Marx. He 
postulates three elements, which may constitute economic paradigms and thereby 
incommensurability between the rival monetary theories: different starting points, 
different methodological procedures and different conceptual schemes. Tomass starts 
by assuming that incommensurability exists between those rival monetary theories. 
Contrary to his own starting assumption, however, Tomass concludes that rival 
monetary theories are commensurable on the grounds of their logical compatibility, 
that is that they can stand in relations of logical consistency or inconsistency.
Understanding this (theoretical) incommensurability and, thereby, avoiding the 
epistemic fallacy, requires that we break relativism into two different kinds — 
epistemic and judgemental relativism.
Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism
Epistemic relativism is the view that the world can only be known in terms of 
available descriptions or discourses. The way we conceptualise the world, reflects our 
epistemic standpoint(s). There is no independent access to the world. We have no 
choice but to confront the world via our conceptual apparatus. This means, of course, 
that all accounts, theories, models, descriptions, explanations and so on, are theory­
laden, or as Fleetwood (2005) calls them, conceptually mediated. And accounts o f 
money are no different. To say that an account of money is conceptually mediated, or 
to say that we can only know money in terms of some account or other, is not to say 
that money is simply an epiphenomena of this theory or these accounts. There are 
many ways of saying this, so allow me to say it in several ways to avoid any 
confusion. Whilst an account o f money is a social construct it is not a mere social 
construct. Whilst an account of money is conceptually mediated, it is not simply an 
epiphenomenon of our concepts, it is irreducible to our concepts. That is, some entity, 
some referent remains as money and now, alongside it as it were, the fact that we have
22 Incommensurability between theories may arise from other facts (Richardson, 1994, p. 260): (a) a 
priori nature o f knowledge: much of what is learned is seemingly a priori or definitional. What is a 
priori or definitional may serve as a criterion of correctness for the elaboration of other parts o f one’s 
view, (b) Different cognitive ends: Values that go into defining what is taken as theoretical success,
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a concept with which to deal conceptually with it. Fleetwood (2005) would say money 
is an example of a ‘socially real’ entity —  i.e. it is not materially, artefactually, nor 
conceptually real. It is possible to say different theories of money are 
incommensurable, because they are epistemically relative. But let us be clear, the 
charge of (theoretical) incommensurability goes further than this. Let us see how far, 
and whether or not we need to go this far. There might be incommensurability 
between different accounts of money in the sense that all accounts o f money (or 
whatever) are conceptually mediated. Although money can only be known in terms of 
some accounts of money, this does not mean money is simply an epiphenomenon of 
these accounts, a mere social construct. Money remains as a common referent. 
Epistemic relativism simply makes the claim that what we see is coloured by our 
standpoint. It makes no claims about judging.
Incommensurability and Judgmental Relativism
Judgmental Relativism is the view that, because of epistemic relativism, one cannot 
judge between different accounts and decide whether or not some accounts are better 
than the others. And accounts of money are no different. But here we see the 
ontological slippage at work. Underlying judgmental relativism is an ontological 
commitment. When advocates of judgemental relativism say an account of money is 
conceptually mediated, or say that we can only know money in terms of some account 
or other, the clear implication here is that money is simply an epiphenomena of this 
theory or these accounts. Money is a mere social construct; it is reducible to our 
concepts. That is, there is no entity, no referent that remains as money. All we have 
are competing accounts o f money. In this case, we cannot compare our account of 
money to money itself, because the account socially constructs money. With no 
referent against which to compare pour account, all we can do is compare accounts to 
one another. Clearly, from this ontological position, judgmental relativism is 
unavoidable. It is possible to say different accounts of money are incommensurable, 
because they are judgementally relative. But here is the snag. Judgemental relativism 
is avoidable because the ontology upon which it rests is avoidable. Judgemental 
relativism is avoidable provided we are willing to keep a distinction between our 
account of the world, and the world itself; between our account of money, and money
corresponds to cognitive ends [values], including those of the scientists, such as simplicity, elegance,
46
itself. To deny this distinction is to accept some form of subjective idealism, to accept 
that our thinking, theorising, talking or whatever, about the world makes the world. I 
suggest that almost no-one does hold this position, not even Post-structuralists. The 
reason many Post-structuralists end up ensnared by judgemental relativism is because 
they are ontologically ambiguous.
In sum, then, Critical Realists accept epistemic relativism without having to go the 
extra step and accepting judgemental reason. That said, there is nothing in my claim 
that suggests judging between competing accounts or theories is easy. To be sure, it is 
often exceptionally difficult: but it is not an impossible task. Thus, this thesis accepts 
epistemic relativism, but does not accept judgmental relativism: it accepts 
incommensurability between theoretical discourses only in respect of epistemic 
relativism.23
There is incommensurability between different theoretical discourses on money (e.g. 
neo-classical, Keynesian, Monetarist, Marxist, Austrian) in a sense that money is 
conceptually mediated: money can only be known in terms of some accounts of 
money, whilst there is money as a common referent. (Crude) idealists or subjectivists 
in the Post-structuralist camp, however, claim that there is no such thing as money as 
a common referent, but our different accounts, stories and theories of money. From 
this viewpoint, discourse is always everywhere as our creative force, with whomever 
it is involved, theorists or money users. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
incommensurability between values and ‘constitutive incommensurability’, argued 
above, could neither be derived from nor reduced to incommensurability between 
(theoretical) discourses.24 The former forms of incommensurability are not a result of 
our different accounts, stories and theories of money and incommensurability: it is not
fruitfulness in engendering hypothesis, and explanatory value.
23 There is an interesting twist in my standpoint. I take a ‘commensurabilist’ standpoint for theoretical 
discourses. From a viewpoint of epistemic relativism without accepting judgmental relativism, I 
defends the logical compatibility of different theories on money: rival monetary theories are 
commensurable on the grounds o f their logical compatibility. In contrast, however, I take an 
‘incommensurabilist’ standpoint for certain social relations and value commitments. I believe in the 
existence of constitutively incommensurable items and options, which are constituted by a refusal to 
put a price on them. See 3.2 for further arguments on constitutive incommensurability.
This argument is related to discourse, which will be argued later on. This thesis argues against 
reductionism between two dimensions of discourse: incommensurability as discourse (i.e. intransitive 
dimension) can neither be derived from nor reduced into discourse about incommensurability (i.e. 
transitive dimension).
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the case that there is money and incommensurability because they are regarded as
2.3 What is commensuration?
Commensuration is a social process by which agents transform values of items and 
options into a commensurable form.26 ‘Commensuration transforms qualities into 
quantities, qualitative difference into magnitude. It is a way to reduce and simplify 
disparate information into numbers that can be easily be compared. This 
transformation allows people to quickly grasp, represent, and compare differences’ 
(Espeland and Stevens, 1998, p. 316). Corresponding to the basic concepts defined 
earlier on, commensuration has the following two aspects:
2.3.1 Quantification
Commensuration is a transformation of quality into quantity. To quantify is to 
assimilate incommensurable values into cardinal-value. It is to precisely audit the 
magnitude of the value of options or items. Quantification can distort ordinal values 
(e.g. 1st 2nd and 3rd) or even uncountable values into cardinal values (e.g. 10, 20 and 
30).
2.3.2 Standardisation
Commensuration is a transformation of plural dimensions of value into a common 
scale. To standardise is to assimilate incommensurable values into value-monism’ to 
reduce all values into a single ultimate value (i.e. an intrinsically valuable property).
That is, commensuration reduces weak commensurability and strong and weak 
comparability into strong commensurability: it reduces ordinal values to cardinal 
value, plural values into a single ultimate value, as follows:
25 See 3.4.2 for Posner’s arguments on ‘incommensurable claim’ as an example where (theoretical) 
incommensurability leads to confusion.
26 The following cases can be considered: (i) agents may translate things and activities with value 
incommensurability into a commensurable form: (ii) agents may translate things and activities, which 
are constitutively incommensurable into a commensurable form. Commensuration in both cases can 


















Now, how is commensuration possible? How is it possible to transform quality into 
quantity, and irreducible values into a common scale? What is the consequence of 
commensuration? Who does it? These questions, in the context of monetary 
phenomena, are prefigured by Aristotle, and answered by Marx.
2.4 Aristotle
Aristotle’s view on money and commensurability can be found in his argument on 
justice in Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Chapter 5. As Meikle notes, Aristotle’s 
arguments in NE V.5. are confusing, firstly because he has so many questions and so 
few answers27, and secondly because he does not clearly or explicitly distinguish all 
the questions in his mind (Meikle, 1995, p. 39). Meikle indicates that Aristotle’s 
argument involves the following four problems (ibid., p. 32, italics added):
• Explaining the equalizing, or making equal, o f the proportions in which things are 
exchanged so that the condition o f fairness is met, namely equality of proportion.
• Explaining the commensurability, which is logically presupposes by that equality.
• Explaining the measure and the unit used in quantifying the commensurable 
dimension, which is shared by products.
• Explaining the holding-together of divided labours within associations for 
exchange and within the association of the polis.
27 ‘Aristotle wants to know (1) How do you get fairness and equality into exchange? (2) What is 
equalized in fair exchange? (3) What is commensurable between products? (4) How is the magnitude 
of the commensurating property measured? (5) What is the unit of measure? (6) What holds exchangers 
together? and (7) what holds the polis together?’ (Meikle, 1995, p. 39)
49
Besides, Kaye (1998, pp. 40-52) categorises five aspects of money argued in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
• Money as an instrument o f geometric balance
• Money as a means for just exchange and equality
• Money as an instrument of relation and commensuration
• Money as a practical instrument for price determination
• Money as a part of a dynamic process of commensuration and equalisation.
Developing Meikle’s and Kaye’s indication, I detect the difficultly to follow 
Aristotle’s arguments in NE V.5 from the fact that he argues ‘a measure’ in several 
senses, and correspondingly argues ‘commensurability’ in several different respects: 
different senses of ‘a measure’ correspond to different respects of commensurability. 
In order to reduce the difficulty, let us keep the question in our mind (i.e. 
commensurability in what respect?) and read some crucial parts on money and 
commensuration in NE V.5:
• Commensurability in respect o f  proportionate balance (i.e. geometric 
proportionality)’, in this respect, a measure is a balance — i.e. a ratio between 
objects. The measure compares relative amounts of the homogeneous property 
with one another.
• Commensurability in respect o f  a common dimension: in this respect, a measure is 
a scale —  i.e. a common dimension of homogeneous property (e.g. length, 
weight). The Measure presupposes a common dimension of homogeneous 
property.
• Commensurability in respect o f  quantitative equality (i.e. arithmetic equality): in 
this respect, a measure is a numeraire — i.e. a nominal unit of account. The 
measure counts magnitudes (i.e. absolute amounts) of the homogeneous property 
in a numerical unit.
• Commensurability in respect o f  practical equality: in this respect, a measure is a 
measuring rod —  i.e. an actual device to measure. The measure calibrates degrees 
o f the homogeneous property.
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• Commensurability in respect o f  a common standard: in this respect, a measure is a 
standard —  i.e. a model of criterion. The measure holds objects together in a 
single unit.
2.4.1 Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Chapter 5
(1) When people associate with one another for the purpose of exchange, 
however, this kind of justice — reciprocity in accordance with proportion, not 
equality —  is what binds them together, (2) since a city is kept together by 
proportionate reciprocation. (3) For people seek to return either evil for evil — 
otherwise they feel like slaves — or good for good — (4) otherwise no 
exchange takes place and it is exchange that holds them together (1132b-l 133a). 
(Aristotle, 2000, p. 89)
This part argues on commensurability in respect o f  proportionate balance (i.e. 
geometric proportion): (1) suggests that reciprocal justice with proportionate balance 
instead o f  arithmetic equality binds people together by proportionate reciprocation.28
(2), (3) and (4) suggest that proportionate reciprocation is held for people’s moral 
association: people can only be associated and tied together in their community in a 
city by proportionate reciprocation. Reciprocity is our moral law: ‘[t]his is the special 
characteristic o f grace, because one ought both to perform a return service to someone 
who has been gracious, and another time to make the first move by being gracious 
oneself (1133a) ’ {ibid., p. 89). Thus, Aristotle’s original problem is in a form of ought- 
question: what constitutes a fa ir  exchange? He answers himself that proportionate 
balance sufficiently constitutes a fair exchange: arithmetic equality is not required for 
a fair exchange.
(a) It is not two doctors who associate for exchange, but rather a doctor and a 
farmer, and, in general, people who are different and unequal, and must be made 
equal, (b) This is why everything that is exchanged must be in some way 
commensurable, (c) This is where money comes in; it functions as a kind of 
mean, since it is a measure of everything, including, therefore, excess and
28 See 5.1 for further arguments on an Aristotle account o f reciprocity.
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deficiency, (d) It can tell us, for example, how many shoes are equal to a house 
or some food, (e) Then, as builder is to shoemaker, so must the number of shoes 
be to a house, (f) For without this, there can be no exchange and no association; 
and (g) it will not come about unless the products are in some sense equal, (h) 
Everything, then, must be measured by some one standard, as we said before, (i) 
This standard is in fact demand, which holds everything together; (j) for if  
people needed nothing, or needed things to different degrees, either there would 
be no exchange or it would not be the same as it now is. (k) But by social 
convention money has come to serve as a representative of demand. (1) And this 
is why money is called nomisma, because it exists not by nature but by 
convention (nomos), and it is in our power to change its value and to render it 
worthless (1133a). (ibid., p. 90)
For (a) equality between people, things must be (b) commensurable in respect o f  a 
common dimension. It is where money functions (c) as the universal measure of value. 
Then, (d), (e) and (f) suggest commensurability in respect o f  proportionate balance: 
they suggest that there are two levels of proportion —  i.e. the proportion between 
products and that between producers. The proportion between the shoemaker’s 
product and the farmer’s one must be consistent with that between the shoemaker and 
the farmer. Money can tell the proportion between products, which is reflected by the 
proportion between people. There is neither exchange nor people’s association, (f) 
without this proportional relationship, and without (g) equality between products. 
Then, (h), (i) and (j) suggest commensurability in respect o f  a common standard: the 
demand (chreia) is a standard measure, which holds everything together. Aristotle 
neither connects chreia with commensurability in respect o f  a common dimension nor 
that in respect o f  proportionate balance’, chreia neither is a homogeneous property, 
which makes a common dimension between products, nor has a ratio between 
products. Then, (k) and (1) suggest that commensurability in respect o f a common 
standard shifts to commensurability in respect o f practical equality: while chreia 
holds everything together, it lacks an actual device to measure until a measuring rod 
provides one. Thus, chreia is conventionally represented by money as a measuring 
rod.
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®  So money makes things commensurable as a measure does, and equates 
them; ®  for without exchange there would be no association between people, 
®  without equality no exchange, and ©  without commensurability no equality. 
©  It is impossible that things differing to such a degree should become truly 
commensurable, but in relation to demand they can become commensurable 
enough. ©  So there must be some one standard, and it must be on an agreed 
basis —  which is why money is called nomisma. ©  Money makes all things 
commensurable, since everything is measured by money. ®  Let A be a house, 
B ten minae, C bed. A is half of B, if  the house is worth, or equal to, five minae; 
and C, the bed, is worth one tenth of B. It is obvious, then, how many beds are 
equivalent to a house, namely, five. This is clearly how exchange took place 
before the existence o f money, since it makes no difference whether you pay 
five beds for a house, or the value of five beds (1133b). (ibid., p. 91)
®  suggests commensurability in respect o f  a common standard —  i.e. money as the 
universal measure o f value holds things together. It does not refer to 
commensurability in respect o f  a common dimension, because commensurability as a 
common dimension is not what a measure makes but what a measure presupposes. ® ,  
®  and ©  trace the chain o f  presuppositions (i.e. people’s association presupposes 
exchange, which presupposes equality, which presupposes commensurability). ®  
suggests commensurability in respect o f  proportionate balance, because people’s 
association sufficiently requires proportionate balance. The word ‘equality’ in ®  is 
ambiguous: it may refer to either ‘equality between products’ or ‘equality between 
people’. Commensurability in © , which can be made by equality, is the one in 
respect o f  a common standard. ©  suggests the contrast between commensurability in 
respect o f  a common dimension and that in respect o f  a common standard —  i.e. the 
contrast between that ‘different things become truly commensurable’, and that ‘things 
become commensurable enough in relation to demand’. Then ©  suggests 
commensurability in respect o f  a common standard. ©  is as same as ® : money as the 
universal measure o f value holds things together. Then ©  suggests commensurability 
in respect o f quantitative equality. While things can be commensurable in relation to
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chreia, it lacks a unit o f account until a numeraire provides one. Thus, chreia is 
conventionally represented by money as a numeraire.
2.4.2 ‘Marxist Aristotle’ and Aristotelian Marx 
According to Meikle, Aristotle’s thought on money is fertile but contradictory, since 
he tries a number of ‘moves’ in his thought: first, he tries to establish that money is a 
common standard o f measurement which itself constitutes commensurability and 
makes the equalisation of goods possible (Meikle, 1995, pp. 21-7). This move is, 
however, inadequate, because: (i) a measure requires to have the same property which 
it measures, like a measure of spatial magnitudes has a spatial magnitude; and (ii) a 
measure cannot itself create the same property, just as a measure of length does not 
create, but presupposes spatial extension. On the contrary to his first move, therefore, 
the possibility of measure presupposes some shared property, which makes 
incommensurable things commensurable. Aristotle gives up his first move, and tries 
another one by separating the means of measurement (money) from chreia (i.e. the 
need or demand) for commensurability. He thinks that money is a conventional 
representation of chreia. This chreia holds everything together in exchange, and it has 
come to be conventionally represented as money. His second move still has a problem, 
since he cannot link chreia with commensurability. Although chreia holds people 
together in association for exchange, and thereby holds everything together in 
exchange, it is explained as a condition of the people exchanging them, and not a 
property o f the things. He actually seeks a property, which all things have in common 
in order to explain how they are commensurable. He tries two properties; that of being 
expressible in money, and that of being object o f need. But he finally rejects them and 
concludes that there can be no such property (Meikle, 1995, p. 134).
Meikle claims that most of NE V.5. ‘is devoted to seeking a property that all products 
have in common, in order to explain how things are commensurable ... He tries two 
properties: that of ‘being expressible in money’, and that of ‘being object of the need’. 
But he rejects them and concludes that ‘in truth’ there can be no such property 
(1133bl 8-20). The property o f ‘being a product of labour’ does not occur to him, in 
spite of the fact that the things in question are artefacts’ (Meikle, 1995, p. 134) Marx 
indicates that this ‘failing’ lies in the fact that Aristotle, and Greeks in general, lack a 
notion of labour:
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Aristotle therefore himself tells us what prevented any further analysis: the lack 
of a concept o f value. What is the homogeneous element, i.e. the common 
substance, which the house represents from the point of view of the bed, in the 
value expression for the bed? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. 
But why not? Towards the bed, the house represents something equal, in so far as 
it represents what is really equal, both in the bed and the house. And that is — 
human labour. (Marx, 1976 [1867], p. 151)
Marx’s readings of Aristotle in NE V.5. tend to lay emphasis on commensurability in 
respect o f  a common dimension, to which commensurability in other respects can be 
boiled down. It is wrong, however, to ascribe Marx’s question of what constitutes 
commensurability to Aristotle. It is not the case that Aristotle ‘fails’ to discover 
human labour as the homogeneous element (i.e. the common substance) of products. 
He is not interested in finding out the exact property to constitute commensurability. 
He is rather interested in the way in which one respect of commensurability 
supplements another (e.g. chreia as a standard measure is conventionally represented 
by money as a numeraire) and in tracing the chain o f  presuppositions (i.e. people’s 
association presupposes exchange, which presupposes equality, which presupposes 
commensurability). Unlike Meikle’s claim, moreover, Aristotle does not devote 
himself to seeking a property that all products have in common in order to explain
9Qhow things are commensurable, in most of NE V.5, either. As Meikle himself 
suspects, ‘[p]erhaps Aristotle was not after all asking the question (A), how different 
products can be strictly commensurable in the first place, or was not making it the 
primary objective of his inquiry. Perhaps he was asking another question altogether 
(B), how, or from what point of view, products can be treated as commensurable 
enough to allow exchange and the holding-together of the polis’ (ibid., pp. 36-7). In 
other words, Aristotle does not fully seek what constitutes ‘strict commensurability’, 
but asks what constitutes ‘sufficient commensurability’. It may be enough for him to 
consider about commensurability in respect of proportionate balance for answering
29 Meikle himself indicates that Aristotle wants to answer in this short chapter the following questions: 
(1) How do you get fairness and equality into exchange? (2) What is equalized in fair exchange? (3) 
What is commensurable between products? (4) How is the magnitude of the commensurating property 
measured? (5) What is the unit o f measure? (6) What holds exchangers together? and (7) what holds 
the polis together? (Meikle, 1995, p. 39)
55
his original ought-question: what constitutes a fa ir  exchange? To summarise, 
therefore, the difficulty of understanding Aristotle’s thought on money and 
commensurability derives from the fact that he moves among several different 
respects of commensurability, shifting his questioning from one to another. 
Nevertheless, it is a very fertile difficulty since it reminds us that money involves 
multiple respects of commensurability.
2.5 Marx
The shift o f questioning can also be found in Marx: he is keen on the normative 
arguments (i.e. what is the consequence of commensuration?) in his early works (e.g. 
The Manuscript, The German Ideology). However, he shifts his questioning into the 
factual arguments (i.e. how is commensuration possible) in his middle work (e.g. 
Grundrisse), and then, he is devoted into the metaphysical arguments (i.e. what 
constitutes commensurability) in his late works (e.g. Capital).
2.5.1 What is the Consequence o f Commensuration?
Marx use analogies (e.g. a love analogy, a language analogy) in order to explain how 
commensuration distorts the nature o f what is exchanged and of identities o f those 
who exchange:
If we assume man to be a man, and his relation to the world to be a human one, 
then love can be exchanged only for love, trust for trust, and so on. ... Each one 
of your relation to man —  and the nature —  must be a particular expression, 
corresponding to the object o f your will, o f your real individual life. If you love 
unrequitedly, i.e. if  you love as love does not call forth love in return, if  through 
the vital expression o f your self as a loving person you fail to become a loved 
person , then your love is impotent, it is misfortune. (Marx, 1975 [1844], p. 379)
The love analogy suggests that the particularity o f  certain human relationships and 
activities, like love, would disappear as a consequence o f  commensuration. Love can 
be exchanged particularly for love. Each love is particular. That is, love can only be 
exchanged for love only between certain people: one can only be in love with a 
particular type o f person. Unlike love, money is exchanged not only for a particular 
thing or person, but for everything. ‘[M]oney exchanges every quality for every other
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quality ... ; it is the power which brings together impossibilities and forces 
contradictions to embrace’ (ibid.). In other words, love can be exchanged for nothing 
else but love. If love is exchanged for money, love ceases to be love. There is 
constitutive incommensurability between love and money: the limited exchangeability 
(i.e. love can be exchanged only for love) is constitutive of the nature of what is 
exchanged (i.e. love). The ontology of money, however, exposes the constitutive 
incommensurability within human relationships and activities:
The exchangeability of all products, activities and relations with a third, 
objective entity which can be re-exchanged for everything without distinction — 
that is, the development of exchange values (and of money relations) is identical 
with universal venality, corruption. Universal prostitution appears to as a 
necessary phase in the development of the social character of personal talents, 
capacities, abilities, activities. More politely expressed: the universal relation of 
utility and use. (Marx, 1973 [1857-8], p. 163)
When love is exchanged for everything ‘without distinction’, love is corrupted into 
‘universal prostitution’. Because love loses its limited exchangeability, its 
particularity disappears: when love is exchanged for love in terms of utility, it is not 
particular any more, but rather a general expression of utility relation, and therefore, 
love ceases to be love. It is, as if, in the way in which a particular expression is 
translated into a general expression:
[A]ll the activity o f individuals in their manual intercourse, e.g. speech, love etc., 
is depicted as a relation of utility and utilisation. Hence the actual relations that 
are presupposed here are speech, love, the definite manifestations of definite 
qualities of individuals. Now these relations are supposed not to have the 
meaning peculiar to them but to be the expression and manifestation o f some 
third relation introduced in their place, the relation o f  utility or utilisation. 
(Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845-6], p. 110)
The manual, actual and definite intercourse is depicted as the metaphysical, abstract 
and indefinite intercourse of utility. Now, whilst Marx, especially in Capital, is clearly 
concerned with the material aspect of money, with showing how one commodity
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(gold) becomes the universal equivalent, he is aware of the symbolic aspect o f money 
too. Granted he does not elaborate on the symbolic side to the extent he elaborates on 
the material side, but actually, the material aspect only makes sense if there is also a 
symbolic side. Whilst Marx, clearly, did not use the term ‘discourse’, he presupposed 
something like it. Let us consider how Marx treats the symbolic, discursive aspects of 
money as well as the material aspects. The following language analogies imply that 
the role o f discourse is not lost on Marx: ‘This paraphrasing ceases to be meaningless 
and arbitrary only when these relations have validity for the individuals not on their 
own account, not as self-activity, but rather as disguises, though by no means 
disguises o f the category o f utilisation, but of an actual third aim and relation which is 
called the relation of utility’ {ibid.). ‘The verbal masquerade only has meaning when 
it is the unconscious or deliberate expression of an actual masquerade’ {ibid., italics 
added). These expressions (e.g. paraphrasing, the verbal masquerade) indicate that 
commensuration requires language, signs, or, for brevity, discourse. We will 
scrutinise the discursive nature of commensuration in the next section.
2.5.2 How is Commensuration Possible?
A chapter on money in the Grundrisse (Marx, 1973 [1857-8], espec. pp. 142-5) 
answers the second question —  i.e. how is commensuration possible? He shows the 
way in which qualitatively different things (i.e. commodities) are conceptually 
equated, the equation is replaced by another qualitative element and it transforms into 
social symbol (i.e. money) in actual exchange:
In order to determine what amount o f bread I need in order to exchange it for a 
yard o f linen, I first equate the yard of linen with its exchange value, i.e. = Mx 
hours of labour time. Similarly, I equate the pound of bread with its exchange 
value, = Mx or 2/x hours of labour time. I equate each of the commodities with a 
third; i.e. not with themselves. This third, which differs from them both, exists 
initially only in the head, as a conception, since it expresses a relation; ju st as, 
in general, relations can be established as existing only by being thought, as 
distinct from  the subjects which are in these relations with each other. In 
becoming an exchange value, a product (or a activity) is not only transformed 
into a definite quantitative relation, a relative number -  that is, a number which 
expresses the quantity o f  other commodities which equal it, which are its
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equivalent, or the relation in which it is their equivalent -  but it must also at the 
same time be transformed qualitatively, be transformed into another element, so 
that both commodities become magnitudes o f  the same kind, o f  the same unit, i.e. 
commensurable (ibid., p. 143, emphasis added).
Before being exchanged for one another in reality, two qualitatively different things 
(e.g. bread and linen) are ‘appraised in thought’, that is abstractly and imaginatively. 
In other words, they are brought into a given numerical relation to one another. The 
Qualities of two things is transformed into a quantity, a relative number (i.e. a number 
which expresses the quantitative equivalence). They are transformed into the third 
stuff ‘on p a p er ' ‘in the head’ or ‘in speech’: it has a merely imaginary existence.
This bringing of different things (i.e. use-values) into a numerical relation 
presupposes that they are in the same dimension of homogeneous property (i.e. 
products of labouring activity) called value, and that they obtain the same 
denomination or unit (i.e. labour time) called exchange value. That is, two 
qualitatively different things (i.e. use-values) are transformed into an expression of 
labour time (i.e. exchange-value) in order to be compared as a certain magnitude of 
labour with other magnitudes o f labour. On the one hand, this transformation makes it 
possible to compare qualitatively different things and it proceeds by mere abstraction. 
But actual exchange, on the other hand, requires a measuring rod (i.e. an actual device 
to measure) that represents labour time (i.e. exchange-value) as such: a real exchange 
process requires a real mediation and, therefore, an actual means to accomplish the 
abstraction. Thus, the abstraction is transformed into, or takes the form of ‘a third 
thing,’ namely another qualitative element: it is objectified, symbolised, or realised in 
a symbol. And this symbol is money.
Now, the two qualitatively different things are commodities. The third thing that 
expresses a social relation between them is also a commodity. But the latter 
commodity is a special one: it is the commodity that is to become money. The money 
commodity has ‘a double existence’: On the one hand, it is material —  it is a 
qualitative, natural and physical entity produced by some labouring activities. On the 
other hand, it is symbolic —  it is a quantitative, social and abstract entities. When we 
interact with an ordinary commodity, we focus on its material properties, because
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these properties are why we want it in the first place.30 When we focus on the money 
commodity, by contrast, we focus on its symbolic properties. When we focus, say, on 
a 100 yen note, we do not focus on the paper and the ink: we focus on the symbolic 
side that this paper and ink symbolises, stands for, represents, expresses, something 
that is non-material. It stands for value.
As we have seen, commensurability between qualitatively different things is 
presupposed: it is presupposed that qualitatively different things are in the same 
dimension of homogeneous property, that they obtain the same unit o f quantitative 
magnitude. Besides, this presupposition is accomplished by a measuring rod in actual 
exchange. This means that the agents involved with commodity exchange does not 
have to be aware of a fact o f commensurability. In Capital, Marx, again, tries the 
language analogy:
Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relation with each 
other as values because they see these objects merely as the material 
integuments of homogeneous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating 
their different products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their 
different kinds o f labour as human labour. They do this without being aware o f  
it. Value, therefore, does not have its description branded on its forehead; it 
rather transforms every product o f  labour into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, 
men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret o f  their own social 
product: fo r  the characteristic which objects o f  utility have o f  being values is as 
much m en’s social product as is their language (Marx, 1976 [1867], pp. 166-7, 
italics added).
In difficulties of recognising the existence o f value, and the homogeneous human 
labour that constitutes commensurability, commodity-owners think like Faust: ‘In the 
beginning was the deed, {ibid., p. 180)’ That is, they have already acted before 
thinking what it is. The social action of bringing their products into relation with other 
products as values presupposes the homogeneous property hidden behind 
qualitatively different products, which constitutes commensurability in respect of a
301 ignore here issues relating to do with symbolic commodities like Rolex watches and the like.
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common dimension. Then, after the deed performed without awareness of its real 
meaning, we can figure out what it implicitly meant. Marx metaphorically describes it 
as ‘deciphering a social hieroglyphic’.
To summarise, therefore, commensuration is possible by the existence o f  a 
homogeneous property. ‘The diversity o f the measures for commodities arises in part 
from  the diverse nature o f  the objects to be measured, and in part from convention ’ 
(ibid., pp. 125-6, italics added). On the one hand, commensurability is a social 
construction (i.e. discursive): it is presupposed by the social act o f equating different 
products. On the other hand, commensurability is not merely socially constructed, but 
also a practice or accomplishment (i.e. extra-discursive): it is neither created arbitrary 
nor out o f nothing, but is hidden behind qualitatively different products and is 
discovered.
2.5.3 What Constitutes Commensurability?
Marx uses analogies (e.g. a weight analogy and a geometrical analogy) in order to 
explain what constitutes commensurability between products in respect of a common 
dimension:
A sugar-loaf possesses weight, but we can neither take a look at this weight nor 
touch it. In order to express the sugar-loaf as a weight, we put it into a relation 
o f weight with the iron. In this relation, the iron counts as a body representing 
nothing but weight. Quantities of iron therefore serve to measure the weight of 
the sugar, and represent, in relation to the sugar-loaf, weight in its pure form, 
the form of manifestation of weight (ibid., pp. 148-9). If both objects lacked 
weight, they could not enter into this relation. ‘When we throw both o f them 
into the scale, and therefore that, taken in the appropriate proportions, they have 
the same weight (ibid.).
If we speak of the distance as a relation between two things, we presuppose 
something “intrinsic”, some “property” of the things themselves, which enables 
them to be distant from each other (Marx, 1972, p. 143). We suppose both of 
them to be contained in space, to be points o f space. Thus we equalise them as 
being both existences of space, and only after having them equalised sub specie
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spatii we distinguish them as different points o f space. To belong to space is 
their unity (ibid.). When we speak of the distance between A and B, we 
presuppose that they are points (or lines) in space. Having been reduced to 
points, and points of the same line, their distance may be expressed in inches, or 
feet, etc. The element the two commodities A and B have in common is, at first 
sight, their exchangeability. They are “exchangeable” objects. As 
“exchangeable” objects they are magnitudes of the same denomination. But this 
“their” existence as “exchangeable” objects must be different from their 
existence as values in use (ibid., p. 161).
Marx’s arguments refer to commensurability in respect of a common dimension. Two 
different things (i.e. sugar and iron, point A and B) are commensurable and 
‘exchangeable’ in terms o f a common dimension of homogeneous property (i.e. length, 
weight). Marx considers that the common element o f commodities, which ‘cannot be 
a geometrical, physical, chemical or other natural property o f commodities’ (Marx, 
1976 [1867], p. 127), but can be abstracted from their natural properties when they 
are exchanged, is labouring activity. Whilst many heterodox economists accept this 
argument, many have failed to really unpack what this entails. Many have failed to 
ask (let alone answer) the question: what kind of labouring activity? Fleetwood 
(2000) reminds us not only that commodities are different entities, but also that the 
labouring activities that produced them are different activities: gunsmithing is a 
completely different activity from tailoring. Hence guns and coats are, by their natures, 
incommensurable entities in the sense that they are products of individual, concrete 
and particular (henceforth ICP) labour. ICP labour cannot, therefore, be the common 
property and hence cannot render incommensurable entities commensurable. However, 
as well as being products of ICP labour, they are also products of social, abstract and 
universal (henceforth SAU) labour. They are produced by SAU labour in a sense that 
one undertaking of ICP labour is socially related to many other such undertakings via 
the commodities produced. The individual concrete and particular nature o f the 
various undertakings is abstracted via the market, and hence that ICP labour doubles 
into a unity o f itself and universal labour.
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Whilst ICP labour cannot render incommensurable entities commensurable, SAU 
labour can because it relates the labours of individual producers by abstracting from 
the concrete particularity of their labouring activities. SAU labour itself, however, has 
no material distinctiveness. It cannot manifest itself as empirically observable labour 
‘embodied’ in a commodity because only hours o f ICP labour are observable, and 
hence measurable. SAU labour is reflected in the bodily shape of a commodity. To 
summarise, therefore, what constitutes commensurability is SAU labour, which can 
be abstracted from ICP labour via the market. Commensurability between SAU labour 
products are transformed from incommensurability between ICP labour products 
through the following metaphysical process:
(1) As use-values, ICP labour products are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from one another. ICP labour cannot render incommensurable entities 
commensurable. There is no basis of commensurability between use-values.
(2) As values, SAU labour products are qualitatively identical with one another. SAU 
labour makes incommensurable entities commensurable, and transforms them into 
commodities.
(3) As exchange-values, commodities are quantitatively equal with each other. A 
commodity reflects a certain socially necessary magnitude o f SAU labour, which 
makes commodities not only commensurable, but also commensurate.
As we have seen, the SAU labour is presupposed by exchanging products: when we 
exchange products, we presuppose the SAU labour on a metaphysical ground as a 
homogeneous property to constitute commensurability between heterogeneous 
products. The metaphysical presupposition follows to the actual possibility of 
exchange. Whilst it may have come as a surprise that Marx’s account o f money and 
the commensuration of seemingly incommensurable entities, motivates us in the 
direction of discourse, this is nevertheless the case. The following section takes 
Marx’s account, and augments it with contemporary Critical Realism realist thinking 
on discourse. In brief, commensuration is a process o f social practices in their
31articulation with other non-discursive moments.
31 See 1.3 for a Critical Realist perspective on discourse.
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2.6 Commensuration as a Discursive Process
I suggested above that commensuration makes money, meaning that something is 
constituted as money in the (discursive) process of commensuration. It is time to 
introduce and elaborate upon this discursive process that makes money.
2.6.1 Dialectics
Let us start not only by considering commensuration as a dialectical process in which 
both extra-discursive and discursive elements internalise one another, but by doing so 
without collapsing these elements into each other. We noted above that the money 
commodity has ‘a double existence’: On the one hand, it is material or extra- 
discursive —  it is a qualitative, natural and physical entity produced by some 
labouring activities. On the other hand, it is symbolic or discursive —  it is a 
quantitative, social and abstract entities. As argued in chapter 1, moreover, Searle’s 
distinction between institutional and brute facts correspond to the distinction between 
extra-discursive and discursive: Brute facts/extra-discursive elements require the 
institution of language (i.e. discourse) to be stated or described, but they themselves 
exist independently from it. Institutional facts /discursive elements control and make 
brute facts/extra-discursive elements possible. Neither institutional facts/discursive 
elements nor brute facts/extra-discursive elements can be reduced to one another: they 
internalise one another without collapsing into each other. Although many kinds of 
things can be money, there has to be some material realisation: the institutional and 
discursive reality is built on top o f the brute and extra-discursive reality, irrespective 
of what this happens to be —  dog’s teeth, woodpecker’s scalp, gold, silver, a piece of 
paper or a bit on a computer disc.
2.6.2 Discourses
Recall that discourses are diverse ways o f  representing the social world. 
Commensuration necessitates discourses: it necessitates the representation of the 
social world as commensurable. Discourses involve a dialectic process o f discursive 
commensuration noted at the beginning —  i.e. commensuration as discourses makes 
money at the same time as money makes commensuration as discourses.
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To say commensuration makes money means that something is constituted as money 
in the (discursive) process of commensuration. Money facilitates the quantification 
(i.e. transformation of quality into quantity) and standardisation (i.e. transformation o f 
plural dimensions of value into a common scale) of the values of heterogeneous items 
that are exchanged. Quantification and standardisation are two aspects o f 
commensuration that reside in money. As a result of these two aspects of 
commensuration (i.e. quantification and standardisation), money is constituted as the 
universal measure of value. Now, commensuration as discourses makes money. 
Commensuration occurs when we represent the social world in terms of a cardinal 
measure, and a single scale. That is, when we represent qualitatively different things 
(i.e. use value) as quantitative products (i.e. exchange-value), and then represent these 
things with various kinds of values in terms of a single ultimate value (i.e. the SAU 
labour). As a result of these two aspects of commensuration (i.e. quantification and 
standardisation), money is constituted as the universal measure of value.
To say money makes commensuration means that the very use of money necessarily 
involves us in the (discursive) process of commensuration. Once money is established 
and socially accepted as a means of measurement, it encourages (and, as we will see 
in part two, misguides) us into quantifying and standardising the values o f the 
heterogeneous items being exchanged. Now, money makes commensuration as 
discourses. Money leads us to conceive of and speak of something as if  it were a 
commodity subject to market exchange. ‘Those who use money to value the world see 
it through more quantitative eyes. The ability to apply mathematical operations to 
value has clearly been understood as a considerable economic advantage (witness the 
number o f numerically based financial techniques that monetary valuation has 
generated). But it discounts, downplays, or even ignores those aspects of value that 
cannot be reduced to a single number’ (Carruthers and Espeland, 1998, p. 1401). 
Money leads us to quantify and standardise all sorts of values, and even to make them 
saleable by the ‘market rhetoric’ (Radin, 1996, p. 6).
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2.6.3 Genres
Recall that genres are diverse ways o f  acting upon the social world. Commensuration 
is a social activity. It is a way in which people act upon the social world. It is not only 
constative, but also performative: it not only describes the social world but also 
radically transforms the social world. ‘Commensuration changes the terms of what 
can be talked about, how we value, and how we treat what we value’ (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998, p. 315). Genres involve a dialectic process of discursive 
commensuration: Commensuration as a genre makes money: it creates new social 
categories (e.g. the commodity) and backs them with new social institutions (e.g. the 
market). In contrast, money makes commensuration as genres', it creates private 
categories (e.g. a business corporation) out of public entities (e.g. hospital, school, 
station), and establishes new interpretative frameworks (e.g. market liberalism). ‘The 
capacity to create relationships between virtually anything is extraordinary in that it 
simultaneously overcomes distance (by creating ties between things where none 
before had existed) and impose distance (by expressing value in such abstract, remote 
ways). In doing so, commensuration creates new things, new relations among 
disparate and remote things, and changes the meanings of old things’ {ibid., p. 324). 
As commensuration gets institutionalised, it becomes more taken for granted and 
more constitutive of what it measures.
2.6.4 Styles
Recall that styles are diverse ways o f  perceiving and articulating one’s own social 
role. Commensuration is a process through which identities are constructed. Styles 
involve a dialectic process o f discursive commensuration: Commensuration as a style 
makes money: money is constituted by perceiving and articulating our identities in 
terms o f a cardinal measure and of a common scale. Money is established as the 
universal measure of value as heterogeneous people are re-conceptualised as 
homogeneous producers, and as heterogeneous relations between people are re­
conceptualised as homogeneous relations between products. In contrast, money makes 
commensuration as a style: money leads us to perceive and articulate our identities in 
terms of a cardinal measure and of a common scale. It depersonalises ourselves: it re- 
conceptualises ourselves (only) in respect to their productivity and performance (i.e. 
how much we are productive, how many hours we work, etc.). It transforms a human 
being into a unit o f economic resource whose productivity and performance is to be
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quantitatively measured and enhanced. It also re-conceptualises our relations to others 
(only) in respect to our work. It transforms our various forms o f social relationships 
(e.g. doctor-patient, lecturer-student, transport operator-passenger, husband-wife, 
parent-child) into monetary relationships (e.g. seller-buyer, producer-consumer, 
supplier-demander).
2.6.5 Evaluation
Evaluation refers to the diverse ways o f  selecting or focusing on values by choosing a 
certain measure. Commensuration is a way in which people select commensurable 
values from incommensurable wholes, or focus on commensurable values from 
among otherwise incommensurable values, by choosing a certain measure and 
applying it to them. Evaluation involves a dialectic process of discursive 
commensuration: Commensuration as an evaluation makes money: money is 
constituted by selecting or focusing on the homogeneous property (i.e. the SAU 
labour) from heterogeneous products, which presupposes the capitalism served by the 
labour value. In contrast, money makes commensuration as an evaluation: money 
leads us to evaluate everything in terms of money. In a market society, all kinds of 
values are evaluated and exchanged in terms of money —  i.e. universal 
commodification. Even the performance o f agents is evaluated in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness —  i.e. value for money (VFM) audit. That is, money 
becomes a self-vindicating authority that influences and often changes the nature of 
the social activities being measured.
2.6.6 Presupposition
Presupposition refers to the diverse ways o f  regarding something as i f  it already exists 
and taking it fo r  granted in imagination. Commensuration is a way in which people 
regard something as if  it already exists and take it for granted in their imagination. 
Presupposition involves a dialectic process o f discursive commensuration: 
commensuration as a presupposition makes money: we presuppose the homogeneity 
between heterogeneous things through selecting commensurable values from 
incommensurable wholes. We presuppose that qualitatively different things obtain the 
same unit o f quantitative magnitude (i.e. quantification), and they are in the same 
dimension o f homogeneous property (i.e. standardisation), which constitutes money. 
In contrast, money makes commensuration as a presupposition’, money leads us to
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presuppose a certain standard, goal or purpose, which might be served by the imposed 
monetary values, such as economy, efficiency and effectiveness. ‘When we assume 
that the unity conferred by numbers, when the homogeneity among things appears to 
be a property o f the object rather than something produced by quantification, then we 
imagine we are simply counting or measuring something rather than commensurating 
disparate entities’ (Espeland and Stevens, 1998, pp. 316-7).
2.6.7 Ideology
Commensuration is not only technical but also political. Commensuration is 
technical: it simplifies our decision-making and makes it more mechanical. For 
instance, computer programmes calculate and identify alternative options or values 
that maximise our utility. They mechanically tell us what to do. Besides, 
commensuration is political: it is useful for ‘democratisation’. It is provoked by a 
desire to appear rational, limit discretion or conform to powerful expectation. It works 
to hide behind numbers, impose order or shore up weak authority. ‘Commensuration 
is political: It reconstructs relations of authority, creates new political entities, and 
establishes new interpretative frameworks’ (Espeland and Stevens, 1998, p. 323). On 
the one hand, commensuration as an ideology makes money: while commensuration 
appears to be quite a natural, neutral and merely technical process in which 
heterogeneous items are measured and exchanged, it can radically transform the world 
by creating new social categories (e.g. the commodity) and backing them with the 
weight o f powerful institutions (e.g. the market). On the other hand, money makes 
commensuration as an ideology: while the introduction of the market regime into the 
non-market sphere (e.g. commodification, privatisation of the public sectors) is quite a 
natural, neutral and merely technical process in which fee-free items are charged, it 
can radically transform the world by reconstructing public entities (e.g. hospital, 
school, station) into private ones (e.g. a business corporation) and establishing new 
interpretative frameworks (e.g. market liberalism).
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt primarily with commensurability and incommensurability, that 
is, with phenomena that are usually considered to be the subject matter of quantitative 
kinds on analysis. Economists are familiar with issues such as ordinality and 
cardinality, measurement, price and value. But this chapter has demonstrated that 
phenomena like commensurability and incommensurability have an inextricably 
qualitative, symbolic, and discursive dimension to them, and economists are 
completely unfamiliar with issues such as these. I have not only shown that money 
requires commensuration and that commensuration is a discursive process, but I have 
also used Critical Realist discourse analysis in order to show which discursive 
processes are necessary and how they operate to make money. The next chapter takes 
up the second moment o f the dialectic o f money and commensuration, namely, that 
money makes commensuration.
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CHAPTER 3: A MARKET BOUNDARY32
3.0 Introduction
Recall the MasterCard advertisement from the start of the last chapter, especially one 
of the copy-lines that states, ‘There are some things money can’t buy. For everything 
else, there’s MasterCard.’ Two contradictory presuppositions lie buried within these 
comments:
• ‘For everything else, there’s MasterCard’ suggests that there is an a priori 
boundary between what money can and cannot buy, or a separation between the 
marketable and the non-marketable items.
• ‘There are some things money can’t buy’ seems misplaced in the context of a 
market economy. Indeed, it also appears to be possible to invert the aphorism and 
say, ‘For MasterCard, there is everything else '. This suggests that we can create 
and/or transform things into what money can or cannot buy, and consequently, 
there is an a posteriori boundary.
This chapter makes use of the ontology developed within Critical Realist circles in 
order to accept those seemingly contradictory presuppositions. This chapter considers 
four issues:
1. It examines the issue of blocked exchanges. According to Walzer (1983) a blocked 
exchange involves ‘things which cannot and/or should not be traded for money’. 
Judith Andre (1995) extends the analysis by recognising two scenarios. First, there 
are things ‘that cannot be bought and sold’, referred to as an ‘empirical 
impossibility’. Second, there are things that ‘could be but ought not be bought and 
sold’ referred to as ‘normative undesirability’. Andre is skeptical that all these 
arguments can be synthesised by any single principle.
2. It considers ‘constitutive incommensurability (i.e. those social relations and value 
commitments, which are constituted by the refusal o f being priced)’ as a principle 
for a market boundary. It explores the claim that what cannot be traded off (i.e. the 
empirical impossibility) has implications for what ought not to be traded off (i.e.
32 Whilst there are plural kinds of market boundary (e.g. between civil society and political community, 
public and private lives), this chapter focuses on one kind of market boundary (i.e. a separation 
between the marketable and the non-marketable items).
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the normative undesirability). Because certain things cannot be traded off, they 
ought not to be traded off.
3. It considers a Critical Realist meta-theory as a perspective for exploring the 
ontology o f a market boundary. From a Critical Realist perspective, it explores the 
ways in which a market boundary is both an empirical fact and a social 
construction: things are either marketable or non-marketable on the grounds that 
they are partly brute facts (i.e. extra-discursive) and partly institutional facts (i.e. 
discursive). It also examines how the market and the non-market regimes can co­
exist, despite that the market sphere tends to either invade or corrupt into the non- 
market sphere in a certain context.
4. It tackles skepticism and criticism vis-a-vis the ontological status of a market 
boundary —  e.g. instrumental incommensurability claims (i.e. even if  they are 
incommensurable, it is best to assume they are not), strategic incommensurability 
claims (i.e. people rationally make incommensurability claims to obtain strategic 
advantages), incommensurability belief (i.e. friendship and money may be 
incomparable for you but comparable for me), and no-reason claims (i.e. there is 
no good reason to compare friendship to money, friendship cannot be compared to 
money, because it is reason-excluding).
These four points pave the way for arguing that a market boundary exists not only for 
us, but also in virtue of the nature both of money and of non-monetary goods —  i.e. it 
is both a social construction (i.e. discursive) and an empirical fact (i.e. extra- 
discursive).
3.1 Blocked Exchanges
Walzer regards ‘the sphere of money and commodity (i.e. the market sphere)’ as the 
most dangerous potential (and actual) coloniser in modem societies. He is, therefore, 
concerned with how the market’s colonising tendencies are, or could be, controlled. 
Central to his argument is the notion of a blocked exchange, which involves ‘things 
which cannot and/or should not be traded for money’. His effective device for market 
colonisation is a list o f fourteen ‘blocked exchanges’, which is intended to mark out 
the boundaries between market and non-market spheres, and to limit the market 
colonisation to other non-market spheres (Walzer, 1983, pp. 100-3):
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• human beings
• political power and influence
• judicial decisions and legal services
• basic liberties like freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly
• marriage and procreation rights
• emigration rights
• exemptions from military service, jury duty and other forms of communally 
imposed work
• political office and professional standing
• basic welfare services like police protection and primary and secondary education
• ‘desperate exchanges’ involved with hard and dangerous works
• prize and honours
• divine grace
• love and friendship
• criminal acts like murder and illegal things to possess like drugs and guns
Andre (1995) extends Walzer’s analysis by recognising two scenarios. First, there are 
things ‘that cannot be bought and sold’, referred to as an ‘empirical impossibility’. 
Second, there are things that ‘could be but ought not be bought and sold’ referred to as 
‘normative undesirability’. Andre is skeptical that all these arguments can be 
synthesised by any single principle. She also suggests there are three categories for 
each:33
33 Andre herself summarises her argument up to the following 8 questions: (1) the possibility of 
ownership: is it possible for this entity to be controlled by legal arrangement? (2) The morality o f 
ownership: is this the kind of thing, which may legitimately be controlled or be kept from others? The 
possibility o f alienation: can this thing be separated form the person whom it now attaches? (4) The 
morality of alienation: should it be possible for anyone to lose this? (5) The impact o f the market on 
what is exchanged: does the exchange of this thing for gain endanger or demean it? (6) The impact o f 
the market on buyer and seller: does the exchange o f this thing for gain exploit, engender, or demean 
anyone? (7) The way money shapes an interaction: everything priced is commensurable. (Can we retain 
an understanding of a child’s immeasurable worth if the child was purchased?) Money is unevenly 
distributed; accumulating it depends upon luck, work, and ability. (Should civic duties be distributed 
upon different criteria, perhaps equally?) (8) The fact that accepting money essentially changes some 
actions: Does allowing people to do this for the sake of money destroy something of value (democratic 
office, prizes, criminal justice) or replace a desirable institution with a less-desirable or bad one 
(prostitution)?
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3.1.1 What Cannot Be Sold 
Some things cannot be owned: ‘nothing can be sold unless someone has certain prior 
legal relationships to it’ (ibid., p. 174). Friendship and love, for example, cannot be 
owned, because their essences are spontaneous mutual appreciation, which cannot be 
guaranteed by the law. Divine grace cannot be owned, because by definition, no one 
can have legal rights to the pleasure of God or gifts from God. Nothing can be owned 
unless it is something over which laws can be effective. Affection and divine grace 
are not ownable because our having them is no subject to law. Furthermore, some 
public goods cannot be owned — e.g. the air we breath, the climate of trust in which 
we operate, quiet. Because they do not have right for exclusive use, they do not 
constitute ownership.
Some things cannot be alienated. Alienation can have different meanings: ‘something 
is alienable if  it can be disconnected from the person it is now connected with and yet 
go on existing. In this sense, we can alienate land —  transfer its ownership to 
someone else —  but not our memories'' (ibid., p. 178, italics added) Alienation can 
also mean simply to cease to have it, whether or not another acquires it. Honours, for 
instance, not only cannot be transferred to others but also cannot be lost: they can be 
refused, but once given and received the award cannot be cancelled by the recipient 
although they can be withdrawn by the committee when fraud is discovered.
Some things cannot be exchanged for gain (i.e. for money): some actions cannot be 
exchanged for gain, because ‘[t]he fact that accepting money essentially changes 
some actions’ (ibid., p. 192). When something is done for money, it is done for a 
different purpose than it otherwise is, and the change in purpose can change the nature 
o f action. Criminal justice cannot be exchanged for money because bribery is not just. 
Democratic office cannot be exchanged for money. When the person in office is 
chosen by the voters, the office is democratic, whereas when chosen by people with 
the most money, the office is not democratic. Prizes and honours cannot be exchanged 
for money, because if  exchanged, they become something else. If they could be 
bought, they would represent something else: the luck, particular effort, and specific 
abilities which give one wealth. When a prize is bought, it is not really a prize at all.
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3.1.2 What Could Be Sold, But Ought Not To Be Sold 
Some things ought not to be owned: firstly, human beings could be owned, but should 
not be owned. Many rights over people are regarded as property rights. Some arise 
from contract between employers and employees. Others arise from status between 
parents and children. Whilst people can use some power of the state to persuade 
others to act, those rights should not exist: ‘no one should fu lly  own —  have a 
complete legal right to dispose of —  any other human being’ {ibid., p. 177). Secondly, 
public goods could, but should not, be owned. Some public goods should be beyond 
private control, for reasons of efficiency, justice and community. They are 
preconditions o f community life (e.g. defence, roads); they preserve community 
resources (e.g. wetlands that protect bio-diversity, forests that maintain the ozone 
layer); they are necessities of individual life (e.g. food, water, shelter); and they are 
artistic and historical objects (e.g. a Rembrandt, the original Declaration of 
Independence). The individual ownership of these things must be limited or 
prohibited for the good o f the community.
Some things ought not to be alienated: we should not lose or transfer our own 
freedom (e.g. freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly), and right (e.g. rights 
to emigrate, to marry and to procreate) because ‘persons should be in some respects 
invincibly armoured against the state and other potentially oppressive agents’ {ibid., p. 
179). We should not lose our welfare rights to education and to police protection, 
because they are essential for our life and growth. We should not transfer our military 
duty to another because we should equally share out some duties.
Some things ought not to be exchanged for gain (i.e. for money): firstly, babies could 
be exchanged for gain, but should not be exchanged for gain, because human beings 
should not be treated only as a means. ‘Treating someone as a means only’ is not just 
an ignoring of someone’s intrinsic value, but a denial of it {ibid., p. 182). Secondly, 
human organs could be, but should not be exchanged for gain, because if  money can 
be made from selling organs, a lot more of them will be offered. Besides, people 
offering their organs for profit would have a reason to conceal facts making their 
organs unsuitable. Moreover, those who are likely to submit to painful and invasive 
surgery, and to accept the risks involved will be poor. Thirdly, sex could be, but 
should not be exchanged for gain, because commercial sex leads us to treat each other
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only as a means. Sexual interaction should not be a meeting of mutually self- 
interested parties, treating one another only as means to their own ends.34
Whilst both Walzer and Andre’s ‘blocked exchanges’ arguments are pioneering and 
provocative, they still leave room for improvement. First, Andre rightly indicates that 
some actions cannot be exchanged for profit, because the fact that accepting money 
essentially changes some actions. But, this could also be applied not only to actions, 
but also to goods. If, for example, we exchange environmental goods (e.g. wetlands 
that protect bio-diversity and forests that maintain the ozone layer) for profit, the act 
o f exchange essentially changes them from environment into real estate. Thus, we use 
the word ‘items’ to include actions, goods, and services and will argue that the act of 
exchange against money changes the nature o f items.
Second, Andre’s argument on why some things could be sold, but ought not to be sold 
entails that the nature of some things cannot be sold. She claims, for instance, that 
babies could be exchanged for gain, but should not be exchanged for gain, because 
human beings should not be treated only as a means. We do, however, sell babies 
whereas we cannot sell the parent-child relationships, because if do, they are no 
longer parent-child relationships: Social relations like family, parent-child, between 
friends are constituted by a refusal to put a price on them. Similarly, money can buy 
servants, but cannot buy human beings. Money can buy political office, but cannot 
buy the attention o f elected officials. Money can buy the best lawyer in the country, 
but cannot buy criminal justice (Andre, 1995, p. 171).
Andre doubts that all these arguments can be synthesised by any single principle or 
perspective. I deflect her skepticism with the following two proposals: (a) Joseph 
Raz’s concept of ‘constitutive incommensurability’; and (b) the Critical Realist 
philosophy and methodology. The next two sections deal with these issues in turn.
34 Andre suggests that sex is ‘a borderline case’ between what cannot be bought and sold (i.e. empirical 
impossibility) and what ought not be bought and sold (i.e. normative undesirability) (Andre, 1995, p. 
189). Trading off sex might change (and distort) the nature of sex: if  exchanged, it is not sex (i.e. 
desirable institution) but prostitution (i.e. less-desirable or bad institution).
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3.2 Constitutive Incommensurability
Two items (i.e. actions, goods, services) or options are incommensurable if they 
cannot be measured. Monetary incommensurability can occur between money and 
certain social relations (e.g. family, parent-child, friend) or value commitments (e.g. 
to political rights, legal rights, environment, education, medical service). 
Incommensurability between money and certain social relations is a constitutive 
feature of those relationships (e.g. love, friendship, intimacy) and valuations (e.g. 
democracy, justice, respect).
3.2.1 What Cannot Be Traded 
I have argued that it is an empirical impossibility to trade constitutively 
incommensurable items or options because they are constituted by a refusal to put a 
price on them. Yet there are cases where this appears to be an empirical possibility, 
that is, where it appears that constitutively incommensurable items or options are 
traded. And if they are traded, it is incorrect to say they cannot be traded. We are, 
however, misled by appearances.
Constitutively incommensurable items cannot be traded, because if  and when they are 
traded, they cannot properly be constituted as they are. Consider an example. Let us 
assume a homeland really is a constitutively incommensurable item. When it appears 
that the homeland is traded, what really happens is this. The attempt to trade the 
homeland transforms it into real estate and it is real estate that is traded. The 
homeland is, therefore, no longer properly constituted as a homeland. We do not 
always spot this transformation because a homeland and a piece of real estate look 
similar. It is, therefore, empirically impossible to trade constitutively 
incommensurable items or options because the actions o f trying to trade transforms 
them into something else whereupon they are no longer properly constituted as those 
items or options. The above case of what cannot be traded has implications for what 
ought not to be traded, which is considered next.
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3.2.2 What Ought Not To Be Traded 
We ought not to attempt to trade all constitutively incommensurable items because the 
actions of trying to trade them not only transform them into something else, but also 
in some cases distort them in negative, damaging or harmful ways. The empirical 
impossibility and the normative undesirability of trading constitutively 
incommensurable items combine and allow us to use the notion of constitutive 
incommensurability to locate the market boundary. Items whereby the actions of 
trying to trade them do not change their nature are marketable. Items whereby the 
actions of trying to trade them do change their nature are non-marketable. This allows 
us to correct a common misunderstanding. Even though it appears that we can and do 
(i.e. empirically possible) trade many things, perhaps even everything, we cannot (i.e. 
empirically impossible) and we ought not to (i.e. normatively undesirably) trade some 
things. The empirical impossibility is the very reason fo r  the normative undesirability. 
The argument o f constitutive incommensurability paves the way for exploring the 
ontology o f a market by employing the Critical Realist philosophy and methodology.
3.3 The Critical Realist Perspective
Now that we have grounds for recognising a market boundary, we need to consolidate 
this by making the argument ontologically watertight. This section provides a toolbox 
for doing precisely this and proceeds to consider three ontological positions: 
Empirical Realism (i.e. crude materialist or objectivist), Post-structuralism (i.e. crude 
idealist or subjectivist) and Critical Realism (i.e. a middle standpoint, which can 
prevent the slide into two possible kinds of reductionism). Each section will make use 
of the following three dualities:
(a) Social structure and human agency (i.e. the agents’ actions and relations).
(b) The intransitive dimension (i.e. where actions or objects themselves occur) and 
the transitive dimension (i.e. where theories of them occur). This is important 
because confusion often follows from collapsing the distinction between them 
and implying that our theories (i.e. theoretical discourses) creates on constructs 
the actions or objects.
(c) The extra-discursive and the discursive. This is important because confusion 
often follows from collapsing the distinction between them and implying that 
the discursive creates or constructs the actions or objects.
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3.3.1 The Empirical Realist 
(ai) Empirical Realists tend to ignore ontology. This makes it relatively easy for them 
to walk into ontological problems and yet be totally unaware that they have done so. 
Although they never discuss the agency-structure interaction, they nevertheless use it, 
and use it mistakenly. For Empirical Realists, a market boundary is established via the 
properties of things, to be more specific, by the values o f things. The market sphere is 
created by things with commensurable value (i.e. a single and cardinal value). The 
non-market sphere is created by things with incommensurable values (i.e. values that 
are irreducible with each other or into the third value because they have different 
sources). Either way, the values are a form of social structure, which constrain the 
actions of human agents. This ontology is reificationist because the structure exists 
independently from the human interaction. If we allow that values are forms of social 
structure, then we can say that for Empirical Realists there is a strong boundary 
between social structure and human agency.
(bj) Empirical Realists also have a strong boundary between the intransitive and 
transitive dimension. In the intransitive dimension, practices of commensuration 
occur whereas in the transitive dimension are theories of these practices. Thus the 
market boundary is theory-independent. What we can [not] commensurate in practice 
is what is [in]commensurable in theory. What can [not] be commodified creates the 
[non-]market sphere. There is always one-to-one correspondence between these 
dimensions, and there is no feedback and reflection between them. A market 
boundary is totally ‘out there’ as it were, independent of our identification of it, and 
can be examined from the ‘outside’.
(ci) There is no sense of discourse: everything is non-discursive. Thus, a market 
boundary is non-discursive. Things are reduced into their empirical and actual 
existence and quantified via money: things are either commensurable or 
incommensurable on the grounds that they can be observed and commensurated via 
money. What can [not] be commensurated in terms of money are [in] commensurable 
values, which create the [non-]market sphere. There can be no ‘market colonisation’: 
there is no possibility that incommensurable values can be commensurated via money.
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Because Empirical Realists have an ontology wherein everything is non-discursive, 
the market sphere consists o f things which money can buy, whereas the non-market 
sphere consists o f things which money cannot buy: both spheres are perfectly 
segregated from each other.
3.3.2 The Post-structuralist 
(a2) Unlike Empirical Realists, for Post-structuralists, there is no boundary between 
the social structure and the human agency. It has a voluntarist ontology: the structure 
is merely the product of human interaction Thus, a market boundary is merely the 
product of human interaction. The market sphere is merely the product of economic 
relations between agents (i.e. aliens, strangers) and economic actions o f agents (i.e. 
selling/buying). The non-market sphere is merely the product by ethical relations 
between agents (i.e. friends, family) and ethical actions of agents (i.e. 
giving/ receiving).
(b2) There is no boundary between the intransitive dimension (i.e. practices 
themselves) and the transitive dimension (i.e. theories of them). Thus, a market 
boundary is theory-determined. There is no distinction between (in)commensuration 
as discourse and discourse about (in)commensurability. There is no such thing as a 
market boundary, as a common referent, but there are different accounts, stories and 
theories that construct a market boundary. Discourse is always and everywhere an 
independent and creative force. That is, our ‘(in)commensurability claims’ make 
things (in)commensurable. A market boundary is purely ‘in here’ as it were, 
dependent on our identification of it, and can be examined from the ‘inside’. It is 
arbitrary and anything goes.
(c2) There is no boundary between the extra-discursive and the discursive: everything 
is the discursive. There can be no extra-discursive moments outside ‘discourse’, 
because things are not prior to ‘discourse’: they are already discursively constituted in 
order to make sense. Thus, a market boundary is merely discursive: things are either 
commensurable or incommensurable on the grounds that they are discursively 
constructed. ‘A market boundary’ exists fo r  us: it is classified by us, and therefore it 
can only have a meaning for us. The extra-discursive nature of things is reduced into 
our (theoretical) discourses. There can be no ‘market colonisation’. The non-market
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regime is merely a conceptual pole opposite to the market regime in a theoretical 
framework. While those poles might conceptually be modified, they cannot be 
colonised from one another in reality.
Post-structuralists cannot properly raise the issue of a market boundary, because they 
fail to sustain a boundary between the extra-discursive and the discursive. Money can 
discursively buy everything and/or cannot discursively buy anything: it is simply 
constituted within ‘discourse’. Both spheres are collapsed into one another.
3.3.3 The Critical Realist 
(as) For Critical Realists, a market boundary is constituted by both social structure and 
human agency. The Critical Realist synthesises both kinds of traditional ontology (i.e. 
reificationist and voluntarist) and claims that agency causes structure, which then 
causes agency and so on, because structure cannot be identified with agency, cannot 
be explained in terms of agency, or cannot be reduced into agency, and vice versa. 
Thus, a market boundary is generated by social structures, which are recreated, 
reproduced, and transformed via human agency. The structures of the exchange 
spheres (i.e. commodity/non-commodity) and human interactions (i.e. buying/selling 
between aliens, giving/receiving between friends) are both precondition and outcome 
for each other. The (in)commensurability of things determines the appropriate acts 
(e.g. commodity exchange, gift exchange). The commensuration by agents (i.e. 
selling/buying) transforms the incommensurable into a commensurable form, and re­
create a market boundary (i.e. the market colonisation).
(bs) There is a weak boundary between the intransitive dimension and the transitive 
dimension. There is a weak conceptual distinction between (in)commensuration as 
discourse and discourse about (in)commensurability. There is also the possibility of 
feedback and reflection between them. Thus, a market boundary is theory-laden. It 
cannot exist independently from human agency, but can exist independently from any 
one human agent. A market boundary can only be known in terms of our accounts of 
incommensurability. However, incommensurability between values and ‘constitutive 
incommensurability’ can neither be derived from nor reduced into 
incommensurability between (theoretical) discourses. A market boundary is never 
fully ‘out there’, and at the same never purely ‘in here’. A market boundary is never
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fully dependent or independent on our identification. Each pole is constellationally 
contained within one another (yet irreducible) and hence is open to being transformed 
in its relation to the another.
(C3) A market boundary is both extra-discursive and discursive: things are either 
commensurable or incommensurable on the grounds that they are both extra- 
discursive and discursive. It avoids reducing (in)commensurability into either a mere 
empirical fact or a mere social construction. It is impossible to reduce the argument of 
value incommensurability into that of incommensurability between theories. The 
Critical Realist maintains the distinction between the extra-discursive and the 
discursive and this paves the way for explaining commensuration as a discursive 
process in articulation with the extra-discursive properties of things.
Critical Realists’ ontology of a market boundary can prevent the slide into the 
following two possible kinds o f reductionism: first, Empirical Realists reduce a 
market boundary into a mere empirical existence —  i.e. things either marketable or 
non-marketable on the grounds that they can be observed and quantified via money. 
There is nothing to be considered because both spheres are perfectly segregated from 
each other. Second, Post-structuralists reduce a market boundary into a mere social 
construction —  i.e. things are either marketable or non-marketable on the grounds 
that they are discursively constructed. ‘A market boundary exists fo r  us: it is classified 
by us, and therefore it can only have a meaning fo r  u s \  Critical Realists find these 
views unacceptable because the former is rooted in a crude materialist or objectivist 
ontology, and the latter in a crude idealist or subjectivist ontology. In contrast, the 
Critical Realist presupposes that things are either marketable or non-marketable on 
the grounds that they are they are partly an empirical existence (i.e. extra-discursive) 
and partly a social construction (i.e. discursive).35 As Empirical Realists imply, there 
may be cases where commensurable values facilitate commensuration via money, and 
incommensurable values do not facilitate commensuration via money. As Post­
structuralists imply, there may also be cases where even incommensurable values are 
discursively commensurated via money. In contrast, Critical Realists demonstrate a 
further case o f constitutively incommensurable items or options, which are
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empirically impossible to trade because the actions of trying to trade transforms them 
into something else whereupon they are no longer properly constituted as those items 
or options.
To grasp the efficacy o f the Critical Realist perspective on a market boundary, let us 
consider the issues of market colonisation (i.e. the projection of the market principle 
into the non-market sphere) and non-market distortion or corruption (i.e. the 
projection of the non-market principle into the market sphere).
3.3.4 Market Colonisation and Non-Market Distortion 
To say that market and non-market spheres are internally related, but irreducible, to 
one another, is to say that they are dialectically related. This means that the market 
boundary is permeable and, furthermore, that actions taken in the market sphere can 
impact upon the non-market sphere.
For example, because it is necessary (for most of us) to work in order to earn money 
we commit ourselves to the market sphere and this involves us in many kinds of 
economic, money orientated activities. And yet, we also commit ourselves to the non- 
market sphere and this involves us in many kinds of the non-economic, non-money- 
orientated activities, such as housekeeping, bringing up children, taking care of 
elderly people, and gift giving. These two opposing spheres are dialectically related:
On the one hand, the spheres create a boundary between themselves, making them 
non-permeable. This is because:
• In our everyday language we counterpose these two spheres so that we define the 
non-market sphere against the market sphere and vice versa.
• Our life consists o f the combination of money-making and non money-making 
activities in practice. We cannot continue our life in the single mode, either in the 
market sphere or in the non-market sphere.
Because (a) the market sphere can appear to be the one against the non-market sphere, 
and vice versa in theory, one can only make sense against the other. Because (b) our
35 See 1.3.3 for the argument about how Searle’s conceptual distinction between institutional and brute
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life consists of the combination of money-making and non money-making activities in 
practice, we cannot continue our life in the single mode, either in the market sphere or 
in the non-market sphere.
On the other hand, the spheres internalise each other, making them permeable. This is 
because:
• The market sphere internalises the non-market sphere by projecting its principle
into the other (i.e. a market colonisation). The market sphere transfers its own 
meaning into the non-market sphere.
• The non-market sphere internalises the market sphere by projecting its principle
into the other (i.e. a non-market distortion). The non-market sphere transfers its
own meaning into the market sphere.
How is this dialectical relation possible? Keat claims that whilst the market and the 
non-market spheres can co-exist, the market sphere tends to invade the non-market 
sphere in some certain contexts (Keat, 1993, pp. 6-20). Keat distinguishes two ways, 
in which the market can impact on non-market spheres, which he calls ‘replicatory’ 
and ‘non-replicatory’ forms of market determination. In a replicatory form, market 
norms and meanings are projected into non-market spheres. For instance, human 
actions may be compared in terms of the amounts of utility they generate. In a non- 
replicatory form, economic activities create a sphere, which is dissimilar from an 
economic sphere. For example, the economy may require a sphere o f family life (i.e. a 
sphere of personal intimacy, romantic love and emotional intensity etc.), which serves 
as a ‘haven’ in the ‘heartless world’ of economic life. The central issue here is which 
form of market determination results. Let us consider these possibilities in turn and 
see what is involved.
Market determination would take ‘replicatory’ forms where there are only strangers. 
First, the market sphere can impact on the non-market sphere in ‘replicatory’ form by 
projecting its principle into the other (i.e. a market colonisation). For instance, human 
relations and actions may be compared in terms of the utility they generate. This
facts corresponds to the Critical Realist distinction between discursive and extra-discursive elements.
36 See 6.3.3 The Domino Argument for the possibility o f co-existence o f the market and the non-market 
regimes —  e.g. if  commercialised sex services (i.e. prostitution) drive out non-commercialised sex.
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‘replicatory’ form of the market determination would take place in the larger society 
where personal intimacy is absent. In this context, the defence o f incommensurable 
values from commensuration should be claimed. Second, the non-market sphere can 
impact on the market sphere in ‘replicatory’ form by projecting its principle into the 
other (i.e. a non-market distortion or corruption), which is the opposite case to that of 
a market colonisation. For instance, business relations and actions, in which both a 
seller and a buyer must be responsible for each other, may be distorted or corrupt into 
irresponsible ones (e.g. a business contract may be distorted or corrupt into a verbal 
agreement). This ‘replicatory’ form of the market determination would also take place 
in the larger society where personal intimacy is absent. In this context, the defence of
37the economic independence from personal dependence should be claimed.
Market determination would take ‘non-replicatory’ forms where there are strong 
personal relations between individuals (e.g. family, friends). In a non-replicatory form, 
economic activities create a sphere, which is dissimilar from an economic sphere, 
which makes it resistant to being internalised by the market. For example, the 
economy may require a sphere for constitutive incommensurability such as a sphere 
of family life, which serves as a ‘haven’ in the ‘heartless world’ of economic life. This 
‘non-replicatory’ form of market determination would take place in the smaller 
society where strong personal relations are present between individuals (e.g. family, 
friends). In such a context, the market and non-market spheres can co-exist because 
they are two radically different forms of human interaction: non-market interaction is 
not merely a fee-free version of its market counterpart.
37 While the economic independence should be protected from a non-market distortion or corruption 
into personal dependence in the social context that there are only strangers, it is not the final goal we 
morally ought to aim at: the ‘economic independence’ is not a real and whole independence, because it 
is founded on ‘objective dependence’ on money. For further arguments, see 5.4.1 Money Promotes 
Independence.
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3.4 In Defence of the Ontology of a Market Boundary
The final section tackles with some skepticism and criticism against my ontological 
argument that constitutive incommensurability creates a market boundary. The first 
three arguments (i.e. instrumental incommensurability claims, strategic 
incommensurability claims, and incommensurability belief) fail their arguments 
because they simply collapse constitutive incommensurability into discourse. While 
the last arguments try to justify constitutive incommensurability from the viewpoint 
o f reason, they lead us into moral problems.
3.4.1 Instrumental Incommensurability Claims 
Frederick Schauer (1998) claims:
[Cjommensurability and comparability are not (or are not only) properties of 
sets o f values or reasons that do or do not obtain. Rather, commensurability 
and comparability often have, or can be constructed to have, the character of 
attitudes, dispositions, presumptions, or conceptual frameworks, and, as such, 
they are best thought of as being chosen rather than as simply existing and, 
furthermore, as being chosen for instrumental and not intrinsic reasons. 
(Schauer, 1998, p. 1217)
He suggests a shift o f questioning from ontological to instrumental. He recognises the 
legitimacy o f ontological questions such as what incommensurability is and if it exists. 
But he considers it more important to ask instrumental questions as follows: Should 
we instrumentally create and construct the discourse o f commensurability? Is it useful 
to presume about the (im)possibility of commensurability? Does it maximise our 
utility to believe in a certain discourse of (in)commensurability? From his 
instrumentalist view, we can discursively perform morality: we can perform as i f  
something is (in)commensurable, regardless of its property:
[I]f we view commensurability and incommensurability not only as positions 
that might be true or false, sound or unsound, justified or unjustified, but also 
as dispositions, attitudes, or presumptions that people might possess, then the 
question is whether morality would be better served if  decision makers had 
one or the other attitude, disposition, or presumption, (ibid., p. 1225)
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Even if there are incommensurables, ... it might be best to assume that there 
are not, at least if  we indulge the assumption that overestimate the number of 
incommensurables might lead people to underestimate the number o f times in 
which it would be fruitful to engage in different moral work. ... Conversely, 
under different empirical conditions, we might think that it would be 
instrumentally valuable for people to believe that there were incommensurable 
values or reasons, even i f  there were not. {ibid., p. 1227, italics added).
From Schauer’s view, we ought to assume that there is (in)commensurability simply 
because doing so promotes a good state of affairs and maximises utility, or doing so 
satisfies a non-consequential demand of reason. Against this I suggest we ought to 
discover the existence o f a market boundary regardless of whether or not it maximises 
utility. Incommensurability is not (merely) instrumental: it is not the case that a 
market boundary exists because it is useful, but that market boundary exists, and 
therefore it is useful to know what it is. What is wrong with his ‘instrumental 
incommensurability’ is that it presupposes, what Leiter calls, ‘epistemic agnosticism 
(i.e. the view that norms for belief need not make reference to the truth-bearing 
features of propositions)’ (Leiter, 1998, p. 1724). Besides, it even presupposes its 
radical subset, called ‘fictionalism (i.e. the view that one ought to believe certain false  
propositions because doing so maximises good consequences or doing so satisfies a 
nonconsequential demand of reason)’ {ibid.). This consequentialist mode o f reasoning 
is highly likely to misguide us to trade off incommensurable items regardless of its 
truth, and to accelerate market colonisation.
3.4.2 Strategic Incommensurability Claims 
Eric Posner’s (Posner, 2000, pp. 185-202) view can be summed up as in two points:
(a) The incommensurability issue is not a matter of ethics, but o f sociology. While 
those who support the existence of incommensurable items or options regard it as 
a matter o f moral choice, Posner treats it instead as a sociological fact: people 
often refuse to make tradeoffs in everyday life —  tradeoffs that are often 
demanded by rational choice theory.
(b) Incommensurability is not only a matter of people’s representations, but also of 
their actual behaviours of choices, while the former influences the latter. It is not
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only about the ways in which we represent (in)commensurable options, but also 
about the ways in which we behave as if  there are (in)commensurable options. 
Posner calls the ‘as i f  speech acts ‘incommensurability claims’ and argues that 
they ‘emerge in an equilibrium in which people rationally seek partners for the 
purpose o f obtaining cooperative gains’.
People rationally make incommensurability claims in order to obtain strategic 
advantages in their interactions which other. ‘Incommensurability claims do not 
reflect people’s interests and values; they conceal them’ (ibid., p. 187).
From Posner’s perspective, people have ‘incommensurability claims’ because, if  they 
don’t, they would be seen by others as ‘a bad type’ (i.e. an unprincipled person who 
acts out o f self-interest). He does not intend, however, that ‘people are cynical, or that 
they make incommensurability claims cynically’. Rather, he wants to reveal non­
economic but sociological fact that people tend to rationalise their defection, when 
their interest and ideology conflict. That is, they tend to revise their story or action 
concerning incommensurable options into something believable and something that 
preserves their reputation or self-image as a principled person.
While Posner may have identified why some people claim that values are 
incommensurable, it is irrelevant to the question o f whether or not values are in 
commensurable. Just as ‘the fact that politicians routinely invoke moral 
considerations on behalf of the policies they advocate is irrelevant to the question of 
whether or not these policies are moral’ (Leiter, 1998, p. 1728). While 
incommensurability may be claimed to obtain strategic advantages, questions such as, 
why it is claimed, how it is counted as, whether it is cheating or not, are not 
appropriate for asking whether or not some values are incommensurable.
Posner considers some examples. The first case is when a person who refuses to 
answer a cost benefit survey about the value of mountain, or a mountain view, 
claiming that no amount of money can compensate him for obstruction of that view. 
From Posner’s perspective, this incommensurability claim has nothing to do with 
whether the mountain view has an infinitive value: they serve the strategic purpose of 
signalling one’s loyalty to the environmental group. As Posner claims, an
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‘incommensurability claim’ can be separated from ‘incommensurable values’. 
However, the later argument cannot be reduced it the former. While one can, by 
incommensurability claims, make use o f  the mountain view case for showing oneself 
as a good type, the incommensurability claim does not make constitutive 
incommensurability between money and the mountain view. It is empirically 
impossible to trade the mountain view, because the actions of trying to trade 
transform it into the real estate whereupon the mountain view is no longer properly 
constituted as it were. Posner claims, that when people ‘sacrifice mountain views so 
that they can move to a location where there are better jobs, better schools for their 
children, and more culture’, ‘[t]he mountain view and money are incommensurable, 
but the view and employment are comparable’. But the view and employment would 
be incommensurable in a situation where the view is destroyed by constructing a 
factory to make jobs.
The second case is about a professor who refuses to accept money to skip a faculty 
meeting but who would skip the faculty meeting in order to stay home with a sick 
child when childcare is not available. Posner considers the fact that the childcare can 
be optional for skipping a meeting whereas money cannot depends on value- 
maximising obligations. ‘Most people would think that the professor could skip the 
faculty meeting if  the government threatened to fine him $100,000 if he goes’. Even 
money can be an alternative choice when the implicit value-maximising obligations 
allows one to skip meeting in order to meet serious personal obligations or to avoid 
serious harm. ‘This view is standard in contract theory’. It is consistent with the 
rational choice. The fact that the childcare can be an alternative choice for skipping a 
meeting whereas money cannot, however, does not depend on its value-maximisation, 
but on whether the professor can properly be constituted as a parent o f  the sick child. 
Even if  the professor is threatened with a fine of $100,000, this does not make any 
difference to the fact that incommensurability between childcare and money is a 
constitutive feature o f one’s parenthood.
Posner also considers a related case of a person who refuses to trade time with his 
family for money but would trade time with his family for a better career opportunity. 
He doubts the fruitfulness of the argument on whether time with one’s family can be 
compared with money or with the better career opportunity on a common metric. He
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is rather more interested in whether this honest and limited incommensurability claim 
(i.e. ‘I will not trade off time with my family except for something that is very 
important for me’) can obtain strategic advantages. ‘Trading time with one’s family 
for a better job opportunity would count as cheating in some families but not in others 
—  it simply depends on what value-maximising obligations emerge’. Posner does not 
mean that such incommensurability claims are ‘empty talk’, but that they ‘put people 
in a blind’. One the one hand, one cannot truly act consistently with one’s claims. On 
the other hand, however, if one does, one may lose the reputation that the claims are 
intended to establish. Posner considers only consistency between one’s 
incommensurability claims and one’s action of not trading off one’s family time.
3.4.3 Incommensurability Belief 
Ruth Chang argues against Raz’s constitutive incomparability as an objective fact: 
any such putative incommensurability is relative to the beliefs of agents (Chang, 
2001; 2002, pp. 95-119). She asks, ‘is a belief that friendship and money are 
incomparable constitutive o f friendship?’ If it is so, all friends must have this belief: 
for friends, friendship and money are incomparable. But for those who are not friends, 
friendship and money may well be comparable. There is no error in believing that 
friendship and money are comparable as much as in believing that they are 
incomparable. ‘[Fjriendship and money may be incomparable for you but comparable 
for me. It seems there is no ‘objective’ fact of the matter as to whether friendship and 
money are comparable’ (ibid., 2002, p. 101). What matters to Chang is whether a 
subjective and relative belief in incommensurability can be a constitutive feature for 
friendship.
The belief that friendship is not a mere market good, that it cannot be bought 
and sold like a commodity, that it cannot be replaced, compensated or 
measured by money might plausibly symbolise respect and high regard for 
friendship. ... But these beliefs do not entail that friendship and money are 
incomparable (though the converse arguably holds), (ibid., p. 103)
She claims that whilst an incommensurability belief may symbolise the believer’s 
respect and high regard for friendship, it does not signify constitutive incompatibility 
itself. I have three objections to Chang’s arguments.
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Firstly, constitutive incommensurability is not a subjective belief but an objective
38  • • •fact. It is not the case that a belief in incommensurability is constitutive of certain 
social relations and value commitments, but the act of refusing to trade is. It is not 
about incomparability between our particular friendship and money, but more 
generally between the nature o f  friendship in general and money.
Secondly, constitutive incommensurability is categorically different from 
incommensurability between values. Chang argues that incomparability generally 
refers to that one cannot be favoured over the other in a symmetric relation: if  two 
items or options, A and B, are incomparable, A is not measurable by B, and B is not 
measurable by A, either. Chang continues, however, that incomparability between 
friendship and money is not symmetrical: it only entails that friendship is not 
measurable by money, and it does not entail that money is not measurable by 
friendship. I agree that incommensurable values (e.g. between items, options) are in a 
symmetric relation: when a certain agent-centred value is not measurable by a certain 
outcome-centred value, the latter is not measurable by the former, either. It is not the 
case, however, that constitutive incommensurability (e.g. between friendship and 
money, between environment and money) needs to stand in a symmetric relation.
Thirdly, constitutive incommensurability cannot be reduced to mere metaphorical 
discourse. Chang argues that incommensurability belief is rather ‘a metaphorical 
sense of incomparability’, which refers to the symbolic significance for one over the 
other in a non-symmetric relation. In this sense, one is ‘incomparably better’ than the 
other, which means ‘vastly,’ ‘significantly,’ or ‘off-the-charts’ better. While we have 
incommensurability claims or metaphors as discourse, it neither creates nor excludes 
constitutive incommensurability as extra-discursive. As with Posner’s argument, it is 
just irrelevant to the question of the existence of a market boundary.
38 Sayer defines three notions o f subjectivity/objectivity (Sayer, 2000, p. 58): 'subjectivity 1' means 
'value-laden', and 'objectivity 1' means 'value-neutral'; 'subjectivity2' means 'not true' or 'merely a matter 
o f opinion', and 'objectivity2' means 'true' or 'practically adequate'; 'subjectivity3' means 'pertaining to 
subject', and 'objectivity3' means 'pertaining to object'. Constitutive incommensurability is objective in 
the third sense: whether constitutive incommensurability holds between two items or relations is not 
just a matter o f whether an individual believes or feels it to hold, but rather is a matter o f the nature of 
the objects and relations in question.
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3.4.4 No Reason Claims 
Chang also criticises Elizabeth Anderson’s affirmative argument of constitutive 
incommensurability from the viewpoint of reason —  i.e. there is no good reason to 
compare friendship to money. Chang suggests Anderson’s approach to 
incomparability can be seen as ‘constitutive’, because our attitudes (e.g. respect, awe, 
honour) toward certain goods is constitutive of them, and it is in virtue of those 
attitudes that there is no good reason to compare them. Anderson’s view is based on 
her pragmatic value theory, which holds that ‘value judgements are constructions of 
practical reason that guide our reasoning about what to do and what to care about’ 
(Anderson, 1997, p. 91). It has the following two implications:
(a) Value judgements can only be applied with practical reasoning. It does not make 
any sense to talk about the goodness or badness of things that lack any relation to 
rational agents.
(b) Value judgements are justified by their practical functioning —  i.e. if  they are 
rational to be used to guide our deliberations and attitudes. It is not the case that it 
is rational to value something because it is good, but that it is good because it is 
rational fo r  us to value it. ‘Things are good in virtue of bearing certain relations to 
principles o f practical reason’ (ibid. p. 92).
The pragmatic value theory is more concerned with ‘making sense as good’ rather 
than ‘being good’. Anderson claims that the value of actions (and states o f affairs) is 
derived from principles of expressing rational attitudes toward people. An action is 
good if it conforms to rational principles for expressing an agent’s attitudes toward 
the people one cares about. That is, she reduces “x is good” roughly to “it is rational to 
value x” —  i.e. to value something is to adopt a favorable attitude susceptible to 
rational reflection toward it (ibid., p. 95). From her view, friendship is valuable 
because it is rational to value friendship: our appreciation towards friendship makes 
sense as good. Whereas there is no good reason to compare friendship to money: it 
does not make sense as good.
The problem with Anderson’s view is not that it involves constitutive 
incommensurability as such, but that she is committed to a reductionist view — i.e. 
the truth can be reduced into the reason we have to treat it as the truth. In this sense, 
Chang’s criticism gains force from Anderson’s wrong (or weak) justification of
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constitutive incommensurability. Constitutive incommensurability cannot be reduced 
into the absence of good reason. It is not the case of whether comparing friendship to 
money makes sense as good or bad, but rather the case of whether friendship can still 
make sense as friendship as it were even after being traded. Anderson’s reductionist 
approach to constitutive incommensurability prevents her from arguing about the 
empirical impossibility of trading off constitutively incommensurable items (i.e. what 
cannot be exchanged for money) elaborated above.
Richard Warner also explains constitutive incommensurability from the viewpoint of 
reason —  i.e. some value commitments are constituted by not being compared to 
money, because it is ‘reason-excluding’. Warner supposes, ‘Jones and I are 
revolutionists. An official in the government we oppose offers $1,000,000 to reveal 
names, hiding places, and plans of my fellow revolutionaries’ (Warner, 1998, p. 1294). 
On the one hand, ‘Jones’ refuses the offer by comparing loyalty-provided and money- 
provided reasons: loyalty is more valuable than money. But it could have been 
otherwise if the price were higher, say $10,000,000. On the other hand, ‘I’ refuse the 
offer because ‘I’ do not compare loyalty and money. I refuse the bribe because I have 
a reason to do so —  i.e. no competing reason. A commitment to the revolution ‘is 
constitutive of, definitive of, what I mean by loyalty that the money-provided 
considerations do not play the justificatory-motivational role of a reason for me. ... 
My commitment to the revolution guarantees that the financial considerations are 
motivationally completely inert — they cannot motivate me at all to betray’ {ibid., p. 
1295). Werner claims that such a reason-excluding commitment creates (constitutive) 
incommensurability.
While Werner also justifies constitutive incommensurability, his justification may 
cause some moral problems. When ‘Jones and I’ are offered money to betray the 
revolution, ‘my reaction’ is ‘money is not relevant,’ whereas ‘Jones’ reaction is ‘how 
much?’ This example suggests that loyalty to revolution is a ‘reason-excluding’ 
commitment, and thereby an ‘incommensurability-creating’ commitment fo r  me but 
not fo r  Jones. If constitutive incommensurability is something agents can privately or 
individually create, then a market boundary is relative to individual agents. This 
(mis)guides us towards moral relativism: we might be able to trade what others cannot. 
What is a constitutive feature of loyalty and fellowship is not a justificatory-
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motivational role o f  a reason for individual agents, but a general fact o f  refusing 
trade.
3.5 Conclusion
Let us finally reconsider the inversion of the MasterCard aphorism:
• ‘For everything else, there’s MasterCard’ suggests that there is an a priori market 
boundary between marketable and non-marketable items, and therefore we can use 
money for marketable items and cannot for non-marketable.
• ‘For MasterCard, there is everything else ’ suggests that there is a posteriori the 
market, and therefore we can create and/or transform non-marketable items into 
marketable ones.
Whilst both suggestions are true, the latter case is inclined to be overlooked by 
accident, or perhaps on purpose. On the one hand, commensuration makes money. 
Money becomes a standard of the measurement of value by transforming 
heterogeneous items into homogeneous products. When some items are 
commensurable and others are incommensurable, some commensurable items allow 
themselves to be commensurated via money, and become marketable; whereas other 
items do not allow this and so remain non-marketable. On the other hand, however, 
money makes commensuration. Once money is established and socially accepted as 
the universal measure of value, it persuades (and misguides) us into quantifying and 
standardising many kinds of value that lie within the heterogeneous items. When 
some items are commensurable and others are incommensurable, even 
incommensurable items may be distorted into a commensurable form via money, and 
become marketable. It ought not to be ignored that a market boundary presupposes 
discursive commensuration that money involves, and therefore some items on non-




Part 2: The Normative Nature of Money from an Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
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CHAPTER 4: AGAINST MORAL INSTRUMENTALISM
4.0 Introduction
The aphorism ‘money is the root of all evil’ is a misquotation from the Bible which 
reads, ‘For the love o f  money is the root o f  evil (Timothy 6).’ This tells us that the 
love of money, rather than money itself, is the source of vice. Many others agree. 
Goodwin (1986, p. 554) for example, argues that ‘it is not money that corrupts but 
people who are corruptible’. Keynes argues:
At any rate to me it seems clearer everyday that the moral problem of our age is 
concerned with the love o f  money, with the habitual appeal to the money motive 
in nine-tenths of the activities of life, with the universal striving after individual 
economic security as the prime object o f endeavour, with the social approbation 
o f money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social appeal to 
the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision for the family 
and for the future. (Keynes, 1972 [1925], pp. 268-9, italics added)
Despite being a mistranslation, the aphorism may actually be more accurate: money, 
not those who use it, may be the problem. Nevertheless, the moral problem of our age 
seems to be concerned also with money itself. This thesis contains many examples 
where the nature o f money leads its users astray. For example, money leads us to 
conceive, and speak of, something in terms of standardisation and quantification —  
even where this is highly inappropriate. Money depersonalises us by reducing us to a 
unit o f economic resource (i.e. how productive are we?). It depersonalises our social 
relationships (e.g. doctor-patient, lecturer-student, transport operator-passenger, 
husband-wife, parent-child) into monetary relationships (e.g. seller-buyer, producer- 
consumer, supplier-demander). Because money is not merely a measure of values, but 
a universal measure of value, it can in principle sell and buy any kind of thing or 
service (e.g. human organs, babies, sex, surrogate motherhood, human genome 
information).
Operating from the perspective of an Aristotelian virtue ethic, this chapter and next 
chapter explore the accuracy of the opening aphorism, (despite it’s being) a 
mistranslation, and consider the ways in which money itself may be incompatible
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with our ethical behaviour and human virtue. From an Aristotelian virtue ethic 
perspective, this chapter aims to critically examine what I will call, a morally 
instrumentalist view o f  money (i.e. the view that it is pointless to argue about morality 
of money since money is merely a tool), and the next chapter aims to deal with a 
Smithian virtue-based justification o f money (i.e. whilst the society may subsist 
without a positive virtue of beneficence, it cannot subsist without a negative virtue of 
justice promoted by money).
This chapter aims to do as follows:
1. It introduces three ethical perspectives that provide a basis for the specific purpose 
o f examining the morality o f money — i.e. consequentialism, deontological ethics 
and virtue ethics. It explores a number of recent consequentialist and deontological 
approaches which have involved a morally instrumentalist view o f  money.
2. In order to avoid moral instrumentalism, it elaborates an Aristotelian virtue ethics 
perspective through Aristotle’s teleological specification of essentialism: it entails 
a teleological view (i.e. an entity’s essences can be revealed in the pattern of its 
development) and an essentialist view (i.e. the distinction between an entity’s 
‘necessary’ and ‘accidental’ properties). The teleological essences of money 
cannot be reduced into our conceptions of money: they precede our discovery of 
them.
3. In order to demonstrate furthermore that moral instrumentalism can be avoided, it 
criticises Radin’s rejection of what she takes to be a misplaced Marxist argument 
and her defence of ‘anti-foundationalism’ and ‘incomplete commodification’.
4. It puts an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective to work critically assessing some 
attempts to justify money from an egalitarian perspective (i.e. money promotes 
equality and justice).
These arguments pave the way for exploring how money is incompatible with our 
ethical behaviour and human virtue from an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics.
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4.1 Three Ethical Perspectives
Harman indicates that ethics is concerned with the following three questions (Harman, 
2001, p. 117)39:
(1) How are we to assess the relative goodness or value of situations?
(2) What is it for something to be one’s moral duty?
(3) What are the moral virtues and vices?
According to these questions, there are following three moral theories (Harman, 2001, 
pp. 117-8):
(1) A theory of value, which concerns what it is for a state o f affairs to be good, all 
things considered, and for one situation to be better, all things considered, than 
another.
(2) A theory o f duty, which concerns what agents ought morally to do on various 
occasions, what they have to do or are morally required to do, what they may do 
or are morally permitted to do, and what it is morally right or wrong for them to 
do.
(3) A theory of virtue, which concerns what it is to act virtuously or viciously on a 
particular occasion and how that is related to what it is to have a good or bad 
moral character.
Moreover, there are three ethical perspectives according to which moral theory they 
take to be the most basic:
(1) Consequentialism: states of affairs are the ethical primitives.
(2) Deontological ethics: acts of agents are the ethical primitives.
(3) Virtue ethics: dispositions of characters are the ethical primitives.
Let us respectively consider these ethical perspectives for examining the morality of 
money.
39 In Harman’s paper, ‘What is it for something to be one’s moral duty? ’ ‘Theory of duty’ and 
‘Deontological ethics’ come the first, and ‘How are we to access the relative goodness or value of 
situations?’ ‘Theory of value’ and ‘Consequentialism’ come the second.
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4.1.1 Consequentialism
Consequentialist ethics are concerned with the state o f  affairs we should or should not 
bring about. Thus, the primitives of the ethical theory (i.e. what is intrinsically good 
or bad) are the states o f  affairs. From this view, it follows that money’s morality can 
be judged in terms of the goodness and badness of a state of affairs it promotes. From 
a perspective of consequentialism, money is [in]compatible with our ethical behaviour 
if it promotes a good [bad] state of affairs. A number of recent consequentialist 
approaches have involved a moral instrumentalist view of money:
• Moral Instrumentalism: because money is just a means or a tool for maximising
our utility, it is pointless to argue about the morality of money, as it is pointless to
do about the morality of any other tool such as a hammer. Money’s morality 
cannot be judged in terms of the goodness and badness o f what it is, but in terms 
of goodness and badness of the state o f  affairs it promotes.
This consequentialist form of moral instrumentalism is applied for the justification of 
money in the following two ways:
• Functionalist Justification: money can be explained in terms of its functions —  i.e. 
its causal roles. Money is an instrument that fulfils economic, social and political 
tasks. From this view, money is consequentially compatible with ethical behaviour 
if it fulfils those functions (e.g. as a medium of exchange, a measurement of value, 
a store o f value, a means of payment).
• Utilitarian Justification: money can be justified in terms of welfare. Money is
instrumentally useful to maximise our pleasure or preference satisfaction, which
we can get from exchanging goods and services. From this view, it follows that 
money is consequentially compatible with ethical behaviour because it maximises 
utility.
4.1.2 Deontological Ethics
Deontological ethics, o f which Kant’s is prominent, are concerned with the acts we 
should or should not perform. The primitives of deontological ethics are the acts o f  
agents. What is intrinsically good are certain acts we are obliged to perform and what 
is intrinsically bad are certain acts which are impermissible. From this view, it follows
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that money’s morality can be judged in term of rightness and wrongness of the acts 
involved in its use.
Consequentialism vs. Deontological Ethics
Consequentialism and deontological ethics have different views on a relationship 
between the right action and the good state:
• Consequentialism holds that the right action is what promotes the good state of 
affairs. The rightness and wrongness of a certain action is dependent on the 
goodness and badness of a state of affairs it promotes. In other words, the good 
state is given priority over the right action. For instance, a right action with 
money is determined by the utilities it maximises. The rightness of action is the 
extrinsic and instrumental value (i.e. the value derived from another source), 
whereas the goodness of state is the intrinsic and final value (i.e. the value derived 
from its own source). Thus, consequentialism is described as an agent-neutral 
moral theory: the agent’s identity does not make any difference to the rightness 
and wrongness o f our action, but the good result does. The goodness o f the state is 
an outcome-centred value, which pertains to everyone.
• Deontological ethics hold that the right action is independent from the good state 
of affairs. The rightness and wrongness of a certain action is not determined by the 
goodness and badness o f a state o f affairs it promotes. In other words, the right 
action is given priority over the good state. It is therefore possible that even a 
wrong action promotes a good result. In monetary relationships, for instance, it is 
wrong to treat others not as ends but as means, regardless of whether or not money 
maximises utilities. The rightness o f an action is not merely an extrinsic and 
instrumental value, but an intrinsic and final value. Thus, deontological ethics is 
described as an agent-relative moral theory: a reference to the agent’s identity 
plays an important role in defining agents’ moral obligations. For example, /  have 
made a particular promise to pay a certain amount of money that I  have an 
obligation to pay it. The rightness o f the action is agent-centred.
From a perspective of deontological ethics, money is [in]compatible with our ethical 
behaviour if it its use constitutes a right [wrong] action. From Kant’s deontological 
ethics, money is incompatible with our ethical behaviour i f  it leads human beings to
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treat others not as ends but as mere means. Kant argues that human beings should 
never be treated merely as means, but as ends in themselves. Kant allows that persons 
can be treated both as means and as ends, but never just as means. In the kingdom of 
ends, Kant argues, things have either instrumental value (i.e. means) or final values 
(i.e. ends):
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a 
price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other 
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity. 
(Kant, 1996 [1785], p. 84)
Everything has either a relative, extrinsic and instrumental value, called ‘price’, or 
absolute, intrinsic, and final value, called ‘dignity’. The former value is optional, 
comparable and exchangeable, whereas the latter value has no alternative: it is 
constitutive o f dignity o f human existence. For Kant, some monetary transactions are 
incompatible with the dignity of persons, for example the buying and selling of 
persons. However, according to Kant’s view, some monetary relations, such as the 
buying o f services are consistent with the dignity o f persons since persons are not 
used merely a means but also as an end. Marx’s view, which we will discuss later, 
however, is stronger than Kant’s view: money leads us to treat others as means, while 
human beings should always and only be treated as ends in themselves.
A number of recent deontological approaches have involved a moral instrumentalist 
view of money:
• Moral Instrumentalism: because the social meaning of money is created through 
use, money does not have any meaning outside o f particularly uses in particular 
contexts —  i.e. there is no such thing as ‘universally representational properties of 
money’. Thus, money’s morality cannot be judged in terms of the goodness and 
badness o f what it is, but in terms o f rightness and wrongness o f how it is used.
American pragmatists develop the Kantian deontological ethics by criticising 
consequentialism and foundationalism (Anderson, 1993, 1997; Carruthers and 
Espeland, 1998; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Radin, 1987, 1996; Zelizer, 1997). For
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instance, Carruthers and Espeland view that money’s meaning and morality depend 
on its use and context:
The meaning of money, like the meaning of words, cannot be reduced to that 
which it represents. Thus, it is misguided to try and identify universally 
representational properties of money and to link these to its meaning. The 
meaning o f money does not depend on some characteristic that is common to all 
money. Instead, its meaning depends on what people in a particular context do 
with it. (Carruthers and Espeland, 1998, p. 1387, italics added)
They claim that the meaning of money does not depend on some common 
characteristics o f money, but on its usage in a certain context. From this view, it 
follows that money’s morality can be judged (a) in terms of the goodness and badness 
of its usage, and (b) in terms of the rightness and wrongness of a context it is used. 
‘There are some places where money does not or should not go and some functions 
for which it is inappropriate (Carruthers and Espeland, 1998, p. 1387)’. Thus, moral 
agents can and should encourage [avoid] a good [bad] usage of money in a right 
[wrong] context. In other words, American pragmatism theoretically leaves out the 
possibility that money itself influences the acts of moral agents. Because it rejects the 
very possibility o f identifying ‘universally representational properties of money’, it 
reduces money’s meaning and morality into its uses in contexts. Although those 
pragmatists claim that ‘money is not a neutral or meaningless social object’, they still 
regard money as a value free instrument from an ethical perspective. From this 
morally instrumentalist view, it follows that the morality of money can and ought to 
be a matter o f its users and usages in contexts, not the nature of money as such.
4.1.3 Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics take the basic question in ethics to be the question what kind of person 
ought we to be. The primitives of virtue ethics are dispositions o f  characters. The 
basic good o f ethical life is the development o f a certain character. From this view, it 
follows that money’s morality can be judged in terms of the goodness or badness of 
what it leads us to be.
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Consequentialism vs. Virtue Ethics
Consequentialism and virtue ethics are two different types of ethical theory called 
‘teleological’:
• Consequentialism is extrinsically teleological because it identifies the right action 
as that which promotes the good result. From this view, the right action is 
regarded only as an extrinsic and instrumental value for another intrinsic and final 
value. The right action promotes an independently identifiable good result. 
Consequentialism, therefore, makes a distinction between 'the right’ and ‘the 
good’, and puts the priority o f  the latter over the former. The goodness and 
badness of the consequences are independent from, and can be in conflict with the 
rightness and wrongness of the action.
• Virtue ethics is intrinsically teleological because they identify virtue as an 
excellence of human nature. Virtue is not a means to excellence of human nature, 
but is itself constitutive of the excellence of human nature. For example, 
intelligence is the excellence of thought. Beauty is the excellence of appearance. 
That is, virtue is identical with the best state of human beings. Virtue ethics, 
therefore, neither makes a distinction between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’, nor puts 
the priority o f  one over the other. The virtuous and right actions are good in 
themselves.
The consequentialist form of moral instrumentalism is derived from its own extrinsic 
teleology: money’s morality cannot be judged in terms of the goodness and badness 
of what it is, but in terms of goodness and badness of the state o f  affairs it promotes. 
Consequentialists identify a good state of affairs independently from a right act of 
agents and a good disposition o f agents’ character, regard intrinsic and final value in a 
state of affair and put primacy on it over others. This causes a shortcoming of moral 
commensuration: it reduces any kinds o f moral value into utility. When 
consequentialists explain utility maximisation as our ultimate aim, they presuppose 
strong commensurability between states o f affairs. If not, it does not make sense to 
maximise their values. The consequentialist form of moral instrumentalism and moral 
commensuration, however, ought to and can be avoided by virtue ethics, which is 
based on intrinsic teleology. This will be considered in the section 2.
102
Deontological Ethics vs. Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is different from deontological ethics in its respect of the distinction 
between agents’ actions and their characteristics.
• Deontological ethics concern only our virtuous actions. It holds a view that there 
are reasons for performing certain actions (e.g. kind actions). It presupposes no 
theoretical distinction between performing a virtuous action and acting virtuously: 
a virtuous action is done by a virtuous person. From a perspective o f deontological 
ethics, for instance, the reason for telling the truth is that to do so would be in 
accordance with the categorical imperative.
• Virtue ethics concern both our virtuous actions and our virtuous characteristics. It 
holds the view that there are reasons not only for performing certain actions (e.g. 
kind actions) but also for being a certain type person (i.e. a kind person). It 
presupposes a theoretical distinction between performing a virtuous action and 
acting virtuously. While a virtuous action appears to be what a virtuous person 
would do, it need not necessarily done by a virtuous person. From a perspective o f 
virtue ethics, for instance, the reason for telling the truth is to be honest.
The deontological form of moral instrumentalism is derived from its own action- 
oriented moral judgement: money’s morality cannot be judged in terms of the 
goodness and badness of what it is, but in terms of rightness and wrongness of how it 
is used. The deontological form of moral instrumentalism, however, ought to and can 
also be avoided by virtue ethics, which concern the compatibility between essences of 
money and the excellence of human nature —  i.e. the realisation of human essences. 
This will be considered in the next section.
4.2 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics
This section elaborates an Aristotelian perspective of virtue ethics through Aristotle’s 
teleological specification of essentialism in order to demonstrate how moral 
instrumentalism can be avoided. Aristotelian virtue ethics is currently argued to be a 
third alternative ethical perspective to consequentialism and deontological ethics, 
especially as a basis for arguing against the key consequentialist notions of value- 
monism and utility maximisation. Virtue ethics is a contextual ethics that strives for 
the good. What is good is the excellence of human nature, human flourishing, or
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eudaimonia (i.e. happiness). The ends that are constitutive o f human flourishing are 
on the Aristotelian account plural:
The valuable ends in human life are chosen for their own sake and they are self- 
sufficient, Aristotle maintains, not instrumental to a higher goal that would 
make the ends commensurable: pleasure, utility, or otherwise. The acts involved 
in pursuing the intrinsically valuable ends should strive for excellence and 
completeness. They imply that the good life consists of a plurality of 
incommensurable ends. As a consequence, Aristotle argues, the virtuous person 
would seek a mean between excess and deficiency of each value, rather than 
maximise one ultimate, commensurable goal. (Staveren, 2001, pp. 79-80)
The virtuous person seeks the full development of human capacities, which is neither 
extrinsically nor instrumentally, but intrinsically and finally valuable. Aristotle 
presupposes some shared tendency for human beings to be virtuous —  i.e. all human 
beings equally have tendency to be virtuous unless it is interrupted. This illustrates 
that Aristotelian virtue ethics entail following two notions: one is a teleological view, 
which holds that an entity’s essences can be revealed in the pattern of its development, 
and the other is an essentialist view, which holds the distinction between an entity’s 
‘necessary’ and ‘accidental’ properties.
4.2.1 Teleology
Teleology ‘is a theory about how the real nature (essence, q.v.) of a whole entity is to 
be identified; how its development from immature, to mature (telos, q.v.) and 
declining forms is to be explained; and characteristic behaviour (ergon, q.v.) is to be 
explained in a law-like fashion’ (Meikle, 1985, p. 178). Teleology is a theory of telos 
—  i.e. the form, state or condition towards which an entity tends to develop by virtue 
of its intrinsic capacities, unless its development is interrupted. Aristotle’s 
essentialism contains this teleological claim: an object’s essences can be revealed in 
the pattern of its development. Thus, from Aristotle’s teleological account of essences, 
it follows that what money is relates to what money can do, and that depends upon its 
intrinsic capacities and causal powers. In other words, asking ‘what is money’ relates 
to asking ‘where is money heading’, and ‘what is money likely to do’.
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In Politics, Aristotle introduces the teleological conception of money as the 
development or the evolution of exchange through following successive four forms 
(Meikle, 1995):
(1) Barter, or exchange without money (C-C’): Aristotle thinks that it is ethically 
acceptable, because its end is both meeting natural needs and having enough. It is 
to get some useful things that satisfy your need. It is natural and necessary.
(2) Exchange mediated by money in case o f  selling a commodity in order to buy 
another commodity (C-M-C’): barter is inconvenient for using what you have and 
getting what you need, because the acts of sale and purchase are fused into a 
single act. Money can separate the single act into two, which is more flexible 
since it allows the act of sale (C-M) and the act of purchase (M-C’) to be 
separated in time and space. Aristotle thinks that it is also ethically acceptable, 
because its end is the satisfaction o f human’s natural needs.
(3) Exchange mediated by money in case o f  buying a commodity to sell it and make 
money (M -C-M ): once people are accustomed to C-M-C’, they are to come to the 
market, not with surplus goods you have made, but with money. Your aim is to 
get more money, by buying commodities and selling them for a greater sum. 
Aristotle thinks that M-C-M’ is not ethically acceptable, because its end is not 
meeting natural needs or having enough, but the accumulation of money. One sum 
of money is different from another only in quantitatively, not in quality. There is 
no limit of the end in the art of wealth getting.
(4) Usury, or the lending o f  money at interest (M -M’): money is lent to get a larger 
amount of money returned. It is the most hated monetary form.
Aristotle here distinguishes between two forms of acquisition, oikonomike and 
chrematistike, in terms of two forms of usage of acquired object. On the one hand, the 
first two acquisition modes, C-C’ and C-M-C’, are the economic, because it is to use 
an item primarily as it is, for instance, to use sandals to be worn. On the other hand, 
the last two acquisition modes, M-C-M’ and M-M’, are the chrematistic, because it is 
to use an item to be exchanged for money, for instance, to use sandals to be 
exchanged for a profit. Aristotle considers that the chrematistic art o f acquisition is 
the natural development outcome of exchange from the economic. Aristotle considers 
the morality o f money in terms of the particular moral character the acquisition mode 
tends to produce. ‘The market, where its development is unchecked, tends to issue not
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in the virtues constitutive o f a flourishing human life, but in the vice o f pleonexia, the 
disposition to want more than is proper’ (O’Neill, 2001b, p. 163). Money tends to 
result, not in the virtue o f human flourishing, but in the vice of pleonexia, the limitless 
pursuit o f the art of wealth getting.
As argued above, a number of recent consequentialist approaches have involved a 
morally instrumentalist view o f money (i.e. it is pointless to argue about the morality 
of money since it is a tool for maximising our utility), which is applied for money 
justifications (i.e. money is consequentially compatible with ethical behaviour 
because it functions or maximises our utility). The consequentialist form of moral 
instrumentalism, however, ought to and can be avoided by virtue theory based on 
intrinsic teleology rather than value theory based on extrinsic teleology. As we have 
seen, consequentialism involves the theory o f  value, which concerns what it is for a 
state of affairs to be good and for one situation to be better than another, whereas 
virtue ethics involves the theory o f  virtue, which concerns what it is to act virtuously 
or viciously on a particular occasion and how that is related to what it is to have a 
good or bad moral character. Both ethical theories are ‘teleological’: they make moral 
judgement in terms of the aim or goal of action. The former’s is an extrinsic telos (i.e. 
a good state of affairs), whereas the latter’s is an intrinsic telos (i.e. a good state of 
human beings).40 An extrinsic telos for utilitarian consequentialists is an economic 
goal. ‘There is only one end, pleasure or utility, and all actions are means to it; they 
are therefore to be judged only on their efficacy in promoting that end, so that only the 
consequences o f action are significant, not the actions themselves. Utilitarianism 
provides economics with a simulacrum of ethics in which it is not difficult to arrange 
a close association between utility maximization and the maximization of exchange 
value’ (Meikle, 1995, p. 107). For Aristotelian virtue ethicists, in contrast, an intrinsic 
telos is rather an ethical goal: it is the full realisation of human nature though virtuous 
actions. That is, predetermining money as a tool for utility maximisation prevents us 
from examining this intrinsic telos and its incompatibility with money.
40 See chapter 7 for further arguments on a contrast between consequentialist and virtue-based 
utopianism, which are relatively based on the intrinsic and extrinsic teleology.
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4.2.2 Essentialism
Essentialism holds a view that an object consists of some ‘necessary’ properties and, 
typically, ‘accidental’ properties.41 Essences define identity: essences make an object 
a certain kind of entity rather than any other. Essences are ‘some characteristics that 
make it the kind of thing it is (or the very thing it is) and without which it could not 
exist or to be what it is’ (Meikle, 1985, p. 177). The essential properties are in contrast 
with accidental properties, which an object can lack and still be what it is. To use a 
chemical example, H 20 are the essential properties o f water, whereas if it is in a bowl 
or a kettle is a matter of accidental properties. Or to take a social example, in chess 
certain rules are essential, whereas if the chess pieces are wooden or plastic, or if  the 
chess players are left-handed or right-handed are accidental (Sayer, 1997, p. 456).42 
The nature of essences can be characterised as follows (Meikle, 1985, pp. 153-74; 
O ’Neill, 2001b, pp. 159-60, Sayer, 1997, pp. 453-87)43:
(a) Essences are dispositional: many essential properties of objects are dispositional, 
which are only actualised in certain circumstances. It is even a case that some 
essences are can only be characterised in terms of potentiality. For instance, a 
kitten becomes a cat. If a kitten could not become a cat, it wouldn’t have been a 
kitten, but something else. Certain sorts o f  change belong to essences’, being a 
mature cat is an essence a kitten potentially has. “ Going to be a cat in the future’ 
is a part of what it is to be a kitten now; to be a kitten now is to have the present
41 Aristotelian essentialism has traditionally been argued as opposing to atomism or accidentalism 
derived from Democritus and Epicurus (Meikle, 1985, pp. 8-9), which will be discussed in chapter 7: 
Utopia. The atomist considers that reality is made of ‘building blocks’ or atomistic ‘small-bits’, and 
further believes everything else is reducible to them. The essentialist, in contrast, considers that reality 
cannot be explained in terms o f its constituent matter (i.e. atoms), but in terms o f ‘organic wholes’ or 
‘entities’, and further believes that everything else is rather irreducible to them (Meikle, 1985, p. 154; p. 
175).
42 Not all rules are necessarily essential. ‘Constitutive rules’ are essential to a certain social practice 
whereas ‘regulative rules’ are accidental. Constitutive rules, on the one hand, constitute (and also 
regulate) an activity the existence o f which is logically dependent on the rules. The rules of football or 
chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but create the very possibility of 
playing such games. The activities of playing football or chess are constituted by acting in accordance 
with the appropriate rules. The activity, therefore, cannot exist without its constitutive rules, and it is in 
this sense inseparable from the rules. Regulative rules, on the other hand, regulate a pre-existing 
activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. For example, many rules of 
etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships that exist independently o f the rules. While traffic rules 
may regulate traffic, it does not create or define our driving activity: (chaotic) traffic can exist without 
traffic rules.
43 There are even more: (c) Essences are dependent: some essential properties o f objects are dependent 
on other properties, and part o f the purpose of scientific investigation is to discover those dependencies, 
(d) Some have plural essences and others do not have one: ‘We could ... argue that gender has no 
essence but that minerals, species, contracts, bureaucracies or the game o f football do’ (Sayer, 2000, pp. 
86-7).
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potential to become a cat; to be an adult cat is to have realised that past potential’ 
(Meikle, 1985, p. 160). A kitten may be killed by car accident or fatal disease 
before becoming a mature cat. But they are features that a kitten does not 
necessarily have. If a kitten comes across those accidents, its potential is 
accidentally not realised.
(b) Essences are discoverable: essential properties of an object precede its discovery. 
We do not always know essential properties, but we discover them. Some entity 
has its essential properties before we know them to be so, and would still have 
essential properties even if they had never been discovered. Discovery o f  essences 
does not make some properties essences ex post factum. Discovery of essences 
requires investigation: essential properties cannot be discovered simply by looking 
at them or looking for them in a dictionary, but by means of observation, 
investigation and analysis o f facts. The appearance of an object does not reveal its 
essences directly to us.
As was noted above, a number o f recent deontological approaches have involved a 
moral instrumentalist view of money (i.e. money’s morality cannot be judged in terms 
of the goodness and badness o f what it is, but in terms of rightness and wrongness of 
how it is used). This view is held by American pragmatists —  i.e. there is no such 
thing as ‘universally representational properties of money’, because money does not 
create any meaning outside of its use in particular contexts. ‘Money creates meaning 
pragmatically, that is through use. Money is not a neutral or meaningless social object, 
and its meanings are consequential. People treat money differently depending on what 
it means —  good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong, dirty or clean’ 
(Carruthers and Espeland, 1998, p. 1401). If money created meaning through people’s 
use, however, money would also have different meanings depending on how people 
treat it. While it appears to be value-pluralistic and emancipatory, it can easily flip 
into moral relativism: money can be either good or bad by depending on right or 
wrong usage. By being against misplaced essentialism, American pragmatists end up 
committed to a crude social constructivism —  i.e. money is nothing more than our 
social construction o f money. The essential properties o f  money, however, cannot be 
reduced to our conceptions o f  money: they can exist independently from  us, and can 
precede our discovery o f  them. The discovery o f  money essences does not make them 
essences ex post factum. The essential properties of money are not ‘universally
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representational properties of money’, but the ‘necessary properties’ money 
ontologically consists of. They are essential to the ontological status of money 
regardless of being discovered or not.
4.3 Radin Against Marx
The third section considers Radin’s rejection of (what appears to her) misplaced 
Marxist arguments in order to furthermore demonstrate how moral instrumentalism 
can be avoided from an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective.
Radin (1996) considers that Marxist arguments on incompatibility between universal 
commodification and human flourishing still have relevance, ‘because they expose the 
link between our conceptual schemes and our world’ {ibid., p. 83). ‘Universal 
commodification is a conceptual scheme, a worldview’ (ibid., p. 6). For Radin, we 
speak of market rhetoric (e.g. supply, demand, price, opportunity costs, production 
functions) as the commodification discourse: we conceive of and speak of something 
as if  it were a commodity subject to market exchange. Moreover, ‘[universal] 
commodification is a reductionist conceptual scheme’ (ibid., p. 8). Universal 
commodification presupposes that all value can be expressed in terms of price, and 
reduces all values to a sum of money. This reductionist conceptual scheme may keep 
us from becoming a well-developed person.
While Radin shows her affinities to the Marxist arguments on the unethical nature o f 
universal commodification, however, she rejects two further Marxist propositions: she 
does not adopt ‘the Marxist notion that commodification is always wrong’, and ‘the 
Marxist notion that commodified understandings of social interactions cannot coexist 
with noncommodified one’ (ibid., p. xii). Let us consider Radin’s two claims (i.e. 
anti-foundationalism and incomplete commodification), which she defends through a 
rejection of what she takes to be two misplaced Marxist positions (i.e. the rejection of 
foundationalism, and the rejection of universal non-commodificationism).
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4.3.1 Anti-Foundationalism 
Radin’s criticism of the Kantian categorical imperative (i.e. universal principle of 
ethics) leads her to embrace a philosophical turn towards ‘anti-foundationalism’. 
From a perspective of Kantian deontological ethics, the market conceptualisation of 
personhood harms personhood because it leads us to conceive o f persons as means, 
not ends. It follows that, market rhetoric, which turns personhood into commodities, 
ought to be culturally and legally discouraged. Radin claims, however, that this 
Kantian ideal o f personhood is even a cultural artifact maintaining this conception 
means maintaining a firm cultural commitment to it. There can be no ‘universal 
principle of ethics’, because a firm cultural commitment to Kantian conceptual 
scheme makes a difference to reality:
If we accept the gist of the antifoundationalist theories, facts are not “out there” 
waiting to be described by a discourse. Facts are theory-dependent and value- 
dependent. Theories are formed in words. Commitments to facts and values are 
present in the language we use to reason and describe, and they shape our 
reasoning, our description, and the shape (for us) of reality itself. (Radin, 1996, 
p. 89)
Radin ‘denies that rationality or truth consists of linear deductions from an 
unquestioned foundational reality or truth’ (ibid.), because there are inseparable links 
between value and fact, between words and the world, between rhetoric and reality, 
and so on. Radin claims that our discourses matter to reality and truth through a 
consequentialist form of reasoning: the rhetoric matters to the reality, because ‘there 
is no such thing as two radically different normative discourses reaching the “same” 
result’ (ibid., p. 84, italics added). ‘Our conceptualizations o f what is matter for what 
is. Because words and the world are linked, the result at which a normative discourse 
arrives is not detachable from that discourse without altering the meaning o f the 
result’ (ibid., p. 88, italics added). ‘This integration of discourse into a state o f  affairs 
follows from the pragmatist rejection of foundationalism’ (ibid., p. 89, italics added). 
These suggest that since radically different normative discourses reach different 
results, market rhetoric may (and may not) promote a good result. Normative 
discourses may (and may not) arrive at a good result by altering the meaning of the
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result. Radin’s stresses the integration of rhetoric into reality as a state o f  affairs, 
integration of words into the world as a state o f  affairs.
Radin’s ‘anti-foundationalism’, however, has a problem through its collapse into 
moral relativism. Her pragmatism, rooted as it is in social constructionism and strong 
social constructionist ontology, views that our normative discourses constitute the 
world may misguide us into making or selecting our normative discourses in 
accordance with the result they promote. If our normative discourses constitute the 
world, as she claims, then we can control the morality by them. If our normative 
discourses about money, for instance, constitute the morality of money, we can regard 
money either as good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, right or wrong, dirty or 
clean, and so on, by some appropriate discourses for the result we expect to promote. 
However, while facts are, as Radin claims, not ‘out there’ waiting to be described by a 
discourse, they are not ‘in here’ either to be arbitrarily manipulated by a discourse. 
While facts are, as Radin claims, theory-dependent and value-dependent, they are 
neither theory-determined nor value-determined. Radin summarises here position 
thus:
Simply put, there is no sharp distinction between the nature o f an interaction and 
the terms in which we conceive of it. ... Whenever we can perceive a harm to 
persons, our perception is mediated through a conceptual structure or structures; 
conceptualisation makes it possible for us to see harm as harm. (Radin, 1996, p. 
14, italics added)
From the absence o f a sharp distinction between reality and concept, however, it does 
not necessarily follow that they can be reduced into each other. A moral harm can 
neither be reduced into our conception nor perception o f it. While conceptualisation, 
as Radin claims, makes us possible to see harm as harm, it is not the case that it 
causes harm, just as the idea of gravity does not cause a harmful result o f drowning, 
but gravity does (Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845-6], p. 37). As Radin herself denotes, 
‘[t]he social world is partly constituted by our concepts and categories of belief 
(Radin, 1996, p. 80, italics added), meaning, importantly, that it is not totally 
constituted by our concepts.
I l l
4.3.2 Incomplete Commodification 
Radin brings her argument down to the relative goodness o f a state of affairs: she 
takes a state o f affairs, which is integrated with our normative discourses, as an ethical 
primitive. As we have seen, she argues from the claim that radically “different” 
normative discourses do not reach the “same” result to the conclusion that there can 
be no universal principle of ethics, which is independent from a result it promotes. 
Thus, conceptual schemes of universal commodification and non-commodification 
reflect in the world. As for whether commodified and non-commodified sex are the 
“same” or “different”, therefore, she claims that certain things (e.g. nuts and bolts) are 
the “same” whether commodified or not, whereas others (e.g. love, friendship, 
sexuality) are very “different” if  commodified (Radin, 1996, pp. 94-5). She suggests 
that this ambiguous stance would be unsatisfactory to ‘utopian humanist Marxists’ 
who commit themselves to the idea that commodification is bad for human being in 
all senses:
The prohibition argument —  that commodification of things is bad in itself, or 
because these things are not the “same” things that would be available to 
people in nonmarket relationships — leads to the universal noncommodification 
pursued by many utopian humanist Marxists. If commodification is bad in itself, 
it is bad for everything. Once we have understood the point about social 
construction, any social good is arguably “different” if  not embedded in a 
market society. (Radin, 1996, p. 95, italics added)
For Radin, there can be no black and while sort of moral judgement (e.g. 
commodification is either good or bad in itself, for everything and for everybody). 
Thus, she seeks her stance in a gray area between commodification and non­
commodification. She claims that theories about the role of the market can be 
imagined as ordered on a continuum between universal commodification (i.e. 
everything in markets), represented by Hobbesian utilitarian economists, and 
universal noncommodification (i.e. nothing in markets), represented by ‘utopian 
humanists Marxists’ (ibid., p. xiii). She considers that both theoretical poles are 
inadequate, and seeks a middle way. it is not a traditional middle way of market 
compartmentalisation (i.e. theorising the social world in terms of pure market and 
non-market domains) represented by Michael Walzer, but a new middle way of
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incomplete commodification (i.e. the coexistence of commodified and non- 
commodified understandings). Incomplete commodification is the social state o f  
affairs in which a commodified understanding (for some people) coexists with a non- 
commodified understanding (for others) (ibid., p. 102).
Radin’s ‘incomplete commodification’, however, has problems in virtue of being 
argued on consequentialist grounds (i.e. in terms of the relative goodness of a state of 
affairs) in spite of Radin's own criticism of a utilitarian consequentialist claim: ‘all 
values may be translated into — reduced to — money and radically (numerically) 
compared’ {ibid., p. 6). She reduces the morality of commodification into a case of 
‘everything or nothing (i.e. which is a better social state o f  affairs, in which 
everything is commodified or in which nothing is commodified?)’, and clams that 
incomplete commodification is a better social state of affairs than universal 
commodification and How-commodification. It is not the case, however, that the 
incomplete state o f  affairs realises the morality. Rather one needs to discover market 
boundaries properly in accordance with the ontology o f  items. While incomplete 
commodification may leave the possibility o f a market boundary, it does not explain 
why certain things (e.g. nuts and bolts) are the “same” whether commodified or not, 
whereas others (e.g. love, friendship, sexuality) are very “different” if  commodified. 
Moreover, ‘incomplete commodification’ also refers to the incompleteness in respect 
that the commodification of things is good for some people but bad for others, which 
again collapses into moral relativism where commodified things like love, friendship 
and sexuality are different from non-commodified forms for some people and the 
commodified form morally objectionable, but the same for others and hence morally 
acceptable. In any case, Radin’s claim can easily flip into anything goes —  i.e. the 
commodification may [and may not] consequently be compatible with somebody’s 
morality.
Radin claims that the Marxist notion is that commodified understandings of social 
interactions cannot coexist with non-commodified ones. ‘In his [Marx’s] view that 
“bourgeois property” cannot coexist with other kinds o f property, Marx may be 
understood to have meant that market and nonmarket forms cannot coexist’ {ibid., p. 
102). However her account misconstrues the nature of Marx's objections to money. 
Marx does not argue about the morality on a consequentialist ground. M arx’s ethics is
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rather a reconciliation of Kantian deontological ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics 
(Kain, pp. 64-5). From a Kantian deontological ethics perspective, Marx considers 
that money is incompatible with categorical imperative, because it leads human 
beings to treat others not as an end but as a means: human beings ought to be treated 
as ends in themselves, never as means only, regardless o f  the consequences treating 
others as a means promotes. From an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, in 
contrast, Marx argues that money perverts human virtue: money prevents us from the 
realisation of human essence, which is not an extrinsic telos (i.e. a good state o f  
affairs), but an intrinsic telos (i.e. a good state o f  human beings). Marx considers that 
commodification is incompatible with our ethical behaviour and human virtue, since 
treating others not as a means but as an end is incompatible with both a categorical 
imperative and an excellence of human virtue. From whichever ethical perspective, 
however, Marx’s argument does not depend upon the co-existence of the market and 
the non-market interactions as a state o f  affairs (i.e. an extrinsic telos): fo r  Marx, a 
state o f  affairs (i.e. an extrinsic telos) does not play any role in the determination o f  
our moral obligation.
4.4 Against Egalitarian Justifications of Money
This final section critically assesses, from an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, 
egalitarian justifications of money that appeal to equality and justice.
4.4.1 Money Promotes Equality 
One argument for the defensibility of money is that it can be used to promote 
egalitarian objectives. Goodwin, for example, claims that money can be a better 
means than other alternatives to promote equality of wellbeing and satisfaction. What 
she refers to as communist states used to measure satisfaction ‘objectively’ according 
to some stipulated criteria o f  wellbeing — e.g. everyone gets eight ounces of meat a 
day, forty cubic sheet of space, three new outfits of cloth a year, and neglects 
individual preferences and differing needs too cavalierly and necessarily. ‘If we are 
attempting to evaluate and equalize material wellbeing and satisfaction, arrived at 
through the consumption of a variety of goods (as it is any advanced society), we can 
better do this by using money than by statutory bread and circuses —  and, as an 
additional good, we can thereby foster a degree of free choice and control over 
personal life’ (Goodwin, 1986, p. 565). Goodwin’s argument, however, has a problem
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in her assuming equality in respect of individual’s preference and satisfaction.44 
Money can neither evaluate nor equalise preference and satisfaction because they are 
incommensurable —  i.e. they cannot be measured in terms of single and cardinal 
measurement o f value, namely money. Moreover, the process through which our 
preferences are formed and satisfied is context-dependent and contingent. 
‘Preferences often adapt to circumstances’ {ibid.). One may give up wanting what one 
believes one cannot get. One may start wanting something because others also want it.
Goodwin’s egalitarianism is based on a utilitarian consequentialist view, which 
conceives welfare or utility as the satisfaction of a person’s preferences for some 
states of affairs over others, and treats individuals as those who rationally and freely 
choose their favourite options to maximise their welfare. This is called telic - 
egalitarianism, which can be in good contrast with virtue-based egalitarianism, based 
on an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. Let us compare these different kinds of 
egalitarianism:
• Telic Egalitarianism concerns equality as a good state of affairs. It claims that we 
ought to promote equality because equality over some set of goods is a good state 
of affairs in itself. What is wrong with inequality, correspondingly, is that it is a 
bad state o f affairs as such (Parfit, 1997; cf. Miller, 1997; Norman, 1997).
• Virtues-based Egalitarianism concerns equality as a constitutive condition of 
excellences of character. It claims that we should aim at equality as a constitutive 
condition of virtues o f character. What is unethical about inequality, 
correspondingly, is that it is a constitutive o f vices of character (O’Neill, 2001a). 
Typical vices o f inequality cited in the egalitarian tradition are such as dependence, 
snobbery, sycophancy; typical virtues of equality would be self-respect, 
independence and fellowship.
Telic egalitarianism needs to assume commensurability: it needs to assume a 
particular metric of equality through which we can compare different states of affairs 
and ascertain which is more or less equal than another. Like traditional maximising 
consequentialism it has to assume there is a single metric for comparison. However, 
there can be no such metric to measure our heterogeneous natures. Any metric that
44 Apart from equality o f preference satisfaction, there are equality of resources, equality of access to
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equalises in one respect will leave us unequal in others. Commensurability is as much 
a problem for the egalitarian consequentialist as it is for the maximising 
consequentialist. In contrast, a virtue-based egalitarianism need not involve any such 
assumption of commensurability. It does not assume there is some single metric 
through which different states o f affairs can be compared. It is concerned rather with 
the realisation of human flourishing and recognises that given our heterogeneous 
natures that different individuals have different needs.
The same line o f argument against telic egalitarianism can be found in the Critique o f  
the Gotha Programme (Marx and Engels, 1970 [1875]). Marx speculates that a virtue- 
based account of equality may be realised in a higher phase of communal society, 
which is yet an unequal society in a number of respects as a state of affairs. Marx 
firstly claims that, in a lower phase o f communal society, its members may be equal 
in terms of their labour: an individual producer ‘receives a certificate from society that 
he has furnished such-and-such an amount of labor (after deducting his labor for the 
common funds); and with this certificate, he draws from the social stock of means of 
consumption as much as the same amount o f labor cost. The same amount o f labor 
which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another’ {ibid). In a 
lower phase o f communal society, an each individual works according to one’s ability, 
and the wealth is distributed to an each individual according to one’s contribution to 
the society. Members o f a society are equal in respect of exchanging equivalent 
values: telic-egalitarian account o f equality is realised through arithmetic equality 
between exchanged products. Marx claims, however, ‘equal right here is still in 
principle —  bourgeois right’ {ibid.), because the equality consists in the fact that 
measurement is made with an equal standard, labour:
But one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more 
labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a 
measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a 
standard o f measurement. This equal right is an unequal right fo r  unequal labor. 
It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like 
everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus
advantage, or equality o f capabilities to function etc.
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productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right o f  inequality, 
in its content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the 
application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be 
different individuals if  they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal 
standard insofar as they are brought under an equal point o f  view, are taken 
from one definite side only — for instance, in the present case, are regarded only 
as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. 
Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than 
another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and 
hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more 
than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these 
defects, right, instead o f  being equal, would have to be unequal {ibid., italics 
added).
While there are inequalities between the workers’ abilities (e.g. physically, mentally) 
and/or between their circumstances (e.g. marriage, family), they can be ‘equalised’ 
through a standard measure of labour only in that respect as a state o f  affairs. It 
follows that the society has to be rather unequal in order to get rid of the defect of 
ignoring heterogeneous human natures. Marx further speculates that, in a higher phase 
of communal society, in contrast, its members are not any more ‘equalised’ though a 
standard measure o f labour. ''From each according to his ability, to each according to 
his needs!' {ibid.): in a higher phase o f communal society, an each individual works 
according to their ability, and yet the wealth is distributed to each individual, not 
according to their contribution to the society, but to their needs. Members of a society 
are equal in respect o f  a constitutive condition o f  certain virtue: virtue-based equality 
is realised through geometrical proportionality between the society members.45
45 Arie notes the similarity between M arx’s communal society and Aristotle’s polis in respect o f their 
unequal natures. He has a citation from Castoriadis, which argues that M arx’s the Critique o f  the Gotha 
Programme is a result o f paraphrasing several lines in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: Book V 
(Castoriadis, 1978, p. 718).
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4.4.2 Money Promotes Justice 
Goodwin argues the relevance o f money to a socialist idea of social justice: ‘money 
would be an important instrument in achieving the egalitarian distributive justice 
which socialists advocate’ (Goodwin, 1986, p. 537, italics added). She is prompted by 
her own ‘three experiences’ to think about money and justice:
• The first is in a hairdresser’s salon. A stylist streaks the hair of an attractive young 
blonde, while another, with equal care, gives an old lady the best style that he can 
devise. ‘Given free choice, doubtless both the stylist would have chosen to titivate 
the young woman. That is one of the profoundly unfair facts o f  human life, but 
one which money can mitigate. ... The natural inequality between individuals can 
and should be modified or compensated for in a socially just society’ (ibid., p. 562, 
italics added).
• The second is in Paris, while it takes (only) a week to find a flat ‘if you arrive on 
the doorstep before anyone else with a deposit’, it takes weeks to get a nominal 
attachment to a French college with letters and interviews with members of the 
academic hierarchy who have no particular incentive to grant it. ‘How I wished I 
could give a deposit, or a bribe! (ibid.)’, which suggests that money is a much 
more efficient mechanism than bureaucratic process for distributing justice.
• The third is reading a student’s dissertation on racial bias in the allocation of 
council housing in London. ‘Statistics shows that blacks in London are 
consistently offered older and poorer quality council housing than whites, for 
reasons probably attributable to conscious and unconscious bias among housing 
officials. ... Without a doubt it would be better if  all blacks had sufficient incomes 
to rent or buy housing in an ideal, bias-free market’ (ibid., p. 563).
The structure o f Goodwin’s argument can be summarised as the following three steps:
(a) Injustice may occur in terms of difference age, sex, nationality, ethnicity etc.
(b) Injustice should not occur, because being unfair in terms of those differences is a 
bad state of affairs.
(c) Money can be the solution for injustice in terms of those differences.
Goodwin also here assumes a telic-egalitarian justification of money: money should 
and can promote justice as a good state o f  affairs: she presupposes a telic-egalitarian
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account of justice/injustice as a good/bad state of affairs. My argument, in contrast, is 
from a perspective o f virtue-based egalitarianism, again: even though injustice may 
occur as a state of affairs in one respect, there might be justice as a constitutive 
condition of virtuous character. What she describes in her three episodes is about the 
unfairness, which may occur in terms o f in terms of age, sex, nationality and ethnicity. 
While the unfairness may occur, as Goodwin indicates, in terms o f those natural and 
social differences, it is not caused by those differences themselves but by prejudiced 
individuals. Differences of age sex, and the like are neither ‘the unfair facts of human 
life’ nor ‘natural inequalities’ in themselves: they are features of our heterogeneous 
human natures, and their differences are not unfair in themselves. The problem lies in 
the social relations between persons that renders age, sex, nationality and ethnicity a 
matter o f social subordination or social stigma. The problem is not resolved by 
making individuals indifferent to those qualities in particular contexts, but rather by 
transforming social relations that are responsible for the social subordination and 
stigma associated with those qualities.
Marx’s argument in the Critique o f  the Gotha Programme is helpful, again. Marx 
speculates that, in a lower phase of communal society, its members are indifferent: 
they ‘are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else 
being ignored’ (Marx and Engels, 1970 [1875]). Still more in a capitalist market 
society, the only relevant factor is that each is an owner of property, and is willing to 
exchange one’s properties with each other. Whatever personalities and identities each 
has, they are just owners of a certain property. In a hairdresser’s salon, a stylist is an 
owner o f hairdressing service, a customer is an owner o f a service fee, and they meet 
to exchange those properties for each other: all other ‘properties’, such as young 
blonde and old, are irrelevant and indifferent for a relationship between stylists and, 
and therefore ignored. In a housing market, we are owners of either house or rent, 
whatever skin colour is. Marx speculates that, in a higher phase of communal society, 
in contrast, its members become different: each individual works according to their 




This chapter has demonstrated that a currently prevailing morally instrumentalist view 
of money should and can be avoided by an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective. The 
moral instrumentalism, rooted in the Post-structuralist ontology, even conceals the 
distinction between gift giving and commodity exchange: ‘O f course, the difference 
between gifts and commodities has little or nothing to do with the objects themselves 
but rather with the role that they play and how they are perceived. ... Things are not 
intrinsically gifts or commodities — that status is bestowed on them depending on 
how they are used’ (Carruthers and Espeland, 1998, p. 1395). While I agree with their 
anti-atomist ontology (i.e. there is no such thing as a material atom of gift or 
commodity in an object), I do not agree with their deontological approach to moral 
instrumentalism (i.e. things can mean whichever, as gifts or commodities, not by 
depending on some common characteristics, but on their usage in a certain context). 
Their view o f moral instrumentalism may cause moral relativism: it may occur that a 
certain thing could be a gift for me but a commodity for you if we do not share the 
same social context. An Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective can avoid the moral 
relativism: the essential properties of gift giving cannot be reduced into our 
conceptions of gift giving. The discovery of the essential properties o f gift giving does 
not make a certain interaction gift giving ex post factum. This chapter against moral 
instrumentalism paves the way for the ontology o f altruistic gift giving argued in 
chapter 6. First, however, we consider in chapter 5 one o f the most influential and 
powerful virtues-based defences of money, that developed by Adam Smith. This 
account avoids many of the problems of the moral instrumentalism to be found in the 
consequentialist and deontological defences of money discussed in this chapter. 
However, I show, through a critical contrast with an Aristotelian virtue ethic, that the 
particular Calvinistic form of virtue ethic that Smith ultimately assumes is inadequate.
CHAPTER 5: AGAINST SMITHIAN VIRTUE ETHICS
Whoever loves money never has money enough; 
whoever loves wealth is never satisfied with his income.
This too is meaningless. (Ecclesiastes, 5:10)
5.0 Introduction
‘Ecclesiastes’ is known as uniquely using many market terminologies, which mostly 
don’t appear in other stories in the Old Testament — e.g. gain, toil, labour, income, 
reward, and wealth.46 While its origins are unclear, it is supposed to have been written 
under the Ptolemaic dynasty in the 3rd century BC, when the monetary economy 
underwent a great advancement. The story begins with a teacher’s nihilistic grief for 
wealth and labour: “ ‘Meaningless! Meaningless!” says the Teacher. “Utterly 
meaningless! Everything is meaningless.” What does man gain from all his labor at 
which he toils under the sun? (ibid., 1: 2-3)’ The teacher undertook an epicurean 
project of building houses, gardens and parks, planting all kinds of fruit trees, making 
reservoirs to water them, bringing slaves, owning herds and flocks, amassing silver, 
gold and treasures, acquiring singers and a harem, and so on. ‘Yet when I surveyed all 
that my hands had done and what I had toiled to achieve, everything was meaningless, 
a chasing after the wind; nothing was gained under the sun’ (ibid., 1:11). Then, 
however, the teacher miraculously turns this nihilism over to the affirmation of the 
meaningless life and world:
What does a man get for all the toil and anxious striving with which he labors 
under the sun? All his days his work is pain and grief; even at night his mind 
does not rest. This too is meaningless. A man can do nothing better than to eat 
and drink and fin d  satisfaction in his work. This too, I  see, is from the hand o f  
God, fo r  without him, who can eat or find  enjoyment? To the man who pleases 
him, God gives wisdom, knowledge and happiness, but to the sinner he gives 
the task of gathering and storing up wealth to hand it over to the one who 
pleases God. This too is meaningless, a chasing after the wind, (ibid., 2:22-6, 
italics added).
46 ‘Ecclesiastes ( ‘qohelet’ in Hebrew)’ refers to a preacher or a teacher who speaks at an assembly.
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Being quite different from a former nihilist, the teacher commends the enjoyment of 
the meaningless life and world. The teacher realises that it is good and proper for 
human beings to eat and drink, and to find satisfaction in their toilsome labour, since 
this is the gift o f  God. God gives human beings wealth and possessions, and enables 
them to enjoy them. No one can really comprehend what God has done under the sun. 
But human beings don’t need to concern their meaningless life, because God keeps it 
occupied with gladness of heart. What the righteous and the wise do are all in God's 
hands. Whichever the righteous and the wicked, the good and the bad, the clean and 
the unclean, all share a common destiny before God. Why not become the God­
fearing and be happy, then? Because 'even a live dog is better o ff than a dead lionl 
For the living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing; they have no 
further reward, and even the memory of them is forgotten’ (ibid., 9:4-5, italics added).
Succeeding the previous chapter, this chapter critically examines a Smithian virtue- 
based justification o f  money (i.e. whilst the society may subsist without a positive 
virtue of beneficence, it cannot subsist without a negative virtue of justice promoted 
by money). It aims to expose the hidden agenda of Smithian virtue ethics —  i.e. the 
affirmation of the rhetoric of the Ecclesiastes’ turning over the nihilism of wealth into 
the affirmation of the meaningless life and world. The rhetoric of the Ecclesiastes ’ 
turning over can be summarised as follows:
(1) Imperfect human beings are assumed before the perfect God.
(2) Their imperfect nature is taken to be the gift o f God.
(3) The imperfect human beings are urged to make a contract with the perfect God.
(4) Imperfect human beings are supposed to enjoy their meaningless life in God's 
hands.
This Ecclesiastes' turning over corresponds to the Smith’s conversion from the Stoic 
into the Calvinism in the 6th edition of The Theory o f  The Moral Sentiments: through 
abolishing the Stoic view of perfect virtue and employing the Calvinist view of 
imperfect but attainable virtue instead, Adam Smith attempts to persuade us to 
moderate our expectations of positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and to prioritise 
negative virtue (i.e. justice). Through a comparison with Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
this chapter aims to reveal the way in which Smithian virtue ethics rather impedes the 
possible excellence of human virtues. It aims to do as follows:
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1. It considers the Aristotle’s account of ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’. For Aristotle, virtue is 
a mean between two extremes (i.e. excess and deficiency). He claims the 
possibility and desirability of reciprocation as a synthesis o f the qualitative nature 
of persons and the quantitative nature of things.
2. It considers the Smith’s account of ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’. Smith divides a virtue 
into two kinds —  i.e. a positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and a negative virtue (i.e. 
justice). Through employing the rhetoric of the Ecclesiastes ’ turning over, Smith 
persuades us to moderate our expectations of positive virtue and to prioritise 
negative virtue.
3. It summarises the contrast between Aristotle’s and Smith’s virtue ethics in respect 
of their different conceptions of virtue and justice. Aristotle considers that 
friendship is more basic than justice for people’s association in their community, 
whereas Smith considers that justice is more basic than friendship for the 
subsistence o f the society.
4. It puts an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective to work critically assessing some 
Smithian attempts to justify money (i.e. money promotes independence and 
freedom).
These arguments pave the way for exploring how the Smithian virtue-based 
justification o f  money conceals a positive virtue o f beneficence by leading us to seek a 
negative virtue of justice as the second best.
5.1 Aristotle
Aristotle’s argument is based on the dichotomy of the qualitative nature of persons, 
which he characterises as a geometrical proportionality between persons and the 
quantitative nature of things, which he characterises as an arithmetic equality between 
things. Aristotle claims the possibility and desirability o f reciprocation as a synthesis 
of these two natures: reciprocation is the transformation of geometrical 
proportionality, which makes people’s association in their community, into arithmetic 
equality, which is to seek the medium between two extremes (i.e. excess and 
deficiency) themselves. Let us summarise Aristotle’s concept o f virtue and justice:
123
5.1.1 Virtue
Aristotle explains that the virtue is neither a feeling nor a capacity but a state:
[E]very virtue causes that o f which it is a virtue to be in a good state, and to 
perform its characteristic activity well. The virtue of the eye, for example, 
makes it and its characteristic activity, because it is through the virtue of the eye 
that we see well. Likewise, the virtue of the horse makes a horse good —  good 
at running, at carrying its rider and at facing the enemy. If this is so in all cases, 
then the virtue o f a human being too will be the state that makes a human being 
good and makes him perform his characteristic activity well (1106a). (Aristotle, 
2000, p. 29)
The virtue is a good state, which can be a constitutive condition for performing certain 
characteristic activity. Beside, Aristotle claims that the virtue o f character is a mean: 
‘it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency (1109a)’ {ibid., p. 
35). Then, Aristotle introduces two virtues related with wealth —  i.e. generosity and 
magnificence: (i) generosity is a mean between the wasteful and the stingy: ‘Since 
generosity is a mean concerned with the giving and spending o f  money, the generous 
person will give and spend the right amounts, on the right objects, in both small and
t .
large matters alike, and he will do it with pleasure’ (1120 ). {ibid., p. 62, italics 
added): (ii) magnificence is a mean between the vulgar and the niggardly: ‘The 
magnificent person will spend such amounts for the sake of what is noble, since this is 
a feature common to the virtues. Again, he will do it with pleasure and lavishly, 
because precise counting o f  the cost is niggardly ’ (1122 ). {ibid., p. 66, italics added) 
Both cases suggest that the virtue of character is not a mean in respect of its absolute 
amount (i.e. arithmetic equality), but is a mean in respect of its relative ratio (i.e. 
proportionate balance)47: neither does being generous nor being magnificent depend 
on exactly how much wealth has been given or spent, but depend on how the proper 
amount o f  wealth has been given or spent with pleasure and lavishly.
47 This argument directly links to Aristotle’s concepts of three kinds o f justice: ‘distributive justice (i.e. 
geometrical proportionality between persons)’, ‘rectificatory (or corrective) justice (i.e. arithmetic 
equality between things)’, and ‘reciprocal justice (i.e. transformation o f geometrical proportionality 
into arithmetic equality)’. See 5.1.2 Justice.
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While Aristotle considers that both friendship and justice are virtues, which people 
cannot lack in their life, he claims the superiority of the former to the latter:
Friendship seems also to hold cities together, and lawgivers to care more about 
it than about justice; for concord seems to be something like friendship, and this 
is what they aim at most o f all, while taking special pains to eliminate civil 
conflict as something hostile. And when people are friends, they have no need 
ofjustice, while when they are just, the need friendship as well; and the highest 
form  o f  justice seems to be a matter o f  friendship (1155a). {ibid., p. 144, italics 
added)
Aristotle claims that even lawgivers care more about friendship than about justice fo r  
people’s concord in their community. For Aristotle, friendship does not require justice 
whereas justice requires friendship. Besides, justice can be its highest form with 
friendship. These considerations suggest that, for Aristotle, while both friendship and 
justice are required for a good society, friendship is more basic virtue than justice for 
society.
5.1.2 Justice
Aristotle explains ‘reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal justice)’ is a synthesis o f distributive 
justice (i.e. the moral value) and rectificatory justice (i.e. the economic value). 
Followings are the summaries of three kinds of justice:48
• Distributive justice: geometrical proportionality between persons 
Aristotle claims, ‘[o]ne type o f particular justice ... is that found in distributions of 
honour or money or the other things that have to be shared among members o f the 
political community (1130b)’ {ibid., p. 85). The principle o f these distributions must 
be in accordance with axeea, meaning merit or value:
For everyone agrees that justice in distribution must be in accordance with some 
kind o f merit, but not everyone means the same by merit; democrats think that it
481 am indebted to Arie (1990) for understanding the co-relations among Aristotle’s three kinds of 
justice.
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is being a free citizen, oligarchs that it is wealth or noble birth, and aristocrats 
that it is virtue (113l a). (ibid., p. 86)
Justice must be distributed in accordance with a person’s merit or value. Whilst a 
person’s merit or value is uncertain (i.e. it may mean either one’s free citizenship, 
wealth, noble birth or virtue), when honour, money or things are to be distributed to a 
certain individual, whether he/she is deserved to have what is distributed matters. 
Suppose A and B as a value of a person and the other person, and C and D as a value 
o f what is distributed to a person and the other person, ‘since the persons and the 
shares are divided in the same ratio’ (ibid., p. 86):
A : B = C : D
Consequently in permutation:
A : C = B : D 
Moreover:
A : B = A + C : B + D
Thus, the whole value o f a person and what is distributed to a person will bear the 
same ration to the whole value of the other person and what is distributed to the other 
person. A ‘mathematician calls this kind of proportion geometrical, because in 
geometrical proportion what happens is that whole is to whole as each part is to each 
part. But this proportion is not continuous, since there is not a single numerical term 
for person and share’ (ibid., p. 87). The shares are justly distributed by being based on 
the geometrical proportionality between the persons.
• Rectificatory (or corrective) justice: arithmetic equality between things 
Aristotle claims, ‘[t]he other kind of justice is rectificatory, which is found in both 
voluntary and involuntary transactions (1131b) ’ (ibid., p. 87). The voluntary 
transactions are things like selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending 
without interest, depositing, and letting. The involuntary transactions are either secret,
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such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticing away slaves, treacherous murder, 
and false witness, or involve force such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery, 
maiming, slander and insult (ibid., p. 85). For the involuntary transaction’s case, when 
one strikes and the other is struck, or when one kills and the other killed, the action 
and the suffering are divided unequally. Thus, the judge must equalise them with 
penalty: the judge decreases the ‘gain’ o f the assailant and compensate the Toss’ of 
the victim. ‘So what is just in rectificatory will be the mean between the gain and the 
loss (1132a)’ (ibid., p. 88). This also works for the voluntary transaction’s case: these 
‘gain’ and Toss’ are derived from voluntary transactions ‘For having more than one’s 
share is called gaining, while having less than one had at the beginning is called 
losing (1132b)’ (ibid.).
In contrast with distributive justice based on geometrical proportionality between the 
persons, rectificatory justice is based on arithmetic equality between shares: ‘It is as if  
there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he takes away that by which the 
greater segment exceeds the half, and adds it to the smaller segment (1132a) ’ (ibid., p. 
88).
the greater segm ent-—* ^  jh e  smaller segment
^ ■ 'th e  half (arithmetic equality )-^
In contrast with geometrical proportionality, arithmetic equality has nothing to do 
with a person’s merit or value: ‘it makes no difference whether it is a good person 
who has defrauded a bad or a bad person a good, nor whether it is a good or bad 
person who has that has committed adultery’ (1131b) ’ (ibid., p. 87). It rather matters 
to the medium between the two extremes, the gain and the loss, themselves: ‘the just 
is a mean between some kind of gain and loss; it consists in having and equal amount 
both before and after the transaction (1132b)’ (ibid., p. 88).
•  Reciprocal justice: transformation of geometrical proportionality into 
arithmetic equality
Reciprocal justice ‘fits neither distributive nor rectificatory justice’ (Aristotle, 2000, p. 
89). Nevertheless, reciprocal justice consists of both aspects: on the one hand, 
reciprocal justice is the same as distributive justice in respect o f  proportionate 
balance instead o f arithmetic equality: ‘When people associate with one another for
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the purpose of exchange, however, this kind of justice —  reciprocity in accordance 
with proportion, not equality — is what binds them together, since a city is kept 
together by proportionate reciprocation (1132b)’ {ibid., p. 89). Reciprocal justice, 
which binds people together by proportionate reciprocation, is a constituent for the 
community o f a city: ‘we call anything just that tends to produce or to preserve 
happiness and its constituents for the community of a city (1129b)’ {ibid., p. 82). On 
the other hand, however, reciprocal justice is the same as rectificatory justice in 
respect o f  the private exchange instead o f  the public distribution. The following 
passage outlines the way in which reciprocal justice is held through the private 
exchange, such as between a farmer and a shoemaker:
There will be reciprocity, then, when the equation has been made, so that the 
shoemaker’s product is to the farm er’s as farmer is to shoemaker. But we must 
bring them into the form of a proportion not after they have exchanged goods, 
but when they still have their own; otherwise one extreme will have both 
excesses. In this situation, they are equals and capable o f  association, because it 
is possible to establish this kind of equality between them. ... if  this kind of 
reciprocity had been impossible, the two would not have entered in to an
u  #
association with one another (1133 ). {ibid., p. 90, italics added)
Aristotle here suggests that (a) there are two levels o f proportion: the proportion 
between products and that between producers. The proportion between the 
shoemaker’s product and the farmer’s one must be consistent with that between the 
shoemaker and the farmer. Besides, the proportion between two products must already 
be established before being exchanged, since people thereby can associate with each 
other. Aristotle also suggests that (b) proportionate reciprocation is held for people’s 
moral association: people can only be associated and tied together in their community 
in a city by proportionate reciprocation. Since Aristotle considers that a thing’s nature 
is its final cause or final end, he furthermore suggests that people’s moral association 
is the final end of both individual and a city: ‘its end will include the ends of the 
others, and will therefore be the human good. For even if the good is the same for an 
individual as for a city, that o f the city is obviously a greater and more complete thing 
to obtain and preserve (1094b)’ {ibid., p. 4). For Aristotle, a city exists for the sake of 
the human good (i.e. for an individual to live virtuously).
128
This ‘proportionate reciprocation’ is made by a ‘diagonal conjunction’. ‘It is a 
diagonal conjunction that produces proportionate reciprocation. ... ‘If, first, 
proportionate equality is established, and then reciprocation takes place, the result we 
mentioned will follow. If not, there is no equality, and the bargain falls through, since 
there is no reason why what one produces should not be more valuable than what the 
other produces, and the products must therefore be equated (1133a)’ {ibid., pp. 89-90). 
Let us consider a ‘diagonal conjunction’ made by A a builder, B a shoemaker, C a 
house, and D a shoe:
C (House) nD (Shoe)
A (Builder) B (Shoemaker)
When one house is given by the builder to the shoemaker, and in return, some number 
of shoes (i.e. nD) are given by the shoemaker to a builder, then one house is 
equivalent with some number of shoes. Now, the proportion between one house and 
one shoe must be compatible with the proportion between a builder and a shoemaker: 
‘It can tell us, for example, how many shoes are equal to a house or some food. Then, 
as builder is to shoemaker, so must the number o f  shoes be to a house. For without 
this, there can be no exchange and no association (1133b)’ (ibid., p. 90, italics added). 
This means, the proportion between one house and one shoe must be consistent with 
the proportion between one builder and one shoemaker. Aristotle, however, does not 
refer to axeea (i.e. merit or value) of a person. Instead of ascribing a person’s value to 
one’s free citizenship, wealth, noble birth or virtue, Aristotle attributes it to one’s 
craft:
This is the case with other crafts as well. For they would have been ruined if 
what the passive party received were not the same in quantity and quality as 
what the active party produced; it is not two doctors who associate for exchange,
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but rather a doctor and a farmer, and, in general, people are different and 
unequal, and must be made equal (1133a)’ {ibid., p. 90, italics added).
People (e.g. a doctor and a farmer, a builder and a shoemaker) are different and 
unequal in terms of their crafts (i.e. skills and contributions). Thus, the proportion 
between one house and one shoe must be consistent with the proportion between 
builder’s crafts for building a house and shoemaker’s crafts for making a shoe. It 
follows:
A : B = C : D
Furthermore:
A : C = B : D
The ratio is exactly the same as geometrical proportion, on which distributive justice 
is based on. At the same time, however, arithmetic equality is held between one house 
and some number o f shoe (i.e. C = nD). To summarise, therefore, Aristotle considers 
reciprocal justice with the following three conceptual steps:
(1) Geometrical proportionality is presupposed between persons in accordance with 
the different crafts for their production.
(2) Products are exchanged on the basis of arithmetic equality.
(3) Reciprocal justice is realised through a transformation of the qualitative nature of 
persons into the quantitative nature of products.
For Aristotle, reciprocation is the transformation of geometrical proportionality, 
which keeps the community in a city, into arithmetic equality, which is to seek the 
medium between the two extremes (i.e. excess and deficiency) themselves.
Aristotle’s argument can be summarised as follows:
(1) One Virtue: for Aristotle, the virtue is a good state, which can be a constitutive 
condition for performing certain characteristic activities. The virtue of character is 
a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. While there are
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many different forms of virtue (e.g. happiness, generosity, magnificence, 
friendship, justice), they are not categorised in different groups.
(2) Both A and B: Aristotle’s argument is based on the dichotomy o f the qualitative 
nature of persons, which he characterises as a geometrical proportionality between 
persons and the quantitative nature of things, which he characterises as an 
arithmetic equality between things. Aristotle claims the possibility and desirability 
of reciprocation as a synthesis of these two natures: reciprocation is the 
transformation of geometrical proportionality, which makes people’s association 
in their community, into arithmetic equality, which is to seek the medium between 
two extremes (i.e. excess and deficiency) themselves.
(3) Friendship: for a good society, Aristotle takes friendship more basic than justice. 
Aristotle considers that while both friendship and justice are required for a good 
society, friendship is more basic than justice for people’s association in their 
community.
Let us turn to the Smith’s account of ‘virtue’ and ‘justice’.
5.2 Adam Smith
For Smith, there are two kinds of virtues, corresponding to two different endeavours 
to be made for sympathy —  i.e. the Aristotelian virtue of humanity or sensibility and 
the Stoic virtue of self-command. Corresponding to these two kinds of an endeavour, 
Smith divides virtue into two kinds —  i.e. a positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and a 
negative virtue (i.e. justice). And finally, through employing the rhetoric of the 
Ecclesiastes’ turning over, Smith persuades us to moderate our expectations of 
positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and to prioritise negative virtue (i.e. justice). Let us 
consider Smith’s arguments on virtue and justice.
5.2.1 Splitting Endeavour for Sympathy 
Like Aristotle, Smith considers that the society flourishes when its members 
reciprocally stand in need of assistance o f each other and satisfy that need from 
sentiments of reciprocity:
All the members o f human society stand in need of each others assistance, and 
are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is
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reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the 
society flourishes and is happy. All the different members of it are bound 
together by the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn 
to one common centre of mutual good offices (II. ii. 3. 1). (Smith, 2002 [1759],
p. 100)
Human beings are all equally vulnerable, and thus need one another: one may need 
another for help and one may be needed by another for help. Although we require the 
reciprocal assistance, knowing other’s necessity is more difficult than knowing one’s 
own necessity. In order to realise the reciprocal assistance, we therefore have to put 
oneself into the other’s shoes. Smith claims the importance o f sympathy, which is 
founded on imaginary change o f  situation:
In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of sentiments between 
the spectator and the person principally concerned, the spectator must, first o f  
all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation o f  the other, 
and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can 
possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his compassion 
with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that 
imaginary change o f  situation upon which his sympathy is founded (I. i. 4. 6). 
{ibid., p. 26, italics added)
While human beings are ‘naturally sympathetic, [they] never conceive, for what has 
befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the person 
principally concerned’ {ibid.). Thus, the spectator must pay efforts of putting oneself 
into the concerned person’s shoes and render imaginary changes o f  situation as 
perfectly as possible. Smith suggests that two different endeavours must be paid for 
the perfect sympathy: one is for the spectator to enter into the sentiments o f the person 
principally concerned, and the other is for the person principally concerned to bring 
down their emotions to what the spectator can go along with (i.e. lowering one’s 
passion to other’s pitch) {ibid., p. 29). Smith clearly stresses the latter:
We expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend : we 
cannot open to the former all those little circumstances which we can unfold to
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the latter: we assume, therefore, more tranquillity before him, and endeavour to 
fix our thoughts upon those general outlines of our situation which he is willing 
to consider. We expect still less sympathy from an assembly o f  strangers, and 
we assume, therefore, still more tranquillity before them, and always endeavour 
to bring down our passion to that pitch , which the particular company we are in 
may be expected to go along with (I. i. 4. 9). (ibid., p. 28, italics added)
We expect less sympathy from an assembly o f  strangers than from a common 
acquaintance, and from a common acquaintance than from a friend. The less intimate 
we become, the more tranquillity we assume, and thus, the more effort of lowering 
one’s passion to others’ pitch we must make.
To feel much fo r  others and little fo r  ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and 
to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection o f  human nature; 
... As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, 
so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our 
neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of 
loving us (I. i. 5. 5). (ibid., p. 30, italics added)
These two kinds of endeavours are consistent with two laws of Christianity —  i.e. to 
love our neighbour as we love ourselves and to love ourselves only as we love our 
neighbour. Smith also here stresses the latter and claims that not the former but rather 
the latter constitutes the perfection of human nature. Smith claims that two different 
sets o f  virtues are founded on the two different endeavours argued. ‘ The soft, the 
gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent 
humanity, are founded upon the one: the great, the awful and respectable, the virtues 
o f self-denial, o f  self-government, o f that command of the passions which subjects all 
the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of 
our own conduct require, take their origin from the other (I. i. 5.1). (ibid., p. 29, italics 
added)
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5.2.2 Beneficence and Justice 
Corresponding to the two kinds of endeavours, Smith divides the virtue into two kinds 
—  i.e. beneficence and justice. Beneficence, which is based on an Aristotelian virtue 
of sensibility or humanity, seems to deserve the highest reward, whereas justice, 
which is based on the Stoic virtue of self-command, seems scarce to deserve any 
reward. There is a propriety in the practice of justice. ‘But as it does no real positive 
good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a 
negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour’ {ibid., p. 95, italics 
added). Unlike the rules of beneficent we must always fulfil by being productive of 
the greatest good, ‘[w]e may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and 
doing nothing’ (ibid., p. 96, italics added).49 Smith, hereafter, explains about the 
natures of ‘justice’ as a negative virtue in contrast with the natures of ‘beneficence’ as 
a positive virtue.50
(a) Freedom and Obligation
On the one hand, beneficence is a virtue, which cannot be obtained by force. 
‘Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it 
exposes to no punishment; because the mere want o f beneficence tends to do no more 
real positive evil’ (ibid., p. 91). On the other hand, justice is a virtue, ‘of which the 
observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, 
and o f which the violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to punishment’ 
(ibid., p. 93). Because ‘the violation of justice is the injury: it does real and positive 
hurt to some particular persons, from motives which are naturally disapproved o f  
(ibid.). While the lack of beneficence can neither be refused by force nor be punished, 
the lack of justice must be refused by force and be punished.
As for the retaliation and the obligation for return, Smith suggests, on the one hand, 
that a positive [negative] virtue is to be returned for a positive [negative] virtue. ‘As 
every man doth, so shall it be done to him, and retaliation seems to be the great law
491 am indebted to Arie (1990) for understanding the basic scheme o f positive and negative virtues 
within Smith.
50 Smith explains that the word ‘justice’ in Greek has several different meanings: one is ‘distributive 
justice’, which consists in proper beneficence and the other is ‘commutative justice’ which consists in 
abstaining from what is another’s, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to 
do (VII. ii. 1. 10). (ibid., pp. 318-9) Smith suggests that beneficence belongs to the former, whereas 
justice belongs to the latter.
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which is dictated to us by Nature. Beneficence and generosity we think due to the 
generous and beneficent’ (ibid., p. 96, italics added). Likewise, an eye to an eye, and a 
tooth to a tooth, for the case of a negative virtue. Smith suggests, on the other hand, 
that the obligation for return is a criterion for making a distinction between 
beneficence and justice: whilst reciprocity is not obligated in beneficence, it is obliged 
in justice. Beneficence, however, has an exception, namely gratitude: we are obliged 
to return our gratitude:
But of all the duties of beneficence, those which gratitude recommends to us 
approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation. What 
friendship, what generosity, what charity, would prompt us to do with universal 
approbation, is still more free, and can still less be extorted by force than the 
duties of gratitude. We talk o f  the debt o f  gratitude, not o f  charity, or generosity, 
nor even o f friendship , when friendship is mere esteem, and has not been 
enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices, (ibid., p. 92, italics 
added)
While we may be in debt o f gratitude, we cannot be in debt o f charity, generosity, and 
friendship. Thus, the reciprocity o f beneficence is not the exchange of like for like 
(e.g. an eye to an eye, a tooth to a tooth), but may be the exchange of unlike for unlike 
(e.g. a gratitude for a charity, a generosity, a friendship).
(b) Inaccurate and Accurate
The rules o f beneficence are inaccurate: ‘the general rules which determine what are 
the offices o f prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in 
many respects loose and inaccurate’ (ibid., p. 202, italics added). Suppose your friend 
lent you money in your distress, ought you to lend his/her money back in his/her 
distress? Smith claims that there are no general rules to precisely answer questions — 
e.g. if  you ought to lend money, when, how much, how long, and so on —  because 
there are differences between your character and your friend’s, and between your 
circumstance and your friend’s. ‘You may be perfectly grateful, and justly refuse to 
lend him a halfpenny: and, on the contrary, you may be willing to lend, or even to 
give him ten times the sum which he lent you, and yet justly be accused of the 
blackest ingratitude, and of not having fulfilled the hundredth part of the obligation
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you lie under’ {ibid., p. 203). Thus, the general rules of beneficence, ‘which ascertain 
the actions required by friendship, humanity, hospitality, generosity, are still more 
vague and indeterminate’ {ibid., p. 203, italics added).
In contrast, the rules of justice are accurate: ‘[t]he rules of justice are accurate in the 
highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications, but such as may be 
ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow 
from the very same principles with them. I f  I  owe a man ten pounds, justice requires 
that I  should precisely pay him ten pounds, either at the time agreed upon, or when he 
demands i f  {ibid., p. 203-4, italics added).
(c) Final and Efficient Causation
On the one hand, beneficence is the final end. Smith claims that the final causation is 
‘the wisdom of man’: it is ascribed to ‘a refined and enlightened reason’ of human 
beings, which leads us to advance the final end. For instance, a watch-maker’s desire 
and intention lead a watch-maker to produce a watch. On the other hand, justice is the 
efficient end. Smith claims that the efficient causation is ‘the wisdom of god’: it is 
ascribed to the mechanism of a system. In ‘the mechanism of a plant, or animal body’, 
for instance, there are ‘the two great purposes o f nature (i.e. the support o f individual 
and the propagation o f species)’. In the mechanism of the watch, there are the motions 
o f the wheels o f the watch to point the hour by their spring. In the mechanism of the 
human bodies, there are the operations o f bodies o f their own accord, such as the 
blood circulation and the food digestion.
Smith claims, ‘[b]ut though, in accounting for the operations o f  bodies, we never fail 
to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those 
o f  the mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another’ 
{ibid., p. 102, italics added). Smith suggests that the system of human nature would 
have been more simple and agreeable if  its operations were deduced from a single 
principle o f the final causation. But in fact, it is more complicated than its appearance, 
because it operations are from the compound of the final and efficient causations. 
Through indicating the puzzling nature of identifying causality, Smith aims to ascribe 
the operations o f  society, not to the final causation (i.e. the wisdom of man) but rather 
to the efficient causation (i.e. the wisdom of god). Unlike Aristotle, who considers
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that the possibility of the community is identical with the full realisation of human 
nature, Smith considers the possibility o f the society purely as a matter of the 
mechanism of its economic structure.
(d) Sufficient and Necessary for Society
On the one hand, beneficence is sufficient, but not necessary for the existence of 
society. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without 
beneficence. ‘It is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports 
the building, and which it was, therefore, sufficient to recommended, but by no means 
necessary to impose’ {ibid., p. 101, italics added). On the other hand, justice is 
necessary for the existence o f society. Society cannot subsist without justice: it must 
utterly be destroyed by the prevalence of injustice. ‘Justice, on the contrary, is the 
main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense 
fabric o f human society ... must in a moment crumble into atoms’ {ibid?).
We have seen that Smith considers, like Aristotle, that the society flourishes when the 
necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from their love, gratitude, friendship, and 
esteem, among the members. Unlike Aristotle, however, Smith considers that the 
society may still subsist without the reciprocal assistance from those positive virtues:
But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such generous 
and disinterested motives, though among the different members of the society 
there should be no mutual love and affection, the society, though less happy and 
agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved. Society may subsist among 
different men, as among different merchants, from a sense o f its utility, without 
any mutual love or affection", and though no man in it should owe any obligation, 
or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary 
exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation (II. ii. 3. 2). {ibid., p. 
100, italics added)
As we have seen, Aristotle’s community is the moral community, in which people can 
be associated and tied together by proportionate reciprocation. Unlike Aristotle, 
Smith’s society is the commercial society, in which every human being ‘lives by 
exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant’ (Smith, 1993 [1776], p. 17,
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italics added). In the commercial society, we expect our dinner, not from the 
benevolence o f the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, but from their regard to their 
own interest. ‘We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages’ {ibid., p. 11, italics 
added).
Smith already establishes the dichotomy of the positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and 
the negative virtue (i.e. justice) in the first edition of The Theory o f  The Moral 
Sentiments, and has put emphasis on the latter over the former from a Stoic virtue 
ethics perspective till the 5th edition. However, in the 6th edition Smith shifts to a 
form of Calvinism that puts even more emphasis on the latter over the former: Smith 
gives up the positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and to rather seek the negative virtue (i.e. 
justice) as the second best.
5.2.3 The Stoic Perfect Virtue and the Calvinist Imperfect Virtue 
A Smith’s view of virtue is derived from the seemingly conflicting two Christian 
traditions —  i.e. Stoicism and Calvinism.51 The early Smith stresses the Stoic view of 
perfect virtue: ‘in the common degree o f the moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is 
excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is 
vulgar and ordinary (I.i.5.6)’ (Smith, 2002 [1759], p. 30). This appears to entail both 
the amiable virtue, which consists in an extraordinary degree of sensibility, and the 
awful and respectable virtue, which consists in an extraordinary degree o f self- 
command. However, Smith suggests ‘two different standards’ for the relationship 
between a human conduct and virtue: ‘ [t]he first is the idea of complete propriety and 
perfection, which in those difficult situations, no human conduct ever did, or even can 
come up to’, and ‘[t]he second is the idea of that degree o f proximity or distance from 
this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part o f men commonly 
arrive at (I.i.5.9)’ {ibid., p. 32). Thus, Smith has a double standard for the existence 
and the achievability of a perfect virtue: first, Smith presupposes the perfect virtue 
and separates it from a mere propriety, which can be possessed even by ‘the most 
worthless of mankind’. Second, Smith explains that while it is impossible for a 
mankind to achieve the perfect virtue, it is possible to approach nearer to the
511 am indebted to Tanaka (1997) for understanding Smith’s shift from the Stoic into the Calvinist.
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perfection', while ‘the greater part of men are incapable; and though it fails of absolute 
perfection’, ‘[i]t may be a much nearer approximation towards perfection (I.i.5.8)’ 
{ibid., p. 31). However, early Smith does not explicitly argue which virtue is 
achievable and which virtue is non-achievable — e.g. the respectable virtue of self- 
command is the achievable, whereas the amiable virtue of sensitivity is the non- 
achievable.
However, the late Smith critically develops the Stoic view of the perfect virtue, and 
claims that the respectable virtue o f self-command is imperfect but attainable. Smith 
firstly admits that the Stoic view on virtue is not different from the Aristotelian one: 
‘So far the stoical idea of propriety and virtue is not very different from that of 
Aristotle and the ancient Peripatetics (VII.ii.1.17)’ (ibid., p. 323). Then, Smith
t V ieliminates his early argument after this line and puts his new one in the 6 edition of 
The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments. Let us firstly have a look at his early argument, 
which has appeared from the 1st to the 5th editions and is eliminated in the 6th edition:
What chiefly distinguished those two systems from one another was the different 
degrees o f  self-command which they required. The peripatetics allowed o f some 
degree of perturbation as suitable to the weakness o f  human nature, and as 
useful to so imperfect a creature as man. ... The stoics, on the contrary, 
demanded the most perfect apathy, and regarded every emotion that could in the 
smallest degree disturb the tranquillity of the mind, as the effect o f levity and 
folly. The Peripatetics seem to have thought that no passion exceeded the 
bounds o f propriety as long as the spectator, by the utmost effort o f humanity, 
could sympathize with it. The Stoics, on the contrary, appear to have regarded 
every passion as improper, which made any demand upon the sympathy of the 
spectator, or required him to alter in any respect the natural and ordinary state of 
his mind, in order to keep time with the vehemence of its emotions. A man o f  
virtue, they [the Stoics] seem to have thought, ought not to depend upon the 
generosity o f  those he lives with fo r  pardon or approbation (VII.ii.1.18). (ibid. 
italics added)
The early Smith makes a rather clear contrast between the Aristotelian virtue of 
humanity and the Stoic virtue of self-command. The ancient Aristotelian school,
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called the Peripatetics, on the one hand, accept the troubles due to the imperfect 
nature o f  human beings. They consider that we always ought to be passionate enough 
to sympathise with those who suffer. The Stoics, on the other hand, require the perfect 
apathy and the tranquillity o f  the mind. They consider that we ought not to take 
advantage o f others' generosity. As the Stoics used to say, ‘[e]very man is, no doubt, 
by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to 
take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. 
Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately 
concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man’ {ibid., p. 96). Thus, the Stoic 
virtue of self-command does not depend on the other’s generosity (i.e. imperfect 
passion) but on the self-interest (i.e. perfect apathy). In the 6th edition, however, Smith 
eliminates all above argument based on the Stoic view of perfect virtue, and added a 
Calvinist argument on virtue, as follows:
As all those who had arrived at this state o f perfection, were equally happy; so 
all those who fell in the smallest degree short o f it, how nearly soever they might 
approach to it, were equal miserable. As the man, they said, who was but an 
inch below the surface o f  the water, could no more breathe than he who was an 
hundred yards below it; so the man who had not completely subdued all his 
private, partial, and selfish passions, who had any other earnest desire but that 
for the universal happiness, who had not completely emerged from that abyss of 
misery and disorder into which his anxiety for the gratification of those private, 
partial and selfish passions had involved him, could no more breathe the free air 
o f liberty and independency, could no more enjoy the security and happiness of 
the wise man, than he who was most remote from that situation. As all the 
actions o f the wise man were perfect, and equally perfect; so all those of the 
man who had not arrived at this supreme wisdom were faulty, and, as some 
stoics pretended, equally faulty (VII.ii.1.40). {ibid., pp. 342-3, italics added)
As we have seen, early Smith assumes the non-achievable perfect virtue, but leaves 
the possibility to approach nearer to the perfection. In contrast, however, late Smith 
still assumes the non-achievable perfect virtue, and leaves no possibility (or worth) to
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get closer to the perfection.52 ‘As in shooting at a mark, the man who missed it by an 
inch had equally missed it with him who had done so by a hundred yards’ {ibid.), 
those who approach nearer to the perfection are equally as imperfect as those who do 
not approach at all. This change has been caused by Smith’s conversion from the 
Stoic view of the perfect virtue into the Calvinist view of ‘the weakness and 
imperfection of human virtues’ before the perfect god: ‘Man, when about to appear 
before a being o f  infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or 
in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. ... To such a being, he can scarce 
imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the proper object, 
either o f esteem or of reward (II.ii.3. an additional paragraph in the six ed.)’ {ibid., p. 
108, italics added). This Smith’s shift makes a huge difference in the policy for a 
human conduct: the Stoic Smith, on the one hand, tells us that it is impossible for the 
imperfect human beings to acquire the perfect human virtue, but encourages them to 
approach to it as close as possible in practice.53 Calvinist Smith, on the other hand, 
tells that it is impossible for the imperfect human beings to acquire the perfect human 
virtue, and therefore, persuade them to approach rather to the imperfect but attainable
thvirtue. The Smith’s shift can also be found in the following added argument in the 6 
edition:
52 In contrast, Aristotle does not seem to be interested in the achievability of the perfection of virtue. 
‘What is contrary to brutishness might most appropriately be described as superhuman virtue, a virtue 
heroic and godlike', thus Homer depicts Priam saying of Hector that he was good in the extreme: ‘For 
he seemed not to be a child o f a mortal man but o f a god. ’ So if, as they say, people become gods 
through superlative virtue, this must clearly be the sort o f state opposed to brutishness. Just as no brute 
possesses vice or virtue, neither does a god; but the g o d ’s state is more honourable than virtue, while 
that o f  the brute is in a different class from  vice (1145a)’ (Aristotle, 2000, p. 119, italics added). In his 
argument, Aristotle is unclear about whether human beings can achieve the perfection of virtue. 
Aristotle firstly assumes a superhuman, heroic and godlike virtue, which is an extremely good state. 
Then, he argues about a ‘godlike’ discourse (i.e. a statement that ‘he seems to be a child of a god ’) 
without arguing whether a godlike person is really a god (i.e. the achievability o f the perfection of 
virtue). Aristotle argues, ‘since it is unusual for a man to be a godlike (as the Spartans are wont in their 
dialect to call someone they particularly admire, saying ‘He is godlike fellow’), so the brutish person is 
also uncommon among human beings. The point o f Aristotle’s argument is not about whether a godlike 
fellow is really a god (i.e. the achievability of the perfection of virtue), but about a contrast between the 
god and the brute.
Late Calvinist Smith explains the Stoics accepts a not perfectly advanced virtue: ‘[t]he Stoics in 
general seem to have admitted that there might be a degree o f  proficiency in those who had not 
advanced to perfect virtue and happiness. ... they called the imperfect virtues which they supposed 
them capable of exercising, no rectitudes, but proprieties, fitnesses, decent and becoming actions, for 
which a plausible or probable reason could be assigned. ... The doctrine o f those imperfect, but 
attainable virtues, seems to have constituted what we may call the practical morality o f  the Stoics ’ 
(VII.ii.1.42) {ibid., p. 344, italics added). Thus, the Stoics accept the practical attainability o f imperfect 
virtue, whereas the Calvinists rather stress the theological gap between the imperfect (i.e. mankind) and 
the perfect (i.e. the god).
141
If we consult our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear, lest before the holiness 
o f God, vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment than the weakness 
and imperfection of human virtue can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when 
about to appear before a being o f infinite perfection, can feel but little 
confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In 
the presence o f  his fellow-creatures, he may often justly elevate himself, and 
may often have reason to think highly o f his own character and conduct, 
compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite 
different when about to appear before his infinite Creator. To such a being, he 
can scarce imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the 
proper object, either o f  esteem or o f  reward, {ibid., p. 108, italics added)
Before the definite and imperfect fellows, human beings may often justify and 
underestimate their own imperfect natures, whereas before the infinite perfect God, 
they can rarely imagine that their imperfect natures are the proper object of esteem 
and reward. But instead, imperfect human beings can conceive themselves as vile as 
an insect instead, and urge themselves to atone for their guilt. ‘If he [a imperfect 
being] would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from 
the justice, but that he must entreat it from the mercy of God’ {ibid.). The imperfect 
human beings imagine that they must make ‘some other sacrifice, some other 
atonement’ for the purity o f the divine justice. Because we can only a little depend 
upon ‘the imperfection of our own virtue’, we must pay ‘the most dreadful atonement’. 
This is the rhetoric o f the Ecclesiastes ’ turning over hidden in the Smithian virtue 
ethics. Smith starts from a picture o f (1) finite imperfect human beings before the 
infinite perfect God, and claims that (2) their imperfect natures are the proper object 
of esteem and reward before God. Then (3) Smith urges human beings to make 
sacrifice and atonement for God, and (4) be persuaded to obey ‘the great machine of 
the universe {ibid., p. 24)’ without concern and to be Ted by an invisible hand {ibid., p. 
215)’. Through employing the rhetoric o f the Ecclesiastes' turning over, Adam Smith 
has completed his Stoic/Calvinist virtue based justification of wealth.
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5.3 Comparison between Aristotle and Smith
Before criticising the Smithian virtue-based justifications of money, let us summarise 
the contrast between Aristotle’s and Smith’s virtue ethics in respect of their different 
conceptions of virtue and justice:
5.3.1 ‘One Virtue’ or ‘Two Virtues’
Aristotle does not divide the virtue, whereas Smith splits virtue into two kinds. For 
Aristotle, on the one hand, the virtue is a good state, which can be a constitutive 
condition for performing certain characteristic activity. The virtue o f character is a 
mean between two vices, one o f excess and one o f deficiency. While there are many 
different forms of virtue (e.g. happiness, generosity, magnificence, friendship, justice), 
they are not categorised in different groups. For Smith, on the other hand, there are 
two kinds o f virtues, corresponding to two different endeavours to be made for 
sympathy —  i.e. the Aristotelian virtue o f humanity or sensibility and the Stoic virtue 
of self-command. The Aristotelian virtue accepts the troubles due to the imperfect 
nature o f human beings. Accordingly, we always ought to be passionate enough to 
sympathise with those who suffer. The Stoic virtue requires the perfect apathy and the 
tranquillity o f the mind. Accordingly, we ought not to take advantage of other’s 
generosity. These two kinds o f endeavours are consistent with two laws of 
Christianity —  i.e. to love our neighbour as we love ourselves and to love ourselves 
only as we love our neighbour.
5.3.2 ‘Both A and B ’ or ‘Either A or B ’
While both Aristotle’s and Smith’s arguments are based on a dichotomy, Aristotle 
makes a case o f both A and B, whereas Smith makes a case of either A or B. 
Aristotle’s argument is based on the dichotomy of the qualitative nature of persons, 
which he characterises as a geometrical proportionality between persons and the 
quantitative nature o f things, which he characterises as an arithmetic equality between 
things. Aristotle claims the possibility and desirability o f reciprocation as a synthesis 
of these two natures: reciprocation is the transformation of geometrical 
proportionality, which makes people’s association in their community, into arithmetic 
equality, which is to seek the medium between two extremes (i.e. excess and 
deficiency) themselves. In contrast, Smith’s argument is based on the dichotomy of 
the following two virtues: one is a positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and the other is a
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negative virtue (i.e. justice). Smith divides the virtue into the perfect but non- 
achievable virtue and the imperfect but attainable virtue, and puts emphasis on the 
latter over the former.
5.3.3 Friendship or Justice 
Both Aristotle and Smith consider that the society flourishes when the necessary 
assistance is reciprocally afforded from the virtues, such as love, gratitude, friendship, 
and esteem. However, for a good society, Aristotle takes friendship to be more basic 
than justice, whereas Smith takes justice as more basic than friendship: Aristotle, on 
the one hand, considers that while both friendship and justice are required for a good 
society, friendship is more basic than justice for people’s association in their 
community. Smith, on the other hand, considers that while the society may still 
subsist without a positive virtue of beneficence, it cannot subsist without a negative 
virtue o f justice (i.e. justice is more basic than friendship for the subsistence of the 
society). Through employing the rhetoric of the Ecclesiastes’ turning over, Smith 
persuades to moderate our expectations of positive virtue (i.e. beneficence) and to 
prioritise negative virtue (i.e. justice).
5.4 Against Smithian Justifications of Money
In the 6th edition o f The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments, Smith adds a chapter on the 
compatibility between wealth and virtue, in which two faces o f Smith corresponding 
to his conversion can successively be found —  i.e. Stoic Smith and Calvinist Smith:
Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this 
so much desired object; the one, by the study o f  wisdom and the practice o f  
virtue; the other, by the acquisition o f wealth and greatness. Two different 
characters are presented to our emulation; the one, o f proud ambition and 
ostentatious avidity; the other, o f humble modesty and equitable justice. ... 
though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers o f  
wisdom and virtue. The great mob o f mankind are the admirers and 
worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the 
disinterested admirers and worshippers, o f wealth and greatness (I. iii. 3. 5). 
(Smith, 2002 [1759], p. 73, italics added)
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Stoic Smith considers that only a small party goes along the road to virtue, whereas 
the great mob of mankind goes along the road to wealth. From a Stoic virtue of self- 
control perspective, Smith regrets that ‘the respectful attentions of the world more 
strongly directed towards the rich ad the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous’ 
(ibid.). But in contrast, Calvinist Smith always tells us good news:
In the middling and inferior stations o f  life, the road to virtue and that to 
fortune , to such fortune, at least, as men in such stations can reasonably expect 
to acquire, are, happily in the most case, very nearly the same. In all the 
middling and inferior professions, real and solid professional abilities, joined to 
prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success. ... 
In such a situation, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of 
virtue; and, fortunately for the good morals of society, these are the situations o f  
by fa r  the greater part o f  mankind (I. iii. 3. 5). (ibid., p. 74, italics added)
In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and the road to wealth 
are happily the same, whereas in the superior stations of life, they are unhappily not 
always the same. However, the greater part of mankind is in such a situation of being 
on the road to wealth happily coincides with the road to virtue.54 Smith develops 
similar lines of argument for the compatibility between wealth and virtue in The 
Wealth o f  Nations. The arguments in the Wealth o f  Nations focus in particular on the 
virtues o f independence and freedom. Let us, in the final section, critically assess 
these particular Smithian virtue-based justifications of money.
54 Stoic Smith, however, appears again: ‘the greater part o f men are proud to imitate and resemble them 
[the rich and great] in the very qualities which dishonour and degrade them’ (ibid., p. 75); ‘the 
candidate for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road which leads to 
the one, and that which to the other, lie sometimes in very opposite’ (ibid., p. 76). It is not the case that 
late Smith totally denies early Smith as the Stoic, but critically develops it and establishes his 
Stoic/Calvinist perspective.
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5.4.1 Money Promotes Independence 
A virtue-based justification of money for promoting the independence can be found in 
Adam Smith’s argument on virtues o f commercial society. In a pre-commercial (i.e. 
feudal) society, the relations between the landlord and the tenant exhibit ties of 
personal dependence: the landlord must feed a hundred or a thousand of the 
dependants (i.e. tenants and retainers), and the dependants ‘must obey him, for the 
same reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays them’ (Smith, 1993 [1776], 
p. 107). ‘The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great 
proprietor as his retainers’ {ibid., p. 108). In a commercial society, however, a wealthy 
person does not have to feed, but can indirectly maintain many people through the 
monetary exchange: ‘a man of ten thousand a year can spend his whole revenue, and 
he generally does so, without directly maintaining twenty people, or being able to 
command more than ten footmen not worth the commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he 
maintains as great or even a greater number of people than he could have done by the 
ancient method of expense’ {ibid., p. 110, italics added). ‘By paying that price he [the 
wealthy] indirectly pays all those wages and profits and thus indirectly contributes to 
the maintenance o f all the workmen and their employers’ {ibid., p. 111). That is, the 
relations between the employer and the worker no longer exhibit ties of personal 
dependence: the personal independence between the wealthy and the poor can be 
maintained indirectly. ‘Though he [the wealthy] contributes, therefore, to the 
maintenance o f them [the workmen] all, they are all more or less independent o f him, 
because generally they can all be maintained without him’ {ibid., italics added). The 
wealthy can maintain an even greater number o f people in a commercial society than 
in a pre-commercial society. Each tradesman can make living, not due to a single 
wealthy person, but due to many customers instead. ‘Though in some measure obliged 
to them [customers] all, therefore, he [a tradesman] is not absolutely dependent upon 
any one o f them’ {ibid., italics added).
Smith considers that economic independence is rather compatible with personal 
independence: the former indirectly results in the latter. However, Smith’s ‘economic 
independence’, which indirectly results in the personal independence, is not a real and 
whole independence: the ‘economic independence’ is founded on ‘objective 
dependence’ on money itself. The point is one developed by Kant. Kant argues that 
fortune, which consists of money and goods, has an advantage of making us
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independent from others. If we have money, we do not need others and their help. 
Money makes us independent because we do not need to rely on begging but rather 
only on buying. However, money makes us independent only in respect o f  our 
financial condition. Those who are financially independent from others appear to be 
more respectful than those who are dependent on others. Because money makes us 
economically independent, rich people appear to be noble —  e.g. they can have great 
influence upon the social structure and the general welfare. They can also provide 
others' occupation. This does not entail, however, that money makes the rich 
themselves noble: money makes their circumstances noble. The standing of those with 
money renders them dependent on money itself.
Since, then, money makes one independent, one gains respect by the possession 
o f it; one has worth, needs no one and depends on no one. But in making us 
independent o f  others, money in the long run makes us dependent upon itself, it 
frees us from others in order to enslave us. The worth which springs from 
independence is only negative', the positive value of wealth arises from the 
power which wealth gives us. Money gives me the power to use the powers of 
others in my service. (Kant, 1979 [1780-1], p. 177, italics added)
As money makes us independent from one another, it makes us dependent on money. 
Marx develops a similar line of argument that personal independence promoted to 
economic individuals by money is based on objective dependence. While money 
makes us become personally independent, it makes us objectively dependent on 
money:
In the money relation, in the developed system o f exchange (and this semblance 
seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood, 
education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear 
as personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an 
independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly 
called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange 
within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from 
the conditions, the conditions o f  existence within which these individuals enter 
into contract (and these conditions, in turn, are independent o f the individuals
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and, although created by society, appear as if  they are natural conditions, not 
controllable by individuals). (Marx, 1973 [1857-8], pp. 163-4)
What money promotes appears to be ‘independence’, but it is in fact ‘indifference’'. 
As money promotes ‘personal independence’ for economic individuals, it renders the 
employer indifferent to workers such that it treats them purely through their 
homogeneous properties, namely labouring powers, and makes them objectively 
dependent on money instead. ‘The worker becomes (objectively) dependent not on an 
individual, since the particular person to whom the worker sells his or her labor is 
indifferent, but rather on the system of capital’ (Gould, 1978, p. 17).
5.4.2 Money Promotes Freedom 
A Smithian virtue-based justification of money on the ground that it promotes 
freedom can be found in the same argument for justification of the independence:
‘commerce and manufactures gradually introduced other and good government, and 
with them, the liberty and security o f  individuals, among the inhabitants of the 
country, who had before lived almost in a continual state o f  war with their neighbours, 
and o f  servile dependency upon their superiors’ (Smith, 1993 [1776], p. 107, italics 
added). Smith suggests that commerce promotes freedom in terms o f  being 
emancipated from  a state o f  war with neighbours and from the domination o f  
superiors. Smith also considers that the liberty and security of individuals are rather 
compatible with the welfare of the public: the former indirectly results in the latter:
A revolution o f the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in this 
manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not the least 
intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was the sole 
motive o f  the greatest proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less 
ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit o f  their 
own pedlar principle o f  turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. 
Neither o f them had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which 
the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about. 
(ibid., pp. 112-3, italics added)
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Smith gives a reason for the compatibility between wealth seeking and moral virtue, 
from a viewpoint that acting from one’s self interest indirectly promotes the public 
happiness, which is made of individual’s independence and freedom from each other.
While commerce may indirectly promote the negative feature o f  freedom  (e.g. the 
freedom from  a state of war with neighbours and from the domination of superiors), it 
does not promote, and even impedes the positive feature offreedom  (e.g. the freedom 
to help others or to realise one’s potentiality). Because the spirit o f commerce is 
fundamentally incompatible with the spirit o f altruism. Montesquieu, a contemporary 
as Smith in the 18 century, argues as follows:
Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other 
become reciprocally dependent; for if  one has an interest in buying, the other 
has an interest in selling: and thus their union is founded on their mutual 
necessities. But i f  the spirit o f  commerce unites nations, it does not in the same 
manner unite individuals. We see that in countries where the people move only 
by the spirit o f commerce, they make a traffic o f  all the humane, all the moral 
virtues; the most trifling things, those which humanity would demand, are there 
done, or there given, only fo r  money. The spirit o f trade produces in the mind of 
a man a certain sense of exact justice, opposite, on the one hand, to robbery, and 
on the other to those moral virtues which forbid our always adhering rigidly to 
the rules o f  private interest, and suffer us to neglect this fo r  the advantage o f  
others. (Montesquieu, 1914 [1748], Book XX, Chapter 2, italics added)
Nations are instrumentally reciprocal through trade in respect that nations are related 
with each other from their own self-interest.55 Nations are free from  an unequal 
relationship of domination —  i.e. nations can freely trade each other, freely agree on 
pricing, and freely choose to serve the other in order to serve one’s own purposes. But 
this instrumental reciprocity is incompatible with a real sense of mutuality, which 
involves the mutual enhancing relationship between free individuals —  i.e. 
individuals recognise each other not as a means or an instrumental value, but as an 
end or a final value, and freely help each other to enhance other’s freedom.
55 See 6.2 for further arguments on the difference between instrumental reciprocity and mutuality.
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Marx similarly argues that Smith assumes an instrumental and negative account of 
freedom:
‘Tranquillity’ appears as the adequate state, as identical with ‘freedom’ and 
‘happiness’. It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that the individual, ‘in his 
normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility’, also needs a normal 
portion of work, and o f the suspension of tranquillity. Certainly, labour obtains 
its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to 
be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this 
overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity —  and that, further, the 
external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural 
urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits — 
hence as self-realisation, objectification o f the subject, hence real freedom, 
whose action is precisely labour. (Marx, 1973 [1857-8], p. 611)
This passage highlights the different conceptualisations of freedom defended by 
Smith and Marx (Gould, 1978, pp. 101-4): for Smith, freedom is identical with 
‘tranquillity’ or ‘absence of toil’ as an adequate state. This entails a negative feature 
of freedom and labour: freedom is to be free from externally forced labour (e.g. slave- 
labour, serf-labour, wage-labour). For Marx, in contrast, freedom is a liberating 
activity o f overcoming o f obstacles to attain the aim, which is not the external aim, 
but the internal aim o f self-realisation (i.e. the intrinsic telos). This entails a positive 
feature o f freedom and labour: freedom is a free activity or labour to achieve the 
internal aim of self-realisation. Thus, a Smithian virtue-based justification of money 
fails: while money may promote the negative feature o f freedom, it does not promote, 
and even impedes the positive feature o f freedom.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the most notable virtue-based justification of money, 
which can be formed on Smithian lines. We have seen that, corresponding to the 
Ecclesiastes’ turning over the nihilism for money into the affirmation of the 
meaningless life and world, Adam Smith abolishes the Stoic view of perfect virtue 
and employs the Calvinist view of imperfect but attainable virtue. The conversion has 
lead Smith to moderate his expectations of positive virtue (e.g. personal independence, 
positive freedom), and to prioritise negative virtue (e.g. economic independence, 
negative freedom). While Smithian virtue ethics rather impedes the possible 
excellence o f human virtues, Aristotelian virtue ethics help us to seek the spirit of 
altruism as the first priority. In the next chapter, we explore this Aristotelian thought 
in more detail through an examination o f the importance and the possibility of 
altruistic gift giving.
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CHAPTER 6: ALTRUISTIC GIFT GIVING
To emerge from self, to give, freely and obligatorily. (Mauss, 2000, p. 71)
6.0 Introduction
The act o f giving is paradoxical in that it is voluntary and obligatory at the same time. 
Even though the giver does not expect any return from the receiver, the giver may feel 
some kind of superiority over the receiver, and the receiver may feel some kind of 
debt to the giver. The act o f giving is paradoxical in that it is one sided and mutual at 
the same time. While a gift is transferred in one direction from the giver to the 
receiver, their identities may be defined from one another as the superior and the 
inferior, or the creditor and the debtor. These paradoxical natures inherent within the 
act of giving have been defended since long ago (cf. Imamura, 2000):
And I say, o Subhuti, that a bodhisattva performs the act of giving without 
staying in things. They perform the act of giving without staying in any object at 
all. They perform the act of giving without staying in things that you see. They 
perform the act of giving without staying in sounds, and without staying in 
smells, or in tastes, or things that you touch, or in objects o f the thought. O 
Subhuti, bodhisattvas perform the act o f  giving without conceiving o f  any thing 
in any way as a sign. That is how they give. Why is it so? Think, o Subhuti, of 
the mountains o f merit collected by any bodhisattva who performs the act of 
giving without staying. This merit, o Subhuti, is not something you could easily 
ever measure. ... it would be no easy thing to measure the mountains of merit 
collected by any bodhisattva who performs the act o f giving without staying. 
(The Diamond Cutter, Section 4, italics added)
The Diamond Cutter is a Buddhist Mahayana Sutra known as enlightening an ‘empty’ 
state of mind —  i.e. a state in which there is nothing, and there is not nothing, either. 
It tells that the great beings perform the act o f  giving without conceiving o f  their 
performance as the act o f  giving. It is not the case that they perform the act of giving, 
nor they do not perform the act o f giving, either: they do it without conceiving it as an 
act o f  giving. Because the great beings ‘never slip into any conception of a thought as 
a conception, nor do they slip into any conception o f a thought as not being a
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conception. Why is it so? Because if ... these bodhisattvas who are great beings slip 
into any conception of things as things, then they would grasp these same things as 
being a “se lf’; they would grasp these same things as being a living being; they would 
grasp these same things as being something that lives; they would grasp them as a 
person. And even if they were to slip into thinking of them as not being things, they 
would grasp them as being a “se lf’; as being a living being; and as being something 
that lives; and as being a person’ {ibid., Section 6). While it sounds complicated, it is 
quite simple in practice: they can simply perform the act of giving without sticking to 
the form of their act, without sticking to what is given, without sticking to the 
superiority/inferiority or credit/debt relationship.56
The Diamond Cutter does not aim to show the impossibility o f the act of giving, but, 
on the contrary, to demonstrate the possibility of gift giving by achieving the ‘empty’ 
state of mind. Due to the paradoxical natures of gift giving, however, the argument 
that ‘the gift is impossible’ dominates recent theories of the gift in economics, 
anthropology and philosophy. Moreover in practice, we take gift giving (e.g. grants, 
awards, charity, donations, Christmas gifts) so much for granted that we never ask 
ourselves i f  it is ethically right, or how we really do it. That is, we practice it without 
fully knowing what it is and how it is possible. Thus, this chapter aims to defend the 
importance and possibility of altruistic gift giving from both and theoretical 
skepticism and practical indifference. The chapter is structured as follows:
1. We first consider Gregory’s distinction between commodity exchange and gift 
exchange. According to Gregory’s concept o f gift exchange, the giver is taken to 
have ‘some kind of superiority (e.g. political control, power, status, prestige)’ over 
the receiver.
2. We then examine the ways in which the act o f giving involves different kinds of 
social relations —  i.e. domination, instrumental reciprocity and mutuality. Gift 
giving does not exclude the possibility of non-reciprocal mutuality in gift giving 
of the kind described by Titmuss, in which the giver is supposed to make no 
obligation for return to the receiver.
56 Let us try a bicycle metaphor: as those who get used to riding a bike do not often conceive of the 
existence of bike or the fact o f riding a bike even when they ride a bike, the great beings do not 
conceive of gift giving even when they do it.
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3. Finally we consider recent skepticism about, and criticism of, altruistic gift giving, 
and develop a response to these skeptical moves from a perspective o f a particular 
egalitarian mutualist form of Aristotelian virtue ethics.
These arguments pave the way for exploring the importance and the possibility of 
altruistic gift giving.
6.1 Commodity Exchange and Gift Exchange
According to Gregory, ‘commodity exchange is an exchange of alienable objects 
between people who are in a state o f reciprocal independence that establishes a 
quantitative relationship between the objects exchanged, whereas gift exchange is an 
exchange of inalienable objects between people who are in a state of reciprocal 
dependence that establishes a qualitative relationship between the subject 
transacting ' (Gregory, 1982, pp. 100-1; 1983, p. 104, italics added). This account 
involves three crucial distinctions between the two modes of exchange:
(1) Reciprocal independence/reciprocal dependence. Transactors are in a state of 
‘reciprocal independence’ if  they are strangers or aliens, whereas they are in a 
state of ‘reciprocal dependence’ in a clan based economy. ‘This distinction 
between dependence and independence should be seen as the extreme points on a 
continuum: as one moves from one extremity to another, the degree of dependence 
changes’ {ibid., 1982, p. 42).
(2) Alienability/inalienability. Commodities are alienable objects transacted by aliens, 
whereas gifts are inalienable objects transacted by non-aliens. In commodity 
exchange social relations between transactors are objectified as a quantitative 
relation between the objects rather than subjects. In gift exchange things to be 
exchanged as gifts are personified or anthropomorphised between subjects. Marx 
calls this the ‘fetishism’ (i.e. objectification or reification) of commodities: the 
tendency for relations between people in a capitalist society to assume ‘the 
fantastic form of a relation between things’ (ibid., p. 45).
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(3) A quantitative relationship between the objects and a qualitative relationship 
between the subjects. Commodity exchange establishes quantitative relations (i.e. 
relative prices) between the objects. Suppose two transactors, A and B, exchange 
two commodities, Ci and C2, the exchange appears as one transaction as follows:
A —  (CO —> B 
A <—  (C2) —  B
A gives B a commodity, and B gives A another commodity in exchange, which 
establishes the quantitative exchange relation between the objects: one unit o f Ci 
is equal to one unit o f C2. Gift exchange, by contrast, establishes qualitative 
relations (i.e. kinship) between the transactors. Suppose two transactors, A and B, 
exchange two gifts, Gi and G2, the exchange appears as two transactions as 
follows:
A — (GO — > B —  (G2) —> A
When A gives B a gift, B gives A another gift in exchange. This does not 
establish the quantitative exchange relation between the objects, but it does 
establish the gift-debt relationship between transactors: A is the creditor and B is 
the debtor in Gi; B is the creditor and A is the debtor in G2. The one exchange 
consists o f two transactions and the transactors become mutually indebted to each 
other. Gregory claims that the gift-debt relationship can only cancelled by 
reversing the exchange, i.e. by B returning Gi to A and A returning G2 to B.
For Gregory the distinction between commodity exchange and gift exchange can be 
summed up as the difference between ‘value (exchange-ratio)’ and ‘rank (exchange- 
order)’. Commodity exchange is the exchange of unlike-for-unlike, which establishes 
a relation of equality between the objects exchanged. In commodity exchange, two 
heterogeneous things are treated as equivalent by being equal to the third thing, the 
common measurement o f value. Gift exchange, by contrast, is the exchange of like- 
for-like, which establishes an unequal relationship of domination between the
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transactors. The giver is regarded as having ‘some kind of superiority’ over the 
receiver such as political control or simply prestige.
Gregory considers the way in which a given form of ‘kinship distance (e.g. strangers, 
aliens, friends, family)’ influences and determines a state of relationship (i.e. 
reciprocal independence/dependence) and a transaction mode (i.e. commodity 
exchange/gift exchange) —  i.e. transactors have commodity exchange in a state of 
‘reciprocal independence’ if  they were strangers or aliens, whereas transactors have 
gift exchange in a state o f ‘reciprocal dependence’ if  they were family or friends in a 
clan based economy. However, Gregory does not argue the opposite case: ‘kinship 
distance’ between transactors may be influenced and determined by the state of 
relationship between them and the transaction mode they take. Sahlins suggests that 
the structure of ‘kinship distance’ enforces reciprocity in communities with 
established kinship rank, whereas reciprocity may affect kinship ranking in 
communities with not yet established kinship ranking:
[Reciprocity is more or less engaged in the formation o f rank itself, as a 
“starting mechanism”. The connection between reciprocity and rank is brought 
to bear in the first case in the form, “to be noble is to be generous”, in the 
second case, “to be generous is to be noble”. The prevailing rank structure 
influences economics relations in the former instances; the reciprocity 
influences hierarchical relations in the latter. (Sahlins, 1974, p. 207)
The former implies the case that the social distance influences and determines a form 
of sociality — e.g. ‘unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother 
thou shalt not lend usury (Deuteronomy)’; ‘neighbors should be friendly and mutually 
trustful, whereas people from far-off are dangerous and unworthy of morally just 
consideration (Oliver)’ (both in Sahlins, 1974, p. 191). In the former case, for instance, 
a close distance causes mutuality, whereas a far-off distance causes instrumental 
reciprocity. In contrast, the latter implies the case that a form of sociality influences 
and determines the social distance —  e.g. ‘It is a sacrilege, says Tacitus, for a German 
to shut his door against any man whomsoever, whether known or unknown. He who 
has behaved with hospitality to a stranger goes to show him another house where this 
hospitality is also practised; and he is there received with the same humanity’
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(Montesquieu, 1914 [1748], Book XX, Chapter 2, italics added). In the latter case, for 
instance, mutuality reduces the social distance. In the next section, we will consider 
the latter case — i.e. a form of sociality (i.e. domination, instrumental reciprocity and 
mutuality) as a ‘starting mechanism’ for the gift relationship.
6.2 Three Forms of Sociality
Let us firstly consider Carol Gould’s three forms of sociality corresponding to three 
historical stages (Gould, 1978):
(1) Relations of Personal Dependence in Pre-capitalist Society
Relations of personal dependence are unequal, involving domination —  e.g. between 
master and slave, between lord and serf. Individuals are personally dependent on one 
another in accordance with their status, role, and function within the community. 
They are internal relations: individuals are internally related with each other. For 
instance, in the master-slave relation, the master is a master only in and through one’s 
relation to the slave, and vice versa. Hence, they are reciprocal in respect that the 
master and the slave reciprocally require each other to constitute the unequal 
relationship of domination as exhibited in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic: the 
domination of master is a constitutive feature of the slave to be a slave, as the
57subordination of slave is a constitutive feature of the master to be a master. The term 
‘domination’ entails a relationship between one who dominates and one who is 
dominated, as the relative term ‘larger than’ entails a relation between something that 
is larger and another thing that is smaller.
(2) Relations of Personal Independence Founded on Objective Dependence in 
Capitalism
Relations of personal independence involves monetary exchange —  e.g. between 
seller and buyer, between producer and consumer. While individuals are personally 
independent of one another, they are objectively dependent on one another in 
accordance with the values of commodities they exchange. Relations of exchange are
57 However, relations of personal dependence are non-reciprocal in respect o f unequal relations: the 
master stands in the relation of domination to the slave, whereas the slave stands in relation of 
subordination to the master; the master enters into the relation freely, whereas the slave enters into the 
relation under constraint; the master, in being a master, regards the slave as dependent, whereas the 
slave, in being a slave, regards the master as independent.
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external relations: individuals are externally related with each other through 
commodities they exchange in the market — e.g. if  the seller cannot find another who 
buys his/her own commodity, the seller cannot enter into the relationship with the 
buyer, and cannot be a seller, and vice versa. Hence, they are reciprocal, they are 
‘instrumentally reciprocal’ in the sense that each agent enters into the relationship to 
use others as a mean for their own purposes (i.e. from their self-interest).58 Individuals 
freely enter into the exchange relationship, freely agree on the equivalence of value in 
commodities they exchange, and freely choose to serve the other in order to serve 
one’s own purposes.
(3) Relations of Free Social Individuality in a Communal Society of the Future 
Relations of free social individuality are the mutually enhancing relationships 
between free individuals. Individuals are both personally and objectively independent 
of one another. Individuals are related internally and directly with each other. They 
are not reciprocal since they do not expect any equivalent return from each other. But 
they are mutual in the sense that each individual recognises the freedom of others, and 
acts so as to enhance the freedom of others, which is the fullest self-realisation o f  
social individuals', it is not the negative freedom or ‘freedom from’ —  i.e. ‘the 
absence o f external constraint’ —  but the positive freedom or ‘freedom to’ — i.e. ‘the 
overcoming of the external constraint’. ‘Mutuality’ goes beyond the Hegel’s master- 
slave dialectic in that (i) individuals are equal; (ii) each individual freely enters into 
the relation with others freely; (iii) individuals are equally independent from one 
another. Besides, mutuality goes beyond the ‘instrumental reciprocity’ in that each 
individual recognises others not as a means or an instrumental value, but as an end or 
a final value.
These three kinds o f social relation are hereafter called, domination, instrumental 
reciprocity and mutuality. Let us consider the way in which each form of sociality 
involves a social relationship through the act o f giving.
58 Gould argues that they are also ‘formally or abstractly reciprocal’ in the sense that the reciprocity 
between exchanging agents is based on the abstract equivalence of value between commodities.
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6.2.1 Domination
Domination involves the unequal relationship between the giver and the receiver —  
i.e. the act of giving takes a competitive form of assertion, and establishes the moral 
and political unbalance between the superior and the inferior. Aristotle argues that 
giving implies doing good and doing noble actions, while taking implies receiving 
good or not doing what is shameful (ibid., p. 61, italics added), and suggests that the 
effort to be paid fo r  realising reciprocity is helping (i.e. giving) others and asking (i.e. 
receiving) fo r  nothing’.
He [a great-souled person] is the sort of person to do good, but is ashamed to be 
a beneficiary himself, since doing good is characteristic o f a superior, receiving 
it o f  an inferior. And he will repay benefits with interest, so that his original 
benefactor, in addition to being paid, will have become a debtor and a 
beneficiary. Great-souled people seem also to remember any benefits they have 
conferred, but not those they have received (since a beneficiary is inferior to a 
benefactor, and he wishes to be a superior), and to hear o f the former with 
pleasure, the latter with displeasure (1124b). (Aristotle, 2000, p. 70, italics 
added).
Aristotle firstly suggests that the reciprocal relationships between givers and receivers 
are not equal: the characteristics of a great-souled person, for Aristotle, are to ask for 
(almost) nothing, but to help others readily, because giving leads us to be a better 
disposition of a character than receiving. Aristotle secondly suggests that being great- 
souled is an aristocratic virtue available only for the rich but not for the poor: 
Aristotle suggests that giving and receiving good includes giving and receiving wealth.
Moreover, the act of giving is to discursively perform the unequal relationship of 
domination between the giver and the receiver. Being resonant with this Aristotle’s 
view, Marcel Mauss claims that the act of giving is aimed to display not only 
generosity but also greatness:
The act of giving itself assumes very solemn forms', the thing received is 
disclaimed and mistrusted; it is only taken up for a moment, after it has been 
cast at one’s feet. The giver affects an exaggerated modesty: having solemnly
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brought on his present, to the sound of a seashell, he excuses himself for giving 
only the last of what remains to him, and throws down the object to be given at 
the feet of his rival and partner. However, the seashell and the herald proclaim 
to everybody the solemn nature o f  this act o f  transfer. The aim of all this is to 
display generosity, freedom, and autonomous action, as well as greatness. Yet, 
all in all, it is mechanisms o f obligation, and even o f obligation through things, 
that are called into play. (Mauss, 2000, pp. 22-3, italics added)
Mauss suggests that we make the performance o f  giving in very solemn forms — e.g. 
the thing to be given/received is disclaimed and mistrusted; the giver puts on an 
exaggerated modesty; the act of transfer takes procedures. Thus, it is not (only) the 
case o f whether the giver is the superior and the receiver is the inferior, but (also) the 
case that the act of giving is to discursively perform  the moral unbalance: through 
performing the act o f giving, the giver perceives him/herself as the superior (e.g. 
great-souled, magnanimous) and the receiver as the inferior (e.g. petty, little):
Between chiefs and vassals, between vassals and their tenants, through such 
gifts a hierarchy is established. To give is to show one’s superiority, to be more, 
to be higher in rank, magister. To accept without giving in return, or without 
giving more back, is to become client ad servant, to become small, to fall lower 
{minister), (ibid., p. 74)
The act of giving is to perform not only the moral unbalance but also the political 
unbalance: through performing the act of giving, the giver perceives him/herself as the 
higher and the receiver as the lower in rank. The mere fact o f having the thing puts the 
recipients in an uncertain state o f  quasi-culpability o f  spiritual inferiority and moral 
inequality in relation to the one delivering the contract (ibid., p. 52).
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6.2.2 Instrumental Reciprocity 
Instrumental reciprocity involves the credit-debt relationship between giver and 
receiver —  i.e. the act of giving takes a Gregory’s form of gift exchange, and 
establishes the religious and economic dependence between creditor and the debtor. 
Mauss assumes that there are two kinds of the contractual relationship: (A) between 
the human beings and the gods, and (B) between the human beings (ibid., p. 15), and 
demonstrates that the human beings requires the former (i.e. the relationship with the 
gods) in order to have the latter (i.e. the relationship with other human beings):
One of the first groups o f beings with which men had to enter into contract, and 
who, by definition, were there to make a contact with them, were above all the 
spirits o f  both the dead and o f  the gods. Indeed, it is they who are the true 
owners o f  the things and possessions o f  this world. With them it was most 
necessary to exchange, and with them it was most dangerous not to exchange. 
Yet, conversely, it was with them it was easiest and safest to exchange, (ibid., p. 
16, italics added)
Human beings should prioritise their contractual relationship with the gods, namely 
the true owners of the things and possessions of this world. It is the most dangerous 
for the human beings not to exchange with the gods. Mauss suggests that the act of 
giving originates, not in a state of ‘reciprocal independence’ between equal 
individuals or groups o f human beings, but in a state of ‘reciprocal dependence’ 
between human beings and the gods.59 Developing Mauss’ argument, Hitoshi 
Imamura, a Japanese social theorist and historian, rephrases these two kinds o f the 
contractual relationship as (a) the relation with ‘outside’ and (b) the relation within 
‘inside’ (Imamura, 2000). Besides, he argues that the former precedes the latter, 
because the latter (the relation within ‘inside’) is created by being in the former (i.e. 
the relation with ‘outside’) —  i.e. there can be no ‘inside’ without ‘outside’.60 
Imamura cites the following argument by Mauss:
59 ‘This evolution was the natural one’ {ibid.,). While Mauss describes the evolution of the act o f giving 
from the former (i.e. the relationship with the gods) into the latter (i.e. the relationship with other 
human beings) was natural, he does not specify in what sense natural (e.g. normal, not social but 
physical, not learned but inherent, spontaneous).
60 Imamura argues that the relation with ‘outside’ human beings, what he calls the ‘non- or extra-human 
beings’, cannot be lacked for the relations between human beings (Imamura, 2000, pp. 145-6). 
According to Imamura, the ‘non- or extra-human beings’ can be named whatever as ‘the nature’, ‘the
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[I]t is believed that purchase must be made from the gods, who can set the price 
o f things. ... the owner must “purchase” from the spirits the right to carry out 
certain actions on “his” property, which is really theirs. Before cutting “his” 
wood, before even tilling “his” soil or plating the upright post o f “his” house, 
the gods must be paid. Whereas the idea of purchase even seems very little 
developed in the civil and commercial usage of the Tradja, on the contrary this 
idea of purchase from the spirits and the gods is utterly constant. (Mauss, 2000,
p. 16)
Mauss describes in market rhetoric that before carrying out certain actions with what 
the gods possess, such as ‘wood’, ‘soil’ and ‘house’, the human beings must 
‘purchase’ the right to do so from the gods, because there can be no peaceful relation 
with other human beings without a peaceful relation with the gods. Mauss 
furthermore uses market rhetoric: ‘Gifts to humans and to the gods also serve the 
purpose of buying peace between them both’ (ibid., p. 17). Thus, the act of giving is 
aimed at ‘buying peace’: the act of giving to the gods (i.e. sacrifice), in particular, is 
believed to compensate and ease some troubles and conflicts between the human 
beings.
Moreover, Imamura claims: ‘in the beginning was the deed of giving’ (Imamura, 2000, 
p. 123).61 That is, the human beings are, in the beginning, given not only the world 
(e.g. a place to live, food) but also their own beings (e.g. life) by the non- or extra­
human beings (e.g. nature, god). He continues that therefore the human beings feel 
indebted for the very first o f gift giving from the non-human beings, and try to solve it 
by paying their debt back to the creditor in a form of sacrifice, which even motivates
gods’, ‘the extra-natural spirits’, ‘the spirits o f the ancestors and the dead’, ‘the omnipotent’, and so on. 
In whatever the name, he claims that ‘non-human beings’ as such intervene the relation between human 
beings. He considers that it is not because he personally believes so, but because the human beings 
cannot vanish the proto-image o f the ‘non-human beings’. That is, human beings cannot decline ‘non­
human beings’ as a mere illusion. The human beings originate the act o f giving in their dependent 
relationship with the gods, and they reproduce their dependent relationship with other human beings.
61 Imamura also describes, ‘In the beginning is the deed of sacrifice’ (Imamura, 2000, p. 103): while it 
is usually believed that the sacred precedes the act o f sacrifice (i.e. there is a priori the sacred, namely 
the gods, and the profane, namely the human beings, sacrifices to the god), it is rather the case of the 
other way round that the act o f sacrifice precedes the sacred (i.e. the act o f sacrifice presupposes the 
being to be sacrificed). It can be consistent with Imamura’s own claim, ‘in the beginning was the deed
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the trade between human beings.62 That is, through the act of giving (i.e. sacrifice), 
human beings presuppose that there was the act of giving from the non-human beings 
to the human beings. In other words, they presuppose the very credit-debt relationship 
between human beings (i.e. debtor) and the non-human beings (i.e. creditor).
6.2.3 Mutuality
Mutuality involves the independent relationship between the giver and the receiver — 
i.e. the act o f giving takes a form of altruistic gift giving, and establishes the mutually 
enhancing relationship between free individuals. Let us consider Titmuss’ argument 
of the blood donation as an altruistic act of gift giving:
‘Gift-relationships’ ... in modem societies ... signify the notion of fellowship , 
which Tawney ... conceived of as a matter of right relationships which are 
institutionally based. Voluntary blood donor systems ... represent one practical 
and concrete demonstration o f fellowship relationships institutionally based in 
Britain in the National Health Service and the National Transfusion Service. It 
is one example o f how such relationships between free and equal individuals 
may be facilitated and encouraged by certain instruments of social policy. 
(Titmuss, 1997, p. 311, italics added).
Titmuss’ concept o f altruistic gift giving involves the institutionally based 
relationships o f fellowship between free and equal individuals. ‘The gift o f blood 
takes place in impersonal situations’ (ibid., p. 127). The donor and the donee do not 
personally know with each other. Because there can be, in stranger relationships, no 
personal expressions of gratitude or of other sentiments, it is less possible that both 
parties can have some political controls or economic interests. Thus, altruistic gift 
giving defines neither the unequal relationship of domination nor the credit-debt 
relationship, but the independent relationship in the assembly o f strangers in modem 
society.
of giving’: when the human beings firstly did sacrifice to the gods, they presupposed that there had 
already been gift giving (e.g. life, being, world) from the gods to the human beings.
62 Imamura argues that the indebt feeling can universally be found in all human beings on earth. 
Referring to Charles Malamoud’s paper on the ancient Brahmanism, Imamura introduces that for the 
ancient Indians, the indebt is the essence o f human beings. The very fact o f being bom means that, 
regardless o f their own aim or intention, they are given their life from the extra-human being. For them, 
their life is identical with the debt: to live is to pay the debt back.
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Blood donation is totally left to the donor’s discretion. There is neither a social 
obligation for giving, nor personal penalties for not giving. There are even no socially 
enforced sanctions of remorse, shame or guilt, either. The donor spontaneously 
realises the need of help for anonymous others. Blood donation is rather concerned 
with ‘stranger relationships’ —  ‘with processes, institutions and structures which 
encourage or discourage the intensity and extensiveness of anonymous helpfulness in 
society’ {ibid., p. 279, italics added). Titmuss calls the sense o f duty for helping 
anonymous others ‘ultra obligation ' —  i.e. an obligation derived from our own 
characters. Instead of a social obligation for giving and returning in face-to-face 
relations, altruistic gift giving involves this ultra obligation in an egalitarian 
community.
[Sjocial gifts and actions carrying no explicit or implicit individual right to a 
return gift or actions are forms of ‘creative altruism’ ... They are creative in the 
sense that the se lf is realised with the help o f anonymous others; they allow the 
biological need to help to express itself. Manifestations of altruism in this sense 
may of course be thought of as self-love. But they may also be thought o f as 
giving life, or prolonging life or enriching life fo r  anonymous others, {ibid., p. 
279, italics added).
Altruistic gift giving is creative in respect of self-realisation: through altruistic gift 
giving to anonymous others, individuals can realise their social self in an egalitarian 
community. Creative altruism is motivated not only by self-love but also by love for 
anonymous others:
In not asking for or expecting any payment o f money, these donors signified 
their belief in the willingness of other men to act altruistically in the future, and 
to join together to make a gift freely available should they have a need for it. ... 
as individuals they were, it may be said, taking part in the creation of a greater 
good transcending the good of self-love. To ‘love ’ themselves, they recognised 
the need to ‘love ’ strangers, {ibid., p. 307, italics added)
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Altruistic gift giving establishes mutuality o f  ‘love’. Individuals are naturally 
dependent on each other in that they are all equally vulnerable. Thus, individuals need 
to love strangers to love themselves in such as a context of roughly equal 
vulnerabilities in an egalitarian community: I care for others because others may care 
me. Titmuss admits an ‘unspoken assumption of some form of gift-reciprocity; that 
those who give as members of a society to strangers will themselves (or their families) 
eventually benefit as members o f that society’ (ibid., p. 282). Mutuality, however, can 
neither be reduced to domination nor instrumental reciprocity, because it cares for 
freedom to give or not to give. The donor neither deliberately seeks nor desires for 
corresponding gift in return. The recipient is not required to make a corresponding gift 
in return, either. While the donor may have some return in future, there is no certainty 
for counter-gifts in the present or future.
Altruistic gift giving takes place in a state of natural dependence’, there is an 
asymmetry between the donor (i.e. the one who is needed for help) and the donee (i.e. 
the one who needs help). However, altruistic gift giving takes place in a state of social 
independence: there is a ‘social distance’ between the donor and the donee, due to 
their impersonal relationship (i.e. they are unknown to each other). Titmuss makes a 
distinction between natural and social dependencies as follows:
In industrialized societies there are many causes of dependencies; they may be 
natural dependencies as in childhood, extreme old age and child-bearing. They 
may be caused by physical and psychological ill-health and incapacity; in part, 
these are culturally determined dependencies. Or they may be wholly or 
predominantly determined by social and cultural factors. These, it may be said, 
are the ‘man-made’ dependencies. (Titmuss, 1962, pp. 42-3, italics added)
Titmuss considers that the market cannot fully be the solution to dependency. In 
contrast with altruistic gift giving, Titmuss claims, ‘one of the functions of atomistic 
private market systems is to ‘free’ men from any sense of obligation to or for other 
men regardless of the consequences to others who cannot reciprocate, and to release 
some men (who are eligible to give) from a sense of inclusion in society at the cost of 
excluding other men (who are not eligible to give)’ (Titmuss, 1997, p. 307). While the 
market ‘frees’ the rich from the obligation to the poor, it does not free the poor from
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the rich. Thus, it cannot be the solution of the ‘man-made’ dependency between the 
rich and the poor.
Finally, altruistic gift giving involves incommensurable values. ‘Because it has 
continually to ask the question ‘Who is my stranger?’, it must inevitably be concerned 
with unquantifiable and unmethodical aspects of man as well as with those aspects 
which can be identified and counted’ {ibid., p. 290). While Titmuss does not criticise 
economists for not measuring the costs o f medical care and the benefits of individuals 
and community, he is rather concerned with incommensurable values with which a 
cost benefit analysis cannot cope. ‘We cannot count the golden sands of life; we 
cannot number the ‘innumerable smiles’ of seas of love’ {ibid., p. 290). Titmuss is 
concerned with the social role in satisfying the biological need to help, which cannot 
be measured in statistics or monetary terms. ‘Although attempts have been made to 
value human life, no money values can be attached to the presence or absence o f a 
spirit o f altruism in a society’ {ibid., p. 263). Among many ‘unmeasureable’ or 
‘innumerable’ things, Titmuss considers human blood as the most basic and sensitive 
indicator o f social values and human relationships, which cannot be quantified or 
priced in monetary terms. ‘If dollars or pounds exchange for blood then it may be 
morally acceptable for a myriad of other human activities and relationships also to 
exchange for dollars or pounds. Economists may fragment systems and value; other 
people do not’ {ibid.).
To summarise, the act of giving involves some kind of social relations — i.e. 
domination, instrumental reciprocity and mutuality. Gregory suggests that the 
‘unreciprocated gift’ is impossible, because it is a contradiction in terms: ‘[t]he notion 
of an unreciprocated gift is a contradiction in terms because reciprocity, along with 
the inalienability and the obligation to return it implies, is the defining characteristic 
of a gift’ (Gregory, 1997, p. 65). Titmuss’ concept of altruistic gift giving, however, 
can be argued as a possible instance of an ‘unreciprocated gift’. The notion of an 
unreciprocated gift is not a contradiction in terms, because mutuality does not involve 
inalienability, and the obligation to return: mutuality involves the independent 
relationship between free individuals. In Gregory’s concept of gift exchange, the giver 
is supposed to have ‘some kind of superiority (e.g. political control, power, status, 
prestige)’ over the receiver, whereas in Titmuss’ concept o f altruistic gift giving, the
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giver is supposed to make no obligation for return from the receiver. In the final 
section, we will consider some skepticism about, and criticism of, altruistic gift giving.
6.3 In Defence of Altruistic Gift Giving
Claims that the gift is impossible are commonly held in economics, anthropology and 
philosophy. In this section, the possibility of altruistic gift giving is defended from a 
perspective of a particular egalitarian mutualist form of Aristotelian virtue ethics.63
6.3.1 Anti-‘Free Gift’ View 
Due to a strong influence by Mauss, many anthropologists believe that there are no 
such things as ‘free  gifts ’ or ‘pure gifts ’. For instance, Douglas alleges that Mauss 
would have declared ‘Nonsense!’ to Titmuss’ idea of anonymous relationships 
through blood donation as pure gift, and claims, ‘[e]ven the idea of a pure gift is a 
contradiction. By ignoring the universal custom o f  compulsory gifts we make our own 
record incomprehensible to ourselves’ (Douglas, 2000, viii, italics added).64 As 
argued above, however, gift giving, is not necessarily compulsory. Ridley argues, ‘gift 
giving in a tribal society, where the object is to put somebody else under an obligation, 
is not gift giving at all; it is exploiting a reciprocal instinct’ (Ridley, 1996, pp. 123-4). 
He claims that the gift acts argued commonly by anthropologists are not some human 
invention that shapes our natures, but is a human invention to exploit our pre-existing 
natures, our innate respect for generosity and disrespect for those who would not 
share. In other words, the gift acts discussed by anthropologists are not acts o f gift 
giving, which does not expect any return, but gift exchanges, which occur in credit- 
debt relationships between transactors, or in a state of ‘reciprocal dependence’ in a 
clan based economy. Although the existence of gift exchanges is plausible, they do 
not exclude the possibility o f gift giving. If gift exchanges exclude gift giving, a pair 
of true altruists would never engage in gift acts. Because (a) a truly altruistic donor
63 Aristotle himself does not take a perspective of a particular egalitarian mutualist form of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. As argued in 6.2.1, Aristotle concerns the act o f giving, which takes a competitive form of 
assertion, and establishes the moral and political unbalance between the superior and the inferior. In his 
gift argument, Aristotle concerns an aristocratic virtue available only for the rich. In contrast, Titmuss 
concerns the act o f giving, which takes a form of altruistic gift giving, and establishes the mutually 
enhancing relationship between free individuals. Titmuss concerns a virtue equally available for all. 
Thus, Titmuss moves away from Aristotle’s account of gift and develops a more egalitarian mutualist 
account of gift giving.
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would not insult the recipient by putting them in debt, and (b) a truly altruistic 
recipient would not insult the donor by returning the debt {ibid., pp. 118-9). As Ridley 
suggests, however, this pessimistic view is wrong: while altruistic motivation is 
incompatible with gift exchange under the obligation to return, it is compatible with, 
and made possible by, gift giving.
Moreover, some moral philosophers believe, as a normative fact, that there should be 
no ‘free  gifts ’ or ‘pure gifts ’ because we ought to be reciprocal. For instance, Becker 
claims ‘reciprocity’ to be a fundamental virtue and claims, ‘[w]e ought to be disposed, 
as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in proportion to the good we receive’ 
(Becker, 1986, p. 3, italics added). Becker admits that the reciprocating habit (e.g. 
bookkeeping) ‘is not the sort of thing friend and family and lovers do. (Or at least, not 
what they should do.) In fact, it is the sort of thing we stop doing when we make 
friends, or fall in love’ {ibid., p. 137). He claims, however, ‘[t]he disposition to 
reciprocate does not require explicit or exact accounting. In fact, where such 
bookkeeping interferes with the practice of other virtues, it is unjustified. It is, after 
all, only means, not an end in itself {ibid., pp. 137-8, italics added). That is, balancing 
the books is not the point o f an act o f love. ‘But it can be one of the results. And it is 
important to get that result. The equilibrium that reciprocity establishes is a means -  
something that enables us to sustain productive (justifiable) relationship’ {ibid., p. 
138.). Becker’s argument is a consequentialist’s one, which assumes that actions (e.g. 
bookkeeping) are instrumentally valuable as a means to producing the best state of 
affairs (i.e. balanced relationships). From an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, 
however, we raise an objection to this: we are not disposed to sustain, what Becker 
calls, ‘social equilibrium’ as a moral virtue. Becker claims that we need to 
commensurate a proportional return in order ‘to reciprocate’. According to his view, 
we need to commensurate ‘benefits’ received from a gift and ‘sacrifices’ made by a 
counter-gift. Nevertheless, it is impossible, because there is no scale to measure such 
costs and benefits, which are derived from the gift. Gift relationships are those 
involved with incommensurable values (i.e. values which cannot be counted or 
audited by a cardinal scale like money) such as gratitude, friendship, love, etc. As
64 Douglas has an anti-ffee-gifts view also from a normative reason: ‘There should not be any free gifts. 
What is wrong with the so-called free gifts is the donor’s intention to be exempt from return gifts 
coming from the recipient. Refusing requital puts the act o f giving outside any mutual ties’ {ibid., vii).
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Titmuss suggests, gift relationships are neither quantitative nor quantifiable. 
Moreover, commensuration is incompatible with morality, because it distorts the 
quality o f gift relationships in the translation into quantity. Gift relationships cannot, 
and should not, be reduced to ‘reciprocity’ governed by economic rationality.
6.3.2 The Universal-Egoist View 
Many economists believe that there are no such things as ‘altruistic gifts because we 
are always motivated by self-interest. Arrow, for example, translates Titmuss’ 
altruistic motivations for giving blood into the language o f Hobbesian utility theory, 
as follows:
(1) The welfare o f each individual will depend both on his own satisfaction and on the 
satisfactions obtained by others. We have in mind here a positive relation: one of 
altruism rather than envy.
(2) The welfare of each individual depends not only on the utilities of himself and 
others but also on his contributions to the utilities of others.
(3) Each individual is, in some ultimate sense, motivated by purely egoistic 
satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him, but there is an implicit social 
contract such that each performs duties for the other in a way calculated to 
enhance the satisfaction of all (Arrow, 1972, p. 348).
Arrow argues that there are two levels of utility from gift acts; one is the recipient’s 
satisfaction derived from a gift, and the other is the donor’s pleasure derived from 
seeing recipient’s satisfaction increased. A donor aims to give satisfaction to a 
recipient by an act o f gift. But it is only a means to a self-interested end: to gain 
personal pleasure. Besides, self-interested motivations can maximise social welfare.
Arrow’s argument is fallacious: that a donor gets pleasure from the satisfaction o f a 
recipient does not entail that one performs the gift act in order to get pleasure. As 
Hume says of the defenders of universal egoism, ‘[t]hey found, that every act of virtue 
or friendship was attended by a secret pleasure; whence they concluded, that 
friendship and virtue could not be disinterested. But the fallacy is obvious. The 
virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a 
pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the 
sake of that pleasure’ (Hume, 1985 [1777], pp. 85-6). We get pleasure from gift
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giving to others because we care for them; we do not care for them in order to get the 
pleasure.
6.3.3 The Domino Argument 
Many economists are skeptical about the importance of defending altruistic gift giving, 
because they believe that altruistic gift giving is not affected by the introduction of 
market. Arrow triggers this argument, too: ‘Why should it be that the creation of a 
market for blood would decrease the altruism embodied in giving blood? ... The 
statement [by Titmuss] does indeed imply that individuals will be willing to give 
without payment. But it does not explain why this willingness should be affected by 
the fact that other individuals receive money for these services’ (Arrow, 1972, p. 351). 
O’Neill suggests, however, that the nature of altruistic gift giving is affected by the 
introduction of market, because the nature of the individual’s act is changed by the 
mixed system (O’Neill, 1992, pp. 278-88). Without the market, donation is simply an 
act o f what he calls altruismi (i.e. a disposition to act in the interests of others), 
whereas the introduction of the market transforms donation into an act of what he 
calls altruisni2 (i.e. a disposition to act in the interests of others at the expense o f one’s 
own interests). He claims ‘I am free to choose between free donation and paid 
donation but that choice itself alters the nature of free donation. It is redefined as an 
act of self-sacrificial altruism2. This alters the motivational structure o f an individual’s 
act’ (ibid., p. 286).65 That is, the introduction of the market mechanisms transforms 
activities that require weak altruismi into ones that demand strong altruisni2.
There is, however, an even more radical argument, which holds that the market drives 
out altruistic gift giving in a domino effect (cf. Radin, 1989; Mack, 1989). The 
domino argument maintains that market and non-market regimes cannot co-exist 
because o f a slippery slope leading to market domination. As Archard notes, Mack’s 
domino theory contains two arguments (Archard, 2002, pp. 87-103). The first 
argument on the ‘Contamination of Meaning’ refers to the way a market (or money) 
changes the meaning of goods. If the market is introduced for blood, the gift o f blood 
will now also have an equivalent market value. The value of blood can now be
65 Even thought we play, for example, the lottery for an altruistic reason (i.e. for giving to charity), the 
possibility o f winning as part o f the structure of playing would undermine this would-be altruism (cf. 
Peacock, 2000, pp. 120-3).
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conceived in monetary terms, even though it is donated. Thus, the market regime 
undermines the opportunity for a pure gift giving of blood by transforming its moral 
value into monetary value.66 The second argument on the ‘Erosion o f Motivation’ 
refers to the way the market (or money) erodes motivation. If there is a market for 
blood, for instance, the possibility of selling blood erodes the motivation to engage in 
the donation of blood. It is not rational to donate without remuneration when one 
could. Thus, the market regime rules out the opportunity for pure gift giving of blood, 
because there it no reason to do it.
How convincing is the domino argument? A distinction drawn by Keat, discussed 
earlier in chapter 3, is useful here (Keat, 1993, pp. 6-20). He distinguishes two ways, 
in which the market can impact on non-market spheres, which he calls ‘replicatory’ 
and ‘non-replicatory’ forms of market determination. In a replicatory form, market 
norms and meanings are projected into non-market spheres. For instance, human 
actions may be compared in terms of the amounts o f utility they generate. In a non- 
replicatory form, economic activities create a sphere, which is dissimilar from an 
economic sphere. For example, the economy may require a sphere of family life (i.e. a 
sphere o f personal intimacy, romantic love and emotional intensity etc.), which serves 
as a ‘haven’ in the ‘heartless world’ o f economic life. The central issue here is which 
form of market determination results. On the one hand, the market determination 
would take ‘replicatory’ forms where there are only strangers. Titmuss’ argument 
concerned the ways in which relations of care in the larger society where personal 
intimacy is absent can be sustained. In this context there is a strong argument for 
claiming that gift relationships are undermined by the introduction of market 
relationships. In such cases, as Archard notes, ‘[t]he societal domino does, even if 
currently standing, totter where the familial, friendship or love domino stands firm’ 
(Archard, 2002, p. 102). On the other hand, the market determination takes ‘non- 
replicatory’ forms where there are strong personal relations between individuals (e.g. 
family, friends). The market and non-market regimes can co-exist because they are 
two radically different forms of human interaction: non-market interaction is not
66 In the terms we developed in chapters 2 and 3, there is a constitutive incommensurability between 
moral value and monetary value of blood. A social relation between a donor and a donee of blood is 
constituted by a refusal to put a price on blood. We ought not to attempt to trade blood, because the 
actions of trying to trade it not only transforms the meaning of blood from a gift into a commodity, but 
also transforms the meaning of their relation from the donor/donee into the seller/buyer.
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merely a fee-free version of its market counterpart. For instance, commercialised sex 
services (i.e. prostitution) do not drive out non-commercialised sex (cf. Archard, 
2002; Mack, 1989, pp. 211-2).67 If monetary understanding of the good (as priced) 
does not contaminate the non-monetary understanding of the good as gift, there will 
be no erosion of the motivation to give rather than charge a price.
6.3.4 The Social Constructivist View 
Parry is skeptical o f the radical opposition between ‘gift exchange’ and ‘commodity 
exchange’, because he thinks that one can evolve rather easily into the other, the 
opposition looks less absolute than is often implied by many other anthropologists. He 
argues that the idea of the purely altruistic gift is the other side o f the coin from the 
idea of the purely interested utilitarian exchange. By discussing the moral perils 
inherent in an Indian gift, called dana, and the moral neutrality of commercial 
transactions both in Hindu context, he claims that Gregory’s neat opposition does 
scant justice to very real continuities between gift and commodity (Parry, 1989). Parry, 
furthermore, mentions that Mauss often describes how we have opposed ‘the ideas of 
the gift and disinterestedness’ to ‘that of interest and the individual pursuit o f utility’, 
and that Mauss’s real purposes is not to suggest there is no such thing as a pure gift in 
any society, but rather to tell us how we have acquired a theory that it should be. ‘The 
whole ideology o f the gift, and conversely the whole idea of ‘economic self-interest’, 
are our invention’ (Parry, 1986, p. 458). In other words, the radical opposition derives 
from the fact that our ideology of the gift has been constructed in antithesis to market 
exchange. ‘ We ’ refers to Western theorists, although this is not clearly stated. Bloch 
and Parry suggest that there is some sort o f dominant tendency being influenced by a 
certain value or ideology in structure of argument, and call it ‘Western discourse’. 
They indicate the existence of a tendency for postulating a fundamental division 
between ‘non-monetary’ and ‘monetary’ economies (or societies) and this gets elided 
with a series of other dichotomies such as ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’, ‘pre-capitalist’ 
and ‘capitalist’, ‘gift economies’ and ‘commodity economies’, ‘production for use’ 
and ‘production for exchange’ (Bloch and Parry, 1989, p. 7).68 Their aim is to reveal a
67 ‘Pleasurable loving sex between two consenting partners is not an interaction that saves each the 
expense o f paying for sex with a prostitute’ (Archard, 2002, p. 96).
68 Harris similarly indicates that the contrast between ‘non-monetary’ and ‘monetary’ economies has 
been built into the structure o f anthropology, and its theories are often articulated around a play o f 
oppositions o f ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’, ‘traditional’ and ‘modem’, ‘pre-capitalist’ and ‘capitalist’,
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real ambiguity and continuity between gift and commodity, which cannot be grasped 
by ‘Western discourse’ on morality o f exchange as follows: gift exchange is safe and 
good, whereas commodity exchange is threatening and bad. ‘Western ideology has so 
emphasised the distinctiveness of the two cycles that it is then unable to imagine the 
mechanisms by which they are linked’ (Bloch and Parry, 1989, p. 30).
What we can find in their argument is a so-called, post-modern flip: because gift 
cannot be grasped with a naive opposition of ethically good gift and bad money, it 
must be a mere fiction, which is socially constructed by ‘Western discourse’. There 
can be several objections against their flip: first, their argument that ‘Western 
discourse ’ cannot grasp a real ambiguity and continuity between gift and commodity 
does not work. On the contrary, economic anthropologists accept a real ambiguity and 
continuity between gift and commodity. Gregory, for instance, did not claim there 
was a “radical opposition”, but rather wrote of “the very real continuities between gift 
and commodity”. Second, it is premature to simply regard gift exchange as ethically 
good in contrast with commodity exchange as ethically bad. If Western ideology or 
discourse appropriately emphasises the distinctiveness of the market and non-market 
spheres, then it would be even clearer that gift exchange in anthropology is 
fundamentally different from gift giving in ethics. Third, their argument that there is 
no such distinction between commodity and gift exchange does not work unless they 
offer reasons based firmly upon the nature o f commodity and gift exchange, and not 
the discourse about them. That is, the fact that ‘we’ have created a distinction between 
commodity and gift exchange does not negate the possibility that this distinction 
actually exists as an extra-discursive phenomenon. The gift still can be real and 
possible: it can be both a socially constructed (ideally real) phenomena and an extra- 
discursive, socially real phenomena.69
‘non-literate’ and ‘literate’. The presence or absence of money and markets has provided ‘a central axis 
along which historical reality has been divided into two polarised and contrasted fields’ (Harris, 1989, 
p. 236).
69 See 3.3.3 on how the Critical Realist perspective maintains a distinction between the extra-discursive 
and the discursive.
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6.3.5 The Post-Structuralist View 
The Post-structuralist philosophers de-construct the economy/non-economy dualism, 
and claim that the gift cannot appear as a gift. For instance, Derrida indicates the 
impossibility of the gift. ‘At the limit, the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to 
the donee or to the donor. It cannot be gift as gift except by not being present as gift. 
Neither to the “one” nor to “the other.” If the other perceives or receives it, if he or 
she keeps it as gift, the gift is annulled’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 14). Derrida claims, on the 
one hand, that the gift requires economy as non-gift: the gift cannot be treated without 
its relation with economy as non-gift. There is no concept of the gift without being 
distinguished from the concept of economy. On the other hand, however, the gift 
interrupts economy. For there to be the gift, it must be aneconomic: there must be no 
reciprocity, return, exchange, counterfeit, or debt. It must not come back from its 
donee to its donor. It must not be circulated, nor must it be exchanged. It must not 
even be recognised as a gift. If it is recognised as gift, if  it appears to its donee as 
such: ‘if  the present is present to him as [a] present, this simple recognition suffices 
to annul the gift’ {ibid., p. 13). Derrida’s argument is to do with paradoxical natures 
within the act of giving noted at the beginning: it is voluntary and obligatory, one 
sided and mutual at the same time. The Diamond Cutter positively describes these 
paradoxes: bodhisattvas (i.e. great beings) perform the act o f  giving without 
conceiving o f any thing in any way as a sign (i.e. without conceiving o f  their 
performance as the act o f  giving). In contrast, Derrida negatively describes these 
paradoxes: the gift is the impossible, which is not the case that it is impossible in 
practice, but the case that it is possible in practice to exist conceptually as the 
impossible, a double bind (ibid., p. 7).
There is no fundamental difference between Derrida’s and my argument in respect of 
understanding the paradoxical natures in the act of giving. It is acceptable that in the 
theoretical domain the gift cannot be treated without being related with the economy. 
As argued, gift exchange can conceptually be distinguished from commodity 
exchange, and altruistic gift giving can conceptually be distinguished from the act of 
giving, which establishes credit debt relationship. It is also acceptable that the concept 
o f the gift is incompatible with the concept o f the economy. The principles on which 
the altruistic gift giving is based, are incompatible with those on which the profit 
seeking is based. However, I do not agree with the Derridian Post-structuralist view
174
that because the gift is conceptually the impossible, it is impossible in practice. When 
we practice altruistic gift giving, we do not require the different principle of profit 
seeking. The gift can be the gift without keeping a relation o f  foreignness to the circle 
of economy. Whilst it is plausible to suggest that the gift theory makes it possible to 
acquire knowledge of the pre- or non-discovered nature of the gift, it is implausible to 
suggest that the gift theory makes the gift practice exist. Although the gift might be, as 
Derrida indicates, the impossible in the sense of its intelligibility, it can be real and 
possible in the sense of its causal impact.
6.4 Conclusion
We live in a market society where trade in many kinds of things and services (e.g. 
human organs, babies, sex, surrogate motherhood, human genome information etc.) is 
possible. Because we take it for granted, thinking in terms of money appears for us to 
be ‘natural’. And yet we still evaluate, and engage in, non-monetary and non-profit- 
making activities, such as housekeeping, bringing up children and taking care of 
elderly people. I am interested in seeking the possibility of an alternative principle, 
which requires more duties to act for the benefit o f others than a monetary principle. 
The importance and possibility of altruistic gift giving ought to be defended from any 
kind of reductionism. As demonstrated, we can perform the act o f giving without 
sticking to the superiority/inferiority or credit/debt relationship. This is the argument I 




The last six chapters have considered the ontology of money, primarily, from a 
Critical Realist perspective, and the ethics of money, primarily, from an Aristotelian 
virtue ethics perspective. Two interconnected sub-texts have run throughout the 
thesis: the ontology of money involves discursive commensuration, and this 
misguides us to transform even incommensurable values into a commensurable form. 
That is, money itself is incompatible with our ethical behaviour and human virtue. Let 
us finally draw the threads together in the issue of a virtuous society, namely utopia, 
and consider the ways in which we can be less dependent on money.
After some initial definitions, the chapter proceeds by interweaving the following:
• An Aristotelian virtue-based ethics and a consequentialist ethics
• An Aristotelian ‘virtue-based utopianism’ and a ‘consequentialist utopia’ 
propagated by Hodgson
• Three thinkers (Meikle, Hodgson and Hess) who have, in one form or another, 
touched upon:
o The ontology of human beings 
o The ontology of human history 
o The ontology of money 
o The ontology of utopia
Let us start with some definitions. ‘Utopia’ is originally a Greek word, which consists 
o f the prefix ‘ou’ meaning no and the root ‘topos’ meaning place (Sargent, 1994; 
Manuel and Manuel, 1979). In the 16th century, Thomas More coined the word 
‘Eutopia’ with an alternative prefix ‘eu’ meaning good. As a result, the word ‘utopia’ 
has commonly been used to refer to ‘a non-existent good place’, unless a distinction 
between ‘utopia (i.e. no place)’ and ‘eutopia (i.e. good place)’ is specially required. In 
the 19th century, Karl Marx dismissed as ‘utopian socialists’ thinkers like Robert 
Owen, Henri Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier who considered the possibility o f a 
better future through the establishment of small experimental communities. Since 
Marx’s criticism, the term ‘utopian socialists’ has been used to pejoratively to refer to
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unrealistic and naive social theorist and reformers. Around the turn to the 21st century, 
however, ‘utopia’ has started to be used with positive connotations again. In 
Economics and Utopia, Hodgson poses a challenge for the new millennium —  i.e. the 
construction of ‘evotopia’.
This chapter aims to do as follows:
1. It considers Meikle’s argument on two traditions of ontology, atomist and 
essentialist, and sees how different ontological views on human nature, history and 
money make a difference to their utopianism. Despite the fact that Hodgson takes 
himself to be rejecting what he calls an ‘atomist ontology’, Hodgson’s 
Evotopianism, inadvertently perhaps, slides into an atomist ontology, in the sense 
that Meikle characterises it.
2. It considers Hodgson’s ‘evotopia’. While Hodgson partly constitutes his 
‘evotopian thinking’ by criticising Marx’s ‘teleologicaT and ‘deterministic’ 
conception of history, the criticism does not fully work for establishing his 
‘evotopian thinking’, because Hodgson’s case is made not against, in Meikle’s 
terminology, a real ‘essentialist’ but rather against an ‘atomist’ interpretation of 
Marx.
3. It explores the possibility of Aristotelian ‘virtue-based utopianism’, through 
Moses Hess’s account of human nature, history, money and utopia. ‘Virtue-based 
utopia’ is an excellence of human nature, which each individual can seek to realise 
his/her one’s own life. We can be a virtuous person within the teleological 
development of history towards ‘virtue-based utopia’, unless interfered with. As 
we can realise our human virtue, we can internally stop our dependence on money 
within the teleological development of history.
These arguments pave the way for exploring the possibility o f an Aristotelian ‘virtue- 
based utopianism’ in contrast with Hodgson’s ‘evotopianism’.
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7.1 Meikle’s Essentialism
First, Meikle contrasts two traditions: atomist ontology and essentialist ontology. The 
atomist ontology, on the one hand, admits only and gives primacy to, ‘building 
blocks’ or atomistic ‘small-bits’, and further believes everything else is reducible to 
them. The essentialist ontology, on the other hand, admits ‘organic wholes’ or 
‘entities’, and does not consider them to be reducible but rather irreducible to their 
parts (cf. Meikle, 1985, p. 154; p. 175).
An ‘organic whole’ or ‘entity’ is made up of its parts. But the relations between 
‘whole’ and ‘part’ are complex. Firstly, the whole is irreducible to its parts. ‘The 
relation between the whole entity and its parts is not the same as that between the 
constituent simples of an aggregate like a pile o f sand. The complexity of an entity is 
irreducible, and it is what exists’ (Meikle, 1985, p. 154). Secondly, entities are 
ontologically and metaphysically complex: ‘It is part of the nature of an entity in its 
embryonic or immature form, to have the potential to become or develop into a 
mature specimen’ (ibid., p. 154). It is again dissimilar to the case of sand: a pile of 
sand does not have o f its nature a potential to become anything.
Wholes and Parts: ‘On an essentialist ontology, the unity of the whole and its 
parts is, in central cases, not the result o f accidental fortuitous accretions, but the 
result o f increasing differentiation of an original essence. For atomist ontology, 
on the other hand, there are not entities such as men, stars, and trees, with 
natures, but abstraction denoted by the dummy-term ‘thing’, x, which happen to 
have certain ‘qualities” (ibid., p. 159).
In atomist ontology, on the one hand, there is neither the essence nor the potential of 
an entity. “ Going to be a cat’ is not a real feature of the creature, but simply a 
statistical generalisation about a ‘class’ of creatures’ (ibid., p. 160), which we may 
believe to be true of this particular creature because it resembles them. In essentialist 
ontology, on the other hand, certain sorts of change belong to the essence. “ Going to 
be cat in the future’ is part of what it is to be a kitten now; to be a kitten now is to 
have the present potential to become a cat; to be an adult cat is to have realised that 
past potential’ (ibid., p. 160).
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To understand what accidentally and necessarily happened is to understand the 
essence of an entity involving with those happenings. ‘If the creature did not have the 
potential to become a mature cat it would not be an immature cat, i.e. kitten. Potential 
is a feature that the creature necessarily has. What is not necessary is that that 
potential be realised, for accidents can happen. If the creature meets with such an 
accident, then accidentally its potential is not realised’ {ibid., p. 161).
Chance and Necessity: The atomist ontology treats all happenings as accidental, 
whereas the essentialist ontology treats them either as accidental or necessary, 
(cf. ibid., pp. 6-11; p. 161)
Atomist ontology rejects necessary changes, and instead asserts ‘regularities’ or 
constant conjunction of ‘event-types’. Thus, atomist ontology predicts ‘events’ on the 
basis of other ‘events’ with universal regularity. Essentialist ontology, in contrast, 
considers that ‘chance happenings to be exceptional, and that what is not exceptional, 
what happens ‘always or for the most part’, cannot be fortuitous’ (ibid., p. 162). What 
happens ‘always or for the most part’ does happen in virtue of the real nature of an 
entity. We can observe it in the set of events that happens ‘always or for the most 
part’. Thus, essentialist ontology uncovers an entity’s tendencies of development or 
potential, and sees how it can be expected to act or develop and probably will unless 
interfered with.
Essentialist ontology holds an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of change: 
accidental and necessary. Accidental changes are ‘external motions’ arising from  
chance, whereas necessary changes are ‘internal motions’ arising from a thing’s 
essence {ibid., p. 163). This relates to a distinction between efficient causation (i.e. 
functions) and final causation (i.e. goals):
Efficient causation and Final causation: Efficient causation involves chains of 
events in which each event in the chain ‘causes’ the one succeeding it. Final
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causation involves the tendency of development of a kind of thing towards an 
end or state by its nature, if  it is not interfered with, (ibid., p. 175; p. 177)70
Both efficient and final causations are consistent with teleological explanation —  i.e. 
to explain the existence through the question of ‘for what purpose?’. Atomist 
ontology, on the one hand, puts primacy on extrinsic teleology, which concern cases 
of serving functions for benefit: something exists for the sake o f benefit it promotes. It 
reduces all causations into efficient causation. It is a matter o f regularities or 
uniformities of events, o f invariable succession of one event-type by another event- 
type. Essentialist ontology, on the other hand, puts primacy on intrinsic teleology, 
which concerns cases o f aiming towards the goals: something exists for the sake of its 
final goals. Its causal explanation contains the notion o f tendency (potentially 
frustratable): it does not state what actually does happen, but what would happen so 
long as there were no interference.
7.1.1 The Ontology of Human Beings 
The essential properties of the human species (i.e. Gattungswesen) are being 
conscious and social. The individual is already the social being. Thus, the full 
realisation of the essence of human as a mammalian species is identical with the full 
realisation o f the essence o f society.
Thus, the realised human society is a society of realised humans. The full 
realisation of the potentiality inherent in human society as an essence, is at the 
same time the society in which the potentiality o f the social essence o f the 
human natural species is fully realised. A fully realised human essence, and the 
fully realised essence o f human society, are products of one and the same 
process. (Meikle, 1985, p. 58)
70 Kurki has properly criticised Critical Realism for the way in which CR tends to reduce other types of 
causes down to efficient causes is unnecessary and indeed misleading. CR needs and can have more 
regard to final causation rather than merely efficient causation. Kuruki mentions the irreducibility 
between the two kinds o f causation: ‘Final form of causality is closely linked with efficient causality, in 
fact we can often treat agents (efficient causes) and their intentions (final causes) as closely knit ‘causal 
pair’ in social explanation. This does not mean, however, that efficient causality exhaust the notion of 
final causality, that they become the same why’ (Kurki, 2003, p. 12). In my view, however, two kinds 
of causality cannot be reduced into each other because they do not answer the same ‘why ’ questions, 
while in practice they do not necessarily conflict with each other but are even mutually supportive.
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The realisation of fully developed nature, namely telos, o f the human species is at the 
same time the realisation of telos o f society. Thus, human beings are interrelated with 
the teleological development of history: human beings achieve the realisation of 
themselves as real species being through a historical process. Human beings make 
history by achieving their self-realisation, but history equally makes it possible for 
them to realise their essence.
7.1.2 The Ontology of Human History 
History is teleological, in a sense o f realising of potentials inherent in human society. 
Teleology is a theory about how the real nature (essence) of a whole entity is to be 
identified, how its development from immature to mature or declining form is to be 
explained, and about how its characteristic behaviour is to be explained in a law-like 
fashion {ibid., p. 178).
History is the process of coming-to-be of human society. Its essence is human 
labour, and its different 'principles’ are the social forms in which that labour is 
historically supplied. History, in Marx’s view, does have an end or telos towards 
which it tends, however horribly that may jar on latter-day atomism sensibilities. 
Though, of course, as one must always add in order to give at least offence to 
delicate intellectual sensibilities, it is an end that is frustratable anywhere along 
the line. (Meikle, 1985, p. 57)
Meikle lucidly explains that, in history, there are only three categorical possibilities: 
there is only the necessary; there is only the accidental; there are both necessities and 
accidents. The first two cannot be defended, so we are left with the third {ibid., p. 6). 
Although history is not strictly or only a succession of necessary events, it is not a 
succession of accidental events, either.
Meikle’s teleological view on history is rather incompatible with determinism. 
Teleology is not the theory to see ‘the world as the artefact o f God or Guiding 
Intelligence and each thing in the world as existing and behaving in the way that it 
does as a fulfilment of his purpose’ (Meikle, 1985, p. 178). Teleology is not 
deterministic, which sees history as fully determined, universal regularities of event- 
types. Because (a) Marx’s conception of law does not relate to event-types, (b) it is
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not universal but specific to a given real nature and the necessary tendencies, and (c) 
it can be frustrated by accidents.
7.1.3 The Ontology of Money 
In Politics, Aristotle introduces the teleological conception o f money as the 
development or the evolution of exchange through following successive four forms 
(Meikle, 1995):
(1) Barter, or exchange without money (C-C): Aristotle thinks that it is ethically 
acceptable, because its end is both meeting natural needs and having enough. It is 
to get some useful things that satisfy your need. It is natural and necessary.
(2) Exchange mediated by money in case o f  selling a commodity in order to buy 
another commodity (C-M-C’): barter is inconvenient for using what you have and 
getting what you need, because the acts of sale and purchase are fused into a 
single act. Money can separate the single act into two, which is more flexible 
since it allows the act of sale (C-M) and the act of purchase (M-C’) to be 
separated in time and space. Aristotle thinks that it is also ethically acceptable, 
because its end is the satisfaction of human’s natural needs.
(3) Exchange mediated by money in the case o f  buying a commodity to sell it and 
make money (M-C-M’): once people are accustomed to C-M-C’, they are to come 
to the market, not with surplus goods they have made, but with money. Their aim 
is to get more money, by buying commodities and selling them for a greater sum. 
Aristotle thinks that M-C-M’ is not ethically acceptable, because its end is not 
meeting natural needs or having enough, but the accumulation of money. One sum 
of money is different from another only in quantity, not in quality. There is no 
limit of the end in the art of wealth getting.
(4) Usury, or the lending o f  money at interest (M -M ’): money is lent to get a larger 
amount of money returned. It is the most hated monetary form.
Aristotle falls into inconsistency here. He presents the emergence of these four forms 
of exchange as a single and natural process of development, or evolution, in a sense 
that they appear to be accidentally different ways of doing essentially the same thing. 
Once C-C’ becomes a common form of activity, the obstacle it poses to successive 
exchange become common experiences, and the way to get round them is to make one 
commodity into a means of exchange money. Moreover, once C-M-C’ is established
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and repeated over time, it can no longer be divided into a sequence of repetitions of C-
M-C’ as C-M-C/C-M-C/C-M-C/C-M-C/ , but there is as much reason to divide it
up as C-M/M-C-M/M-C-M/M-C-M/M-C. That is, C-M-C’ is an embryonic form of 
M-C-M’. Furthermore, once M-C-M’ is established and repeated over time, money 
becomes the universal form of wealth, and most activities come to be done for the 
sake of it. That is, what is introduced to be a means to human ends becomes an end 
itself, and the human ends it is meant to serve become means to it. Aristotle is in two 
minds on money: ‘money as a means’ and ‘money as an end (te losf, but money 
cannot ultimately be both a means and an end. He drops his thought and concludes 
that the true nature o f money is what it is originally intended to be, a means, and its 
development into an end is an ethical perversion:
The identification of a unity is usually a matter of identifying an end or telos. 
But in his [Aristotle’s] account o f the development of exchange, he identifies 
not one end but two, so it is hard to see what the requisite unity can consist in, 
and without that there cannot really be a single process of development at all. 
(Meikle, 1995, pp. 98-9)
Aristotle defines actions by their ends. But Aristotle is confused by two kinds of telos: 
(a) extrinsic telos (i.e. the aim of exchange) and (b) intrinsic telos (i.e. a final form in 
the development of exchange):
(a) Extrinsic telos (i.e. the aim of exchange): Telos refers to the original aim for 
exchange. The original purpose for exchange is to get useful things that satisfy our 
need. That is, C’ is a telos for C-C’ and C-M-C’. Money is originally introduced 
as a means of exchange. Money is in its nature an instrument or means for the 
circulation of useful things or use values.
(b) Intrinsic telos (i.e. a final form in the development of exchange): Telos refers to a 
final or a matured form in the development of exchange in contrast with an 
original form. Aristotle introduces money as the development of exchange, and he 
sees this as evolving through four forms, namely C-C’; C-M-C’, M-C-M’, and M- 
M ’. ‘M-M realises a potentiality in the nature of money’ (ibid.). That is, M-M’ is a 
telos in development of exchange.
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The extrinsic and intrinsic telos o f exchange do not, in practice, conflict, but are rather 
supportive o f each other: the exchange form does not develop into its final form 
without the aim of exchange. ‘Not only need there be no conflict in practice between 
efficient and final causality, but the two are even mutually supportive’ (Meikle, 1985, 
p. 171). Nevertheless, efficient causal explanation being based on extrinsic teleology 
and fina l causal explanation being based on intrinsic teleology can neither be replaced 
by nor reduced into each other. Aristotle unfortunately gives up his own final causal 
explanation, and rather identifies the nature of money by the original aim for 
exchange in order to secure his stipulation that money is invented to be used for 
exchange. But, as we will see below, Aristotle’s final causal explanation o f the 
development of exchange was rescued by Marx and Hess.
7.1.4 The Ontology of Utopia 
Meikle does not argue about utopianism in particular. From Meikle’s essentialist 
ontology, however, it follows that utopia is the full realisation o f essences of both 
human species and society in the teleological development of history. First, the 
realisation of human essences is an intrinsic telos for the human species. ‘Much as for 
Aristotle and the ancient world, the highest end, for Marx, is the full realisation of 
individuals as ends in themselves’ (Kain, 1988, p. 188). It is not for individuals to be 
subordinate to moral principles, which are supposed to be the highest ends in 
themselves, but to fu lfil and transcend moral principles. Kain indicates that Aristotle 
implicitly claims that human beings f i t  their world, if  and when they realise 
themselves. ‘The human essence, when realised, is at home in the cosmos. Thus, the 
best life, the life which realises our essence, would be a life o f happiness because the 
contemplative life would be at least in part contemplation of this proper fit between 
human beings and their would. If it were the case that humans were alienated from the 
cosmos, ... the best life, even the life of virtue, would not lead to happiness’ (ibid., p. 
191). Like Aristotle, Marx also hopes to bring about a fit between human beings and 
their world so as to realize them as ends in themselves. Besides, this fit would occur 
in the teleological development of history. ‘When the new society finally has emerged, 
then moral ideals or teleological ends can come into their own’ (ibid., p. 193). Thus, 
the realisation of human essences is the intrinsic telos for both human beings and 
history. In other words, human beings achieve the realisation o f themselves as real 
species being through a process of teleological development of history.
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7.2 Hodgson’s Evotopianism
Let us now turn to Hodgson’s ‘evotopian thinking’. Hodgson’s ‘evotopia’ is partly 
derived from his ‘anti-teleological’ and ‘anti-deterministic’ conception of history. But 
what Hodgson opposes is not Marx as a real ‘essentialist’ to use Meikle’s terminology. 
Rather he opposes Marx on the basis of a mistaken interpretation where he reads 
Marx as an ‘atomist’ Indeed, Hodgson himself, perhaps inadvertently, adopts an 
atomist ontology, in the sense that Meikle characterises it. This is the case despite the 
fact that Hodgson takes himself to be rejecting what he calls an ‘atomist ontology’, 
which he contrasts with an ‘organicist ontology’. Here is Hodgson’s account of the 
contrast:
‘Atomistic ontology’ and ‘Organicist ontology’: in an organicist ontology, 
relations between entities are internal rather than external, and the essential 
characteristics of any element are outcomes of relations with other entities. In 
contrast, in an atomistic ontology, entities possess qualities independently of 
their relations with other entities. (Hodgson, 1993, p. 88)
Hodgson criticises the ‘individualistic version of atomism and reductionism’ on the 
basis of ‘organicist ontology’: he criticises the way in which, in mainstream 
economics, economic phenomena are reduced into, and explained in terms of 
individuals (e.g. individual’s utility-driven or -maximising behaviour, individual’s 
taste and preference) independently of their relations with others and a whole society. 
‘In the social sphere the human individual become the fundamental unit o f analysis: 
the individual particle in motion. ... But in such an atomist social ontology the 
essential aspects o f human personality and motivation are conceived of as 
independent o f the social relations with others’ (ibid., p. 236).
Hodgson stresses that he is an anti-atomist in terms of individuals. However, he is an 
atomist in terms of history. That is, Hodgson’s criticism is in fact against a misplaced 
essentialism on the basis of, in Meikle’s s terminology, atomist ontology. Hodgson 
criticises a deterministic view of history (i.e. seeing history as fully determined, 
universal regularities of event-types) from an atomistic view o f history. Hodgson 
reduces all social changes in history into the accidental (i.e. whether predictable or 
not), and reduces all causations into the efficient causation (i.e. whether it functions or
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not). It is all about the wrong basis of ‘evotopia’, which is explained through extrinsic 
teleology and justified through a utilitarian form  o f  consequentialism. Let us start 
considering Hodgson’s ‘evotopianism’ with his anti-teleological view of history.
7.2.1 The Ontology of Human History
History has no pre-ordained path or goal of any kind. It has no necessary 
movement towards a refined liberal-democratic capitalism, nor towards a 
socialism or communism of any variety. Historical development is not 
teleological. (Hodgson, 1999, p. 10, italics added)
Despite the fact that the word ‘evolution’ derived from ‘the Latin word associated 
with a specifically directional and predestined activity; the scroll is unrolled to reveal 
that which is immanent and already within’ (Hodgson, 1993, p. 37), Hodgson himself 
is not ‘evolutionary’ in terms of his conception of history: ‘History is not the unrolling 
o f a scroll: it has no teleology’ (Hodgson, 1999, p. 159). Hodgson’s anti-teleological 
view of history comes from Veblen’s. ‘Veblen criticised both communism and pro­
marketeers for proposing that history could, would or should reach a fixed  or perfect 
outcome. Veblen rejected as pre-Darwinian the doctorial and teleological concept of a 
final goal, be it communism, capitalism or whatever’ (ibid., p. 243-4, italics added).
Hodgson’s anti-teleological view of history is compatible with his account of ‘anti­
determinism’. His rejection of teleological history means ‘a rejection of the idea o f the 
‘inevitability’ of socialism and of a ‘natural’ outcome or end-point in capitalist 
evolution. There is no natural path, or law, governing economic development’ (ibid., 
p. 140). While Hodgson indicates that the interpretation of Marx theory of history as 
‘teleological’ remains controversial, he uses the word ‘teleology’ as ‘a conception of 
immanent tendencies of capitalist development’ (ibid., p. 277). Hodgson criticises 
Marx as ‘determinist’: ‘Marx’s basic idea of history as a succession o f different types 
o f economic structure or system still has a lot going for it. This should not, however, 
be taken to imply that history is a deterministic series of stages, where one system 
inevitably is transformed into another ‘higher’ system’ (ibid., p. 159).
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As we have seen, however, Meikle’s teleological view on history is rather 
incompatible with determinism. Hodgson’s misunderstanding on Marxian teleology 
might be because he inadvertently slips into an atomist ontology. Because Hodgson 
fails to distinguish between accidental and necessary changes, and sees all ‘events’ 
uniquely as ‘regularities’ or epistemological constant conjunction of ‘event-types’, 
non-accidental changes are only unreal ‘inevitable’ changes. In contrast with Marxian 
idea of ‘teleological’ and ‘deterministic’ view on history, Hodgson claims, in terms of 
Darwin’s biological principles, that:
it is impossible to predict the character and form of social change. On the basis 
of Darwinism, change would occur as the result o f chance variations; these are 
a source o f  unpredictability, and deny evolution any predetermined goal. 
(Hodgson, 1993, p. 41, italics added)
Hodgson considers the nature o f social change in terms of whether it is predictable or 
not. However, essentialist ontology does not predict the development of history, in the 
same sense as it does not predict that a kitten is going to be a mature cat in the future. 
Instead, it uncovers an entity’s tendencies o f  development or potential, and sees how 
it can be expected to act or develop and probably will unless interfered with.
1 2 2  The Ontology of Money 
Hodgson establishes his evolutionary view of money through criticism of Menger’s 
‘evolutionary’ view. Menger views money as a paradigmatic ‘organic’ social 
institution. This ‘organic’, however, means neither ‘natural or biological’ nor ‘being 
structurally interrelated with environment’, but means that ‘although the product of 
human action, it is not the product of human design’ (ibid., p. 109). For Menger, 
money is the most saleable commodity, and its saleability is based on the subjective 
evaluation by individuals. Money emerges through some kind of an ‘evolutionary 
process’. ‘Apart from the attribute of being ‘most marketable’, which is a culmination 
and consequence of individual perception and choices, Menger suggests that the good 
that emerges as money may be ‘the most easily transported, the most durable and the 
most divisible’ ... Consequently over time, a single commodity or group of 
commodities will emerge as money’ (ibid., p. 111).
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Hodgson claims, however, that M enger’s ‘evolutionalist’ view on the emergence o f  
money does not provide a complete evolutionary perspective. First, while money is 
‘selected’ in Menger’s evolutionary view of the emergence of money, it is not fully 
‘natural selection’. ‘What is ‘selected’ is the convention, or potential monetary unit, 
itself. However, ... this is not the selection of what could be analogous to the 
‘genetic’ elements driving the system’ (ibid., p. 111). Menger’s ‘ontogenetic’ view  on 
evolutionary contrasts with Hodgson’s ‘phylogenetic’ one in term of understanding 
‘natural selection’:
‘Ontogenetic Evolution’ and ’Phylogeny Evolution’: Ontogeny involves the 
development of a particular organism from a set of given and unchanging genes. 
... In contrast, phylogeny is the complete and ongoing evolution of a population, 
including changes in its composition and that of the gene pool. It involves 
changes in the genetic potentialities of the population, as well as their individual 
phenotypic development, (ibid., p. 40)
For Menger, the object of evolutionary analysis is an emerging monetary unit and the 
cumulative reinforcement o f a given unit. The ‘genetic material’ is the individual with 
her given preferences and goals, and she does not change during the emergence of 
money. ‘There is not necessarily even a process o f evolutionary selection between 
rival monetary units nor is there a consideration of the changes in individual goals or 
preferences. While the medium of exchange is ‘selected’, it is through cumulative 
reinforcement, and is not necessarily through the sifting and winnowing of competing 
alternatives’ (ibid., p. 112). Hodgson claims that it is not fully ‘natural selection’ 
observed in phylogeny, but that confined in ontogeny.
Second, Menger’s ‘evolutionalist’ view on the emergence of money neglects 
problems o f quality variation and verification o f an emerging monetary unit. 
Menger’s ‘typological essentialism ’ contrasts with Hodgson’s ‘population thinking’ in
• • • 71term o f understanding ‘quality variation’:
71 There is a large controversy between ‘population thinking’ and ‘typological essentialism’, for which 
space does not allow a detailed examination of here. For instance, Elliot Sober argues that the 
essentialist method of explaining variability, formulated and applied to biology and physics by 
Aristotle, is no longer tenable: ‘Essentialism about species is today a dead issue, not because there is no 
conceivable way to defend it, but because the way in which it was defended by biologists was
188
‘Typological essentialism’ and ‘Population thinking’: In typological thinking, 
species are regarded as identifiable in terms of a few distinct characteristics 
which represent their essence. Accordingly, all variations around the ideal type 
are regarded as accidental aberrations. By contrast, in population thinking, 
species are described in terms o f a distribution o f characteristics. Whereas in 
typological thinking variation is a classificatory nuisance, in population thinking 
it is of paramount interest because it is precisely the variety of the system that 
fuels the evolutionary process, {ibid., p. 47)
Hodgson indicates that Menger as ‘typological essentialist’ suggests that the 
substance of an emerging monetary unit is homogeneous, invariant and recognisable 
by all agents, and this neglects problems of quality variation and verification of 
money and leaves out the possibility o f the state intervention. In comparison with 
language, which is, Hodgson thinks, self-policing and self-regulating because 
individuals have an incentive to make their words clear, money is not, and thereby 
requires the intervention from the state more than language does. Hodgson concludes, 
therefore, that ‘money will be, to use Menger’s terminology —  partly a ‘pragmatic’ 
rather than a purely ‘organic’ institution’ {ibid., p. 120). For Hodgson, money is 
neither fully nor merely autonomous, self-governing entity, but rather amendable and 
governable one.
First, Hodgson is an atomist in the guise of an ‘anti-atomist’. In contrast with 
typological thinking, which regards species as identifiable in terms of a few distinct 
characteristics, Hodgson regards species, in population thinking, in terms of a 
distribution o f characteristics. ‘Whereas in typological thinking variation is a
thoroughly discredited’ (Sober, 1980, p. 353). However, ‘typological essentialism’, which Sober and 
Hodgson criticise, seems to be different from Aristotelian essentialism this thesis defends. Sober sees a 
problem o f typological essentialism in Aristotle’s distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ state. 
Corresponding with Sober, Hodgson considers that typological essentialism holds a distinction between 
the ideal type (i.e. normal) and accidental aberrations (i.e. abnormal). In contrast, Aristotelian 
essentialism has been defined in 4.2.2 as a view that an object consists o f some ‘necessary’ properties 
and ‘accidental’ properties: it entails a distinction between necessary (i.e. constitutive) and accidental 
(i.e. non-constitutive). In chess, certain rules are essential (i.e. necessary and constitutive to the game), 
whereas if the chess pieces are wooden or plastic, or if the chess players are left-handed or right-handed 
are accidental (i.e. non-constitutive). It is not a case that certain rules are natural and normal, whereas 
whether wooden or plastic, or whether left-handed or right-handed is unnatural and abnormal. This
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classificatory nuisance, in population thinking it is of paramount interest’. On the 
basis o f his atomistic view on history, Hodgson fails to distinguish between accidental 
and necessary characteristics for money, and sees all characteristics uniquely as 
‘interesting’.
Second, Hodgson seems to inadvertently slide towards a crude materialism. Hodgson 
argues only about the substance of an emerging monetary unit from either Menger’s 
old or Hodgson’s new evolutionary view. Hodgson focuses only on the material 
aspect o f  money and suggests the way in which one monetary unit is evolutionary 
selected among rival monetary units, and the way in which the substance of monetary 
units is heterogeneous, variant and not easily recognisable. Nevertheless, as I have 
been at pains to point out in this thesis, money has a symbolic, specifically discursive, 
dimension to it also. Ontological questions relating to money and its evolution cannot 
be reduced to the issue of how its material is selected.
7.2.3 The Ontology of Utopia 
Hodgson’s utopianism is based upon his account o f both ‘anti-teleological’ and ‘anti- 
determinist’ views on history. In order to avoid arriving at ‘the end of history’ through 
a ‘fixed’ path, Hodgson looks at the possibility of utopia as a never-ending flexible 
process through which we can continuously learn:
In very general terms, a challenge for the twenty-first century is not the 
construction of a fixed and final utopia but of evotopia —  a system that can 
foster learning, enhance human capacities, systematically incorporate growing 
knowledge and adapt to changing circumstances. (Hodgson, 1999, p. 240, 
italics added)
Hodgson’s main purpose for evotopianism is to reject any kinds of fixed  blueprint, 
and instead to build scenarios. ‘The very fact that there is learning to be done, and 
human capabilities to be enhanced, means that no fixed blueprint o f a desired future is 
possible’ {ibid.). For Hodgson, however, we can explore a scenario along which 
capitalism could feasibly evolve, not into the past utopias (i.e. the individualistic ffee-
thesis is not interested in the ideal type of money in natural and normal state, but in the constitutive
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market utopia of right and the collectively planned utopia o f the left), but into a 
different type of socio-economic system. He claims that it is not to suggest that such 
as evolution is predestined, but to suggest the possibility o f another system, which is 
driven by the growth of knowledge-incentive production. He considers that ‘evotopia’ 
is more feasible than the past utopias since it can deal more adequately with the 
acquisition and use of knowledge and dynamic process of learning.72
As one o f his evotopian scenarios, Hodgson offers an alternative metric appropriate 
for the learning economy (ibid., pp. 228-39). Hodgson treats knowledge as consisting 
of skills (i.e. the direct human contributions to capabilities) and capabilities (i.e. a 
specific task, whether aided or unaided by tools, machines or other technological 
devices), and tries to track them down to a quantifiable metric. Hodgson believes that 
an increase in the level o f skill and relevant knowledge o f a human population can be 
represented as an upward movement in what he calls the ‘learning frontier’. At the 
learning frontier, the ‘evotopian’ system as a whole is supposed to reach ‘the 
maximum level of learning and skill, given its level of development and state of 
scientific and technological knowledge (ibid., p. 231).
The extent o f the learning frontier is measured by the average amount of time it 
takes the population to reach the levels of skills that are deployed at this optimal 
position. The upward movement of the learning frontier is the main quantitative 
representation o f the general advancement of human knowledge development in 
the system, (ibid., italics added)
Hodgson claims that, in the ‘evotopian’ system, moving the Teaming frontier’ on a 
steady upward curve is a right action in terms of a good state o f reaching the
properties of money.
Hodgson defines learning in the following senses: (a) a dynamic process; ‘Learning is much more 
than a process of blueprint discovery, stimulus-response, input enhancement or statistical correction. 
Learning is a process of problem-formulation and problem-solving rather than the acquisition of given 
‘bits’ o f information ‘out there’ (ibid., p. 75). (b) Learning how to leam; ‘[L]earning is not simply the 
acquisition of information. The rapidly changing world in which we live highlights the importance not 
simply learning, but o f ‘second-order learning’, that is, learning how to learn’ (ibid., p. 247). (c) 
Learning entails changes in routines, habits and institutions; ‘Learning does not simply mean the 
implantation of ideas in the head; it also means the adaptation and replication o f habits and behaviour. 
At the socio-economic level, this entails changes in routines and institutions. The development in 
human learning over the last two hundred years has to a large degree been the result o f such changes’ 
(ibid., p. 247).
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maximum level of knowledge, in which ‘individuals enjoy enhanced possibilities of 
educative development’ {ibid.). This encourages the interpretation o f ‘evotopianism’ 
as a form of consequentialism. The ‘evotopia’ is a good state o f affairs, in which 
individuals can foster learning, enhance human capacities and adapt to unpredictable 
changes. Learning is a right act of agents because it promotes our flexibility and 
adaptability to unforeseen changes in ‘non-teleological history’. ‘Evotopia’ for what 
purpose? Because it functions: ‘evotopia’ is desired for the sake of the benefit it 
promotes. ‘Evotopia’ is expected to foster our endless learning, enhance human 
capabilities and flexibility for unpredictable changes of anti-teleological history out 
there. Its teleological explanation is based on extrinsic teleology — i.e. an alternative 
value system based on skills, which functions and promotes the knowledge 
maximisation within the ‘evotopian’ system. While Hodgson accepts ‘Malthus’s 
doctrine of the imperfectability of the world’ and rejects the possibility of creating a 
perfect social order {ibid., p. 242), Hodgson’s evotopianism is not much different 
from Benthamite utilitarianism in taking as ethically primitive some good and/or 
better state of affairs.
Hodgson also offers an alternative metric appropriate for the learning economy, which 
he contrasts with that he takes to be assumed in Marxism. He proposes the metric of 
skills as follows: the measure o f  a skill is the amount o f  time it takes to achieve that 
level o f  skill {ibid., p. 229, italics author’s). While Hodgson is concerned with the 
metric of skills through time, he claims it is different from ‘the Marxian concept of 
labour time’. He supposes that the acquisition of all necessary skills for being a brain 
surgeon requires about 30 years, but that not all people may have the ability to 
become brain surgeons within 30 years: some may never be capable o f such work. 
Then, he argues that Marxian essentialist approach neglects such a variation: ‘In the 
Marxian approach this difficulty is dealt with by considering the potential of the 
average person, ignoring any variation about the mean. The essentialism of this 
[Marxian] approach is rejected here, in part because of its neglect of the ineradicable 
variety of human ability and skill’ {ibid., p. 229-30). Thus, Hodgson amends his own 
firstly proposed metric so as to cover the variety of human ability and skill, as 
follows: ‘The measure o f  a skill is the minimum amount o f  time that it takes the 
proportion o f  the population allocated to that skill to acquire that skill, given the 
currently optimal allocation o f  labour’ {ibid., p. 230, italics author’s). Hodgson
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believes that it is possible to calculate the minimum amount of time required to 
acquire a certain skill for each person, and that the measure o f a certain skill would be 
the mean of those minima.
Hodgson misunderstands the Marxist essentialism because of his inadvertent atomism. 
It is not the case that Marxist essentialism neglects the variation of human abilities 
and skills by considering the potential o f  the average person. It makes a distinction 
between a necessary element of commodity (i.e. the abstract human labour) and an 
accidental element of commodity (e.g. whether it is smithing or tailoring), and 
considers that products are commensurable in respect o f  abstract human labour, and 
therefore are exchanged in terms o f  their socially necessary labour. Hodgson rather 
fails to make this distinction and sees all elements including skills and capacities as 
equally unique. Hodgson neglects the Aristotelian/Marxist argument on how 
heterogeneous products are rendered commensurable. Hodgson denotes that his 
evotopian scenario differs from Marxism ‘in its treatment of the concept of 
knowledge, seeing labour no longer as the single, undifferentiated, commensurable 
substance, driving production’ {ibid., p. 219, italics added). Ignoring the issue on 
commensurability in respect o f a common dimension, Hodgson just focuses on the 
practical attainability of measuring methods in respect of skills and capabilities. He 
claims that ‘[although these [changing] factors create difficulties for the proposed 
measures o f the skills and capability level, they do not render the methods of 
measurement invalid’ {ibid., p. 234). However, it is not the case that it is difficult to 
get a measure of skills and capabilities, but is fundamentally impossible from the 
Aristotelian categorical separation between quality and quantity. I would rather agree 
with Hodgson’s own late remarks, which are inconsistent with what he says in regard 
to the ‘learning frontier’: ‘The evotopian emphasis, however, is not exclusively or 
primarily on quantitative measures. Quantity can never fully express quality. A huge 
variety o f adaptable skills and capacities are required to deal with complexity’ {ibid., 
p. 247, italics added).
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7.2.4 The Ontology o f Human Beings 
Hodgson offers the truth in a story of Lost Paradise, as follows:
[U]nlike other animals, humanity is forever both cursed and blessed by 
knowledge. It is the original sin, for which there is no clemency and from which 
there is no release. No longer innocent, we are collectively afflicted by an 
unavoidable and endless imperative to pursue wisdom, almost as i f  fo r  its own 
sake. (Hodgson, 1999, p. 262, italics added)
Hodgson, however, has a high regard for the positive side of knowledge, which the 
book of Genesis fails to mention. ‘[Kjnowledge is no longer something to be 
forbidden: it is a formidable necessity. Stored in our institutions, it is a means o f  both 
individual self-realisation and social emancipation. Used properly, it is a basis for the 
enlargement and institutionalisation of other worthwhile human values ' (ibid., p. 262, 
italics added).
Hodgson claims that knowledge is not only a means, but also an end: ‘a major end 
and purpose of economic activity is to safeguard and develop human capabilities, 
including human enlightenment and learning. The ultimate end is not simply 
consumption, but human education and the production o f  useful and warranted 
knowledge’ (ibid., p. 247, italics added). Hodgson cautiously avoids falling into 
teleological explanation of knowledge maximisation as ‘the end of history’, and 
claims: ‘ The normative goals fo r  humanity —  of knowledge, economic development, 
democracy, and need-satisfaction —  are all entwined together. They are both a means 
and an end at the same time. ... Knowledge, in particular, is both a means and an end’ 
(ibid., p. 262, italics added).
But Hodgson does not indicate what the ‘other worthwhile human values’ and ‘the 
normative goals for humanity’ are. He hesitates to argue about the final and intrinsic 
value for humanity, because his main purpose is rather to prove that the learning 
economy is not the end o f  history. For him, knowledge has to be both a means and an 
end, so that ‘evotopia’ can be a dynamic process o f learning. Knowledge is, however, 
only extrinsically valuable. ‘Knowledge is not intrinsically valuable, for it makes 
sense to care about knowing something only if the object of knowledge is interesting
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or important or the knowledge itself is useful. It doesn’t make sense to care 
intrinsically about knowing a boring subject’ (Anderson, 1993, p. 27).
7.3 Virtue-based Utopianism
As noted, ‘utopia’ refers to a non-existent good (or, at least, better) place. Let us ask: 
a good place in what respect? Let us recall the ethical perspectives discussed in 
chapter 4, and contrast what we might call, ‘consequentialist utopianism’, 
‘deontological utopianism’, and ‘virtue-based utopianism’, which can be summarised 
as follows:
• Consequentialist utopianism concerns the state of affairs we ought and ought not 
to bring about. From this concern, it follows that utopia is a good state of affairs.
• Deontological utopianism concerns the kind of actions we should and should not 
perform. From this concern, it follows that utopia is a good state of right action in
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accordance with a moral duty such as the Kantian categorical imperative.
• Virtue-based utopianism concerns the kind of person we ought and ought not to be. 
From this concern, it follows that utopia is a good state o f human essence.74
In contrast with consequentialist utopianism, this section aims to explore an 
alternative utopianism, which presupposes Aristotelian virtue ethics, called ‘virtue- 
based utopia’. These two kinds of utopianism can be distinguished in terms of (a) 
their moral evaluation —  i.e. to which does it put priority, ‘the right’ or ‘the good’?; 
and (b) their teleological explanation —  i.e. is it desired to exist ‘for what purpose?’.
‘Evotopia’ is a good state of affairs, in which individuals can foster learning, enhance 
human capacities and adapt to unpredictable changes. Learning is a right act o f agents 
because it promotes flexibility and adaptability to unforeseen changes in ‘non- 
teleological history’. ‘Evotopia’ for what purpose? Because it functions: ‘evotopia’ is 
desired for the sake of the benefit it promotes. ‘Evotopia’ is expected to foster our
73 ‘Evotopianism’ cannot be understood through a deontological ethics perspective, because it suggests 
that learning is a right act o f agents in terms of a good state of affairs it promotes. Learning, for 
Hodgson, is not intrinsically and finally valuable for its own sake, but rather extrinsically and 
instrumentally valuable to promote our flexibility and adaptability to unforeseen changes in ‘non- 
teleological history’, although human beings are cursed and blessed by knowledge and make 
themselves learn endlessly almost as i f  for its own sake.
74 ‘Evotopianism’ cannot be understood through virtue ethics perspective, either: his claim is not that 
we ought to be a leamable character, or knowledgeable person, as an excellence o f human nature.
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endless learning, enhance human capabilities and flexibility for unpredictable changes 
of anti-teleological history out there. Its teleological explanation is based on extrinsic 
teleology —  i.e. the amendment of the metric of value functions and promotes the 
knowledge maximisation within the ‘evotopian’ system.
‘Virtue-based utopia’, by contrast, is a realisation of the human essence, in which 
each individual can seek to realise in his or her own life. Such a ‘virtue-based utopia’ 
is an intrinsic telos for both human species and history. The teleological development 
of human species is interrelated with that of history: human beings make history by 
achieving the self-realisation, but history equally makes it possible for human beings 
to realise their essence. Human beings achieve the realisation of themselves as real 
species being through a process of teleological development o f history. Its 
teleological explanation is based on intrinsic teleology —  i.e. as we can realise our 
human virtue, we can internally stop our dependence on money within the 
teleological development o f history.
In this section, we try to describe the Aristotelian ‘virtue-based utopianism’, through 
Moses Hess’ account of human nature, history, money and utopia. His ‘Uber das 
Geldwesen [about the essence of money]’ in 1841 is known for inspiring and 
influencing Marx in his ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ in 1844.75
7.3.1 The Ontology of Human Beings 
According to Hess, human beings cooperate with each other through direct 
intercourse in an organic community, which is an essential act of species being. ‘Life 
is exchange of producing activity of life’ (Hess, 1961 [1841], p. 330). Like breathing 
the air, the exchange of producing activity of life is essential to human beings. Hess 
explains the essence of human beings with a natural/social contrast. Human beings 
unintentionally breathe the air in the natural sphere o f the earth, whereas they 
intentionally exchange their producing activity of life in the social sphere o f economy. 
But as human beings cannot live without the natural intercourse of breathing the air, 
they cannot live without the social intercourse o f exchanging the producing activity of
75 While their arguments are very similar, ‘virtue-based utopianism’ can be found more explicitly in 
Hess than in Marx: whilst Marx focuses more on changing the contradictory social order, Hess mainly 
focuses on the emancipation of humanity from that social order.
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life. Just as human beings have a natural activity of life (i.e. breathing), they exchange 
social activity of life in the intercourse o f human beings. ‘The intercourse of humans 
is not merely derived from their nature; it is their real nature’ (ibid., p. 331). In the 
same way as body parts (e.g. organ) cannot live unless in a human body as a whole, 
individuals cannot live unless in an organic community as a whole. ‘They [human 
beings] are dead, if they are separated from each other. Their real life exists only in 
the mutual exchange of their producing activity o f life, only in cooperation, only in 
the co-relation with the whole social body’ (ibid., p. 330). Hess calls this cooperative 
exchange of producing activity ‘species act (i.e. Gattungsact)’ (ibid., p. 331). Thus, 
the human essence lies in the cooperation through direct intercourse in an organic 
community. This allows us to interpret what Hess argues about mutuality, which 
involves the mutually enhancing relationship between free individuals. As argued in 
chapter 6, individuals can be related internally and directly with each other through 
altruistic gift giving as an essential act of species being.
7.3.2 The Ontology of Human History 
For Hess, human beings originated with the immature form of their essence in social 
history. The essence of human being has a history o f  development or a developing 
history. According to Hess, human beings have a ‘double history of development’: 
natural and social. One is the first history of mankind as unconscious bodily beings in 
the natural world. The other is the second history of mankind as conscious spiritual 
beings in the social world. Human beings can appear with their completed form at the 
end of the second, social history that follows from the first, natural one (ibid., p. 345). 
Human beings have never been completed yet: they are approaching the promised 
land (i.e. dieses Land der VerheiBung), something that links to Hess’s utopianism. 
The history of human beings necessarily starts with their mutual destruction, which 
comes from the self-contradiction o f their intercourse among isolated individuals. 
‘The developing history o f the human essence, or that of human kind, firstly appears 
as self-destruction o f this essence’ (ibid., p. 332). Human beings originally could not 
cooperate with each other as members of an organic community and of species beings. 
If they could, they would not have stolen with violence or deceived with cunning. In 
spite o f their cooperative nature, human beings struggled with their egos for external 
and alienated properties, because they were bom with their immature form, as isolated 
individuals. Corresponding to Marx/Gould’s argument on the transformation the
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social relations with historical development, however, Hess also considers that those 
originally isolated individuals can internally and directly be united.
7.3.3 The Ontology of Money
Money is the alienated power of human beings, their traded off activities.
Money is the worth o f human beings expressed in numbers. It is the hallmark of
our slavery, the indelible fire mark o f our slavery [ibid., p. 335).
Hess claims that money is non-organic in contrast with organic human beings. First, 
money is non-organic in the sense that it is alienated and externalised from organic 
human beings. ‘Money is the product of mutually alienated humans, externalised 
humans’ [ibid., p. 335). Second, money is non-organic in a sense that it is quantitative. 
‘This universal plunder, money, is not an organic, living entity. Yes, it must be the 
social body, the organic species, which represents social intercourse; but it cannot do 
it, because money is by its nature not organic, not organised, not internally 
differentiated, but it is a dead mass, an amount or a number. How can the worth o f  a 
living nature, human being and its highest life and work be expressed in amounts or 
numbers? How the worth o f  the social life can be expressed in amounts or numbers?’ 
[ibid., pp. 343, italics added) This allows us to interpret Hess as recognising 
incompatibility between money’s commensuration (especially on the aspect of 
quantification) and incommensurable values (i.e. the worth o f a living nature), argued 
in chapter 2 and 3.
As the following citations show, Marx owes a lot to Hess in terms o f his alienation 
theory of money: ‘The individual is evaluated up as the end, whereas the mankind is 
evaluated down as the means: that is totally the reversal of the human and the natural 
life’ [ibid., p. 333). Money turns over the realisation of human essence from ends for 
human species to means for individuals. ‘Yes, we must keep selling our nature, our 
life, our own free activity, in order to make our miserable living. We keep buying our 
individual living in exchange for losing our freedom’ [ibid., p. 335). We sell our 
freedom in exchange for our life. The more we sell, the less free we are. ‘Money can 
never ever become possession’ [ibid., p. 343). Here, Hess suggests constitutive 
incommensurability (i.e. there are some things money cannot buy), argued in chapter
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2 and 3: if  we exchange a human being for money, it is not an inspired living entity, 
but an uninspired lifeless body. Money does not bring us the real possession. ‘Thus, 
you must eternally strive to acquire something, which cannot be yours, which 
eternally remains far beyond yourself. You can only possess an inspired body with 
your money, but you can also never ever inspire it and it can never become your 
possession! You have to regard yourself happy to have a body which does not belong 
to you, happy to be able to exchange your own body, your meat and blood, your 
activity o f life for this plunder, that is, happy to be able sell yourself, —  although it 
was regarded as unhappy still in the medieval and ancient — you must regard yourself 
happy to be a modem owner of body’ {ibid., p. 344).
7.3.4 The Ontology of Utopia 
According to Hess, as money has been brought about by the demand for an external, 
indirect means of intercourse, money will be destroyed by the demand for an internal, 
direct intercourse.76 An act of altruistic gift giving, as I argued in chapter 6, might be a 
means through which internal and direct intercourse could occur. In an analogy with 
language, Hess claims that the abolition of money would force back history. 
Language is a lively, well-spirited means of intercourse that can grow organically 
with human beings, because it is an organic, organised whole. However, money 
cannot grow organically with human beings. Thus, money does not resemble lively 
language, but rather writing as a dead letter.77 Hess argues that while language has not 
been invented, writing and money have. ‘If the invention is no longer necessary, no 
longer useful, and becomes even harmful, it is used by nobody any more, while it does 
not go back into ‘the mother’s body’ for that reason’ (ibid., pp. 346-7). While those 
inventions were ‘useful’ and even ‘necessary’, it is the case that they will therefore be 
‘useful’ and ‘necessary’ still in the future. Hess admits that an external and alienated 
symbol, namely money, had to be invented by human beings in their mutually 
alienated relation. Because they were not fully human beings (i.e. they were not
76 An act o f altruistic gift giving, discussed in chapter 6, can only be a means o f internal and direct 
intercourse among united human beings in an organic society.
77 Hess’ account of language can be detected in two essays on the origin of language: Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s ‘ Abhandlung iiber den Ursprung der Sprache (1770)’ and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘Essai sur 
l ’origine ds langues, ou il est parle de la melodie et de l’imitation musicale (1781)’. Both essays 
describe writing as dead language, which lacks breathing (i.e. natural activity o f life). The more 
language acquires clarity and precision by being fixed in writing, the more it loses liveliness it 
originally used to have.
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internally united), they had to look for the external unity outside themselves. The 
abstracted means of intercourse rather increased the human capacity of production. 
Without this inhuman means of intercourse, they would not have had an intercourse at 
all.
As soon as human beings unite, and can find instead a direct intercourse 
between them, however, the inhuman, external, dead means o f intercourse must 
necessarily be abolished; this dead and deceased means of intercourse cannot 
and won’t arbitrarily be abolished; its abolishment is not held by ‘order’, as its 
creation is not. As the demand for an external means of unity brought about the 
spiritual and material idol through the internal breakdown of humankind, the 
demand for a direct, intimate unity of human beings will again destroy this idol 
{ibid., p. 347).78
An interesting contrast can be found between Marx and Hess in their views on the 
abolition of money society: ‘Communism is for us not a state o f  affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism 
the real movement which abolishes the present state o f  things. The conditions of 
movement result from the premises now in existence’ (Marx, 1970 [1845-6], italics 
added). Like Hess, Marx offers a non-consequentialist form of utopianism: 
communism is not about establishing a good state o f affairs. For Marx, a present 
state o f  affairs ought to and can be abolished. Marx is concerned with changing the 
contradictory social order by putting an end to a present phenomenon, such as money. 
For Hess, a present state of affairs cannot and w on’t arbitrarily be abolished. Hess is 
concerned with our acquisition of intimate unity through a direct intercourse. Hess can 
be considered to hold a more explicitly virtue-based utopianism than Marx. Because 
money is an external, indirect means of intercourse, it would be rendered redundant 
by the existence of a means of internal, direct intercourse. If and when we acquire our
78 Sobald aber die Menschen sich vereinigen, sobald ein unmittelbarer Verkehr zwischen ihnen statt 
finden kann, muB das unmenschliche, auBerliche, todte Verkehrsmittel nothwendig abgeschafft werden; 
Nicht willkiirlich kann und wird dieses todte und todtende Verkehrsmittel abgeschafft werden; die 
Abschaffung desselben geschieht eben so wenig auf “Commando”, wie dessen Schaffimg. So wie das 
BediirfhiB eines auBerlichen Vereinigungsmittels wahrend der inneren Zerfallenheit des 
Menschengeschlechtes die geistigen und materiellen Gotzen in’s Leben gerufen hatte, so wird das 
Bedurfnifi einer unmittelbaren, innigen Vereinigung der Menschen dies G5tzen wieder vemichten. 
(Hess, 1961, p. 347)
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intimate unity through a direct intercourse, we will no longer be dependent on an 
external, indirect means of intercourse, namely money. We need neither restore nor 
abolish it externally, but we can internally stop our dependence on it.
7.4 Conclusion
There are currently various utopian monetary/moneyless projects (e.g. LETS, Social 
Credit, Time-based Currency, Basic Income), which are also based on the ethical 
perspective of consequentialism.79 In a utopian moneyless project such as LETS, 
‘utopian realism’ takes the following logical steps:
79 The utopian monetary/moneyless projects, defined as follows, are mostly based on assuming that bad 
money makes a bad state of affairs, and that creating good (or better) money makes a good (or better) 
state o f affairs:
(1) LETS (i.e. Local Exchange and Trading System) is designed to be circulated within a local 
community as much as possible in order to promote ‘reciprocal relationships’ between people in a 
community (cf. Linton). Money, in the mainstream capitalist economy, has a fundamental problem in 
its nature of being scarce and hard to come by, since:
there is only so much in circulation;
it can go virtually anywhere, and so it does; and
we can't issue it ourselves.
LETS is designed to solve the problem of scarcity and availability, so that 
it stays within a community it serves; 
it is issued by the people who use it; and 
it exists in sufficient supply to meet the needs of a community.
Since we can issue it whenever we need and it stays within a community, it prevents to flow away.
(2) Social Credit aims to promote social justice and environmental sustainability through the 
reformation o f bank investment (Hutchinson, 1998, pp. 44-5). It assumes that bad money is financial 
credit (debt-based money), which is concerned with the probability o f the delivery o f money in its 
various forms. Banks create money as loans by determining how it will be invested on grounds of 
profitability. The loan does not go out of existence even though it is repaid by original debtor, but the 
repaid loan must be rapidly re-loaned in order to maintain production. In contrast, good money is real 
credit (credit-based money), which is concerned with the probability of the delivery o f goods in their 
various forms. Real credit depends on two factors: the ability of produce, and a need to be satisfied. It 
is social and communal in origin and therefore belongs neither to the producer nor the consumer, but to 
the community. Social Credit aims to eliminate the debt-based financial system and to replace it for the 
credit-based system. The creation o f locally controlled financial mechanism promotes locally 
controlled production and income distribution. It is no longer determined by those motivated by greed 
and operating on the basis o f the creation of artificial scarcities, but by members of community 
motivated by saving non-profitable value such as environment.
(3) Time-based Currency aims to promote equality in respect o f  time: ‘[a]n hour is always worth as 
much as an hour’ (Offe and Heinze, 1992, p. 52). Differences o f talent or skill, between different 
workers and different types of work, are intended to make no more difference than variations o f in the 
intensity of the demand for different types of goods. Good money is supposed to be counted in time 
whereas bad money is traded for time. ‘Time would have to be treated like money, yet without being 
traded fo r  money’ {ibid., p. 51). The labour vouchers are based on time as the unit o f account.
(4) Basic Income aims to promote equality in respect o f  income distribution. It is an income 
unconditionally granted to all on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement. It is a 
form of minimum income guarantee that differs from those that now exist in various European 
countries in three important ways:
it is being paid to individuals rather than households; 
it is paid irrespective of any income from other sources; and
it is paid without requiring the performance of any work or the willingness to accept a job if 
offered.
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(1) It assumes, on one extremity, a state o f affairs with money. While money is 
incompatible with ethical behaviour and human virtue, it cannot be abolished all 
at once;
(2) It assumes, on the other extremity, a state of affair without money. While altruistic 
gift giving is compatible with ethical behaviour and human virtue, it cannot cover 
all transactions already established in terms of money;
(3) It assumes a midpoint between these two extremities —  i.e. a stepping-stone from
(1) to (2).
A Nicotine patch can be a good metaphor for a stepping-stone: because we cannot 
easily stop smoking all at once, we require some kind of tool, such as a nicotine patch , 
which externally helps us to reduce our dependency on cigarette, as a stepping-stone 
for being a non-smoker. Virtue-based utopianism, however, doubts the effectiveness 
o f such an external effort to stop the dependency. For instance, LETS is parallel to 
and parasitic upon the mainstream capitalist economy and, thereby, is mutually 
supplemental with the mainstream economy. What they promote is not post­
capitalism but glocalisation (i.e. globalisation and localisation) of the market. While 
current utopian moneyless projects are ‘realistic’ in a sense that we can start them 
without stopping money all at once, they do not encourage the search for (a non­
monetary) post-capitalist society.
Those utopian projects appeal to certain people because they can be made to work (at 
least the extent they do) without any radical change, that is, without the abolition of 
money. Hodgson’s ‘evotopia’ also entails this ‘utopian realism’. Being associated 
with Giddens’, so called, third way discourse, Hodgson considers that both 
collectively planned utopia of (some on) the left and individualistic free market utopia 
o f the (free-market) right are inappropriate for a complex economy driven by 
innovation and rapid human learning, and thereby unfeasible, because their blueprints 
misunderstand the nature of learning and knowledge in a modem economy. Instead of 
the blueprints offered by the right and the left, Hodgson advocates scenario building 
as discovering ‘institutionally immanent possibilities’. ‘Scenario building is no idle
Basic income also involves ‘utopian realism’: ‘A basic income ... is provided in cash, without any 
restriction as to the nature or timing of the consumption or investment it helps fund. In most variants, it
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speculation, but the investigation of plausible future causal chains, stemming from 
the conditions and force of the present’ (Hodgson, 1999, p. 180). Whether a blueprint 
or a scenario building is on offer, Hodgson’s ‘utopian realism’ is based on the ethical 
perspective of consequentialism, which is concerned with a good state o f affairs for 
our learning:
In very general terms, a challenge for the twenty-first century is not the 
construction o f a fixed and final utopia but o f evotopia —  a system that can 
foster learning, enhance human capacities, systematically incorporate growing 
knowledge and adapt to changing circumstances, {ibid., p. 240, italics added)
This thesis claims, in contrast, that the real challenge, at any point o f  both history and 
individual life, is not the construction of a system as an adaptation to the anti- 
teleological history out there, but virtue-based utopianism — i.e. being a virtuous 
person. Virtue is not a good state of affairs, but a good state o f the human character. 
On the Aristotelian account we define that state in terms of the realisation of the 
human essence. Both Hegel and Marx historicise that essentialism: as Wood puts it 
both views ‘the human nature to be actualized as a historical product’ (Wood, 1999, p. 
33). Being virtuous is the goal for both human species and history. The teleological 
development of human species are interrelated with that o f history: human beings 
make history by achieving their self-realisation, but history equally makes it possible 
for them to realise their essence. Human beings achieve the realisation o f themselves 
as real species being through a process of teleological development of history. Thus, if 
we can uncover money’s tendencies of development or potential, we do not need to 
endlessly Team’ to adapt to unpredictable changes caused by money. If we can realise 
our human virtue, we can be less and less dependent on money, which is incompatible 
with human virtue. Neither need we restore nor abolish it externally, but can 
internally uncover it and stop our dependence on it. We consider the contrast between 
those external and internal approaches further in the final concluding chapter.
supplements, rather than substitutes, existing in-kind transfers such as free education or basic health 
insurance’ (Van Parijs, 2000, p. 3, italics added).
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Let us reconsider the concept of the ‘priceless’ through an episode told by a Japanese 
philosopher, who had been ‘a visiting farmer’ in a mountain village, cultivating a 
small field for more than 25 years.80 He wanted to buy an old farmhouse there, but he 
could not find any houses for sale. ‘It may sound strange for those who are not 
familiar with the present situation of mountain villages, because there must be plenty 
o f vacant houses due to depopulation now in progress in mountain villages. ’ There are 
plenty o f vacant houses. Many villagers kindly offer to let their houses. The rent is 
almost free. Nevertheless, there are no houses for sale. Nobody wants to sell their 
house even though they do not need it any more. ‘Nobody wants to sell a house, in 
which he was born and brought up, in which his parents and grand-parents have 
lived ' He asked many villagers to give him information about a house for sale, and 
even asked his relatives to negotiate with house owners for selling. As soon as he 
finally found a house for sale, he told its owner that he wanted to buy it, and also 
asked a villager to negotiate all about a contract including setting a price. ‘I won’t 
engage in bargaining, so please agree with the deal!’
But later, the philosopher figured out that he had given the negotiator a terrible 
headache. In an urban area, we can rely on market price of real estate for setting a 
price. ‘But there is no market price o f  real estate in a village, fo r  there is, as we can 
easily imagine, no market o f  real estate in a village. There had presumably never 
been any deals in real estate in the village’s history.’ A seller o f the house, on the one 
hand, might have expected a certain price. But it was doubtful how much it was 
subjectively reasonable. A buyer of the house, on the other hand, did not know how 
much it was without a reference to market price. Besides, an 80-year-old farmhouse 
would be assessed at 0 in an urban area. But he says, ‘ I  was desperate to have an old 
farmhouse. I  wanted an old styled farmhouse rather than a modern house. Therefore, 
that house is valuable fo r  me, and should not be assessed at 0. But I  don’t know at all 
about its just price, either.’ That is, the negotiator must be charged with a ‘great 
mission’ to put a price on that which lacks market and price.
80 Uchiyama, 1997, pp. 228-31, abstracted, translated, and italics added by the author.
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There was an even greater hurdle after the negotiation among three parties. No 
transaction can be approved without following nationally established procedures. 
Trading is more than an agreement between a seller and a buyer. It has to go along 
with the nationally established rules. Thus, the philosopher and the house seller 
visited a village office, and were introduced to a judicial scrivener from the same 
village. The procedures are quickly completed. During the procedure, the judicial 
scrivener asked them, ‘what are the items for sale?’ They were just confused and 
could not answer. The judicial scrivener laughed and explained, ‘I mean, how much 
did you price for housing land, forest land, and house?’ They had never considered 
them separately. ''Housing land, forest land next to housing land, and house are 
absolutely necessary fo r  me to make my own base in the village, and cannot be 
separated from  one another fo r  my village life. My aim fo r  this deal is not getting a 
real estate but getting my own base fo r  my village life. That means, the owner loses 
his own base fo r  his village life.'
After all o f this much ado about nothing, the house seller asked the philosopher, ‘will 
you give me a cup of tea, when I come back to the village to visit the family grave?’ 
‘O f course, you are welcome at any time. But I only stay in the village sometimes. I 
hope I will be there on the day you visit.’ ‘I am quite relived to hear it. I thought I 
even lost a place to take a seat in the village.’ It is the reason why villagers don’t want 
to sell their houses. They just don’t want to lose their place to sit down, relax and 
enjoy a cup of tea. ‘It was quite natural from this sense that we hadn’t set a price for 
forest land, housing land etc.’
In this episode, people have traded ‘priceless property’ in the following respects81:
(1) Practically Priceless: because nobody had ever traded their property so far, there is 
no market of real estate in the village. Because the village lacks a real estate 
market, it has no market price for real estate.
(2) Categorical difference between quality and quality: traders are not interested in 
exchanging a real estate, but rather in exchanging the ‘usefulness’ of a base for 
their village life. While a real estate can be divided into several purchasing items, 
such as housing land, forest land and house, the ‘usefulness’ o f a base for their
81 Uchiyama indicates (1) and (2).
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village life cannot be divided from one another. Usefulness (i.e. use-value) is 
qualitative, whereas price (i.e. exchange-value) is quantitative: they are different 
dimensions.
(3) Constitutive Incommensurability: there are certain social relations (e.g. family, 
parent-child, friend) and evaluative commitments (e.g. to lands, forests, streams, 
fisheries, livelihood) that are constituted by a refusal to put a price on them.
‘Nobody wants to sell a house, in which one was born and brought up, in which 
on e’s parents and grand-parents have lived’. That is, social loyalties both to lands 
and forest one was brought up in and to family and ancestors are constituted by a 
refusal to treat them as commodities that can be bought or sold.
There are many different kinds o f ‘pricelessness’, and they are certainly plausible. 
What should not be neglected, however, is its ontological status —  i.e. constitutive 
incommensurability. Pricelessness as constitutive incommensurability cannot be 
reduced into a ‘priceless claim’ —  i.e. ‘priceless’ as a metaphorical expression to 
suggest that it is as i f  something is much more valuable than any amount o f money, 
regardless o f whether it can actually be priced or not. When one sells one’s parents’ 
and grand-parents’ home, it is not home any more, but is transformed into three items 
—  i.e. housing land, forest land, and house. Thus, 'pricelessness ’ is not merely a 
matter o f  our discourse.
Uchiyama tells that he was after all happy with this trade because ‘money has been 
regarded as a silly thing in the whole process o f the dealing’. Both the seller and buyer 
are rather interested in a ‘trade o f usefulness’. Price was not very significant for either 
o f them, provided it would be afforded. They are required by a state, however, to 
make a procedure to justify a trade o f fictitious commodities. ‘Money was just a 
pointless means to arrange the trade o f fictitious commodities’.
Uchiyama mentions, however, that this fiction becomes more and more important and 
acquires reality in market economy. For example, the price o f a car is not set as a 
result o f its design and production but, on the contrary, a car is designed and produced 
according to a price set in advance. This makes a difference to our life style: we do 
not trade useful things to live, but rather, we make a standard o f life according to the
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price of our labour. The fictitious activity of price setting becomes dominant over 
substantive economy.
This is a case of the ‘tail wagging the dog‘: the reality (i.e. the primary) is subordinate 
to the fiction (i.e. the secondary). As I have argued, the capitalist market economy is 
currently being transformed into a ‘discourse-driven (or -based)’ one. Money is being 
transformed via new communication technologies into more symbolic and non- 
substantial forms (e.g. credit card, e-money). What is traded for money also becomes 
more symbolic and various (e.g. information, knowledge, right, image, words). 
Regardless of whether we are aware of it or not, we are discursively driven to project 
the market regime into non-market spheres and increase the range of purchasable 
items. Moreover, this is a case of a ‘Procrustean bed ’ : our satisfaction (i.e. the
internal) is fitted to its criterion (i.e. the external). I have also argued that a 
consequentialist utopian discourse, which concerns the perfection of state of affairs, is 
the dominant utopian discourse. Those who speak a consequentialist discourse neglect, 
however, the fact that our state of mind and character (e.g. happiness, contentment, 
comfortableness) may be distorted to realise a perfect state o f affairs (i.e. an exact 
conformity to a standard measure).
The proposal this thesis suggests, in contrast, is that we need to reverse these 
subordinations back to normal: it suggests that the fiction (i.e. the secondary) be 
subordinate to the reality (i.e. the primary) and that the state of affairs (i.e. the 
external) be subordinate to the state of mind and character (i.e. the internal). Moreover, 
so as to get them back to a proper relationship, this thesis advocates stopping 
externalisation from a perspective of virtue-based utopianism. Let us finally describe 
it with an ill-treatment metaphor.
A Japanese medical doctor, Komazawa, tells us about the Buddhist wisdom of two 
different methods o f treatment —  i.e. ‘against-treatmenf and ‘with-treatment’
82 In an ancient Greek mythology by Theseus, Procrustes, meaning "he who stretches", keeps a house 
by the side o f the road where he offers hospitality to passing strangers, who are invited in for a pleasant 
meal and a night's rest in his very special bed. Procrustes describes it as having the unique property that 
its length exactly matches whomsoever lays down upon it. What Procrustes does not volunteer is the 
method by which this "one-size-flts-all" is achieved, namely as soon as the guest lays down Procrustes 
goes to work upon him, stretching him on the rack if  he is too short for the bed and chopping off his 
legs if  he is too long. Theseus turns the tables on Procrustes, fatally adjusting him to fit his own bed.
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(Komazawa, 1983; Itsuki, 1996).83 ‘Against-treatment’ involves externalising oneself 
from a problem (e.g. physical illness, mental disorder) and taking remedies against a 
problem as an object to be solved. ‘With-treatment’, in contrast, involves just 
acknowledging and going along with a problem till it is healed.84 For instance, using 
ice to cool down a fever is an ‘against-treatment’, whereas keeping warm enough to 
have a good sweat is a ‘with-treatment’ for a fever. For someone who is in deep grief, 
saying some encouraging words to overcome their sorrow is an ‘against-treatment’, 
whereas taking a load off their mind by crying together is a ‘with-treatment’ for 
sadness. Komazawa confesses that he has initially misunderstood the real meaning of 
‘with-treatment’: he thought it referred to being in sympathy and helpful with patients, 
but figured out it did not. No matter how sympathetically a doctor may encourage an 
anorexic child to eat, lack of empathy with the child’s reasons for not eating makes an 
apparently ‘with-treatment’ actually an ‘against-treatment’. Komazawa claims that 
modem Western medical science is based on this idea o f ‘against-treatment’: it 
regards disease as a bad state o f affair and tries to turn it into good health as a good 
state of affairs.85 When a doctor takes remedies to an anorexic child so as to turn 
his/her state without appetite into that with appetite, a doctor is against the child
83 They are English translations of ‘Taiji’ and ‘Douji’ in Japanese.
84 The contrast between ‘against-treatment’ and ‘with-treatment’ is similar to that between the north 
wind and the Sun, in the following Aesop’s fable: The North Wind and the Sun disputed as to which 
was the most powerful, and agreed that he should be declared the victor who could first strip a 
wayfaring man o f his clothes. The North Wind first tried his power and blew with all his might, but the 
keener his blasts, the closer the Traveller wrapped his cloak around him, until at last, resigning all hope 
o f victory, the Wind called upon the Sun to see what he could do. The Sun suddenly shone out with all 
his warmth. The Traveller no sooner felt his genial rays than he took off one garment after another, and 
at last, fairly overcome with heat, undressed and bathed in a stream that lay in his path. In this fable, the 
north wind takes ‘against-treatment’ and tries to attain the object externally, whereas the sun takes 
‘with-treatment’ and makes an effect internally.
85 Like money, cancer is described as evil. Sontag indicates that the controlling metaphors in 
descriptions o f cancer are drawn from the language of warfare: ‘cancer cells do not simply multiply; 
they are ‘invasive.’ ... Cancer cells ‘colonize’ from the original tumor to far sites in the body, first 
setting up tiny outposts ( ‘micro-metastases’) whose presence is assumed, though they cannot be 
detected. Rarely are the body’s ‘defenses’ vigorous enough to obliterate a tumor that has established its 
own blood supply and consists o f billions of detective cells. However, ‘radical’ the surgical 
intervention, however, many ‘scans’ are taken o f the body landscape, most remissions are temporary; 
the prospects are that ‘tumor invasion’ will continue, or that rouge cells will eventually regroup and 
mount a new assault on the organism’ (Sontag, 1991, pp. 65-6). Treatment of cancer also has a military 
favour: ‘Radiotherapy uses the metaphors o f aerial warfare; patients are ‘bombarded’ with toxic rays. 
And chemotherapy is chemical warfare, using poisons. Treatment aims to ‘kill’ cancer cells (without, it 
is hoped, killing the patient). Unpleasant side effects to treatment are advertised, indeed over-advertised. 
( ‘The agony o f chemotherapy’ is a standard phrase) It is impossible to avoid damaging or destroying 
healthy cells (indeed, some methods used to treat cancer can cause cancer), but it is thought that nearly 
any damage to the body is justified if  it saves the patient’s life’ (ibid., pp. 66-7). Not only is the clinical 
course o f cancer and its medical treatment, but also cancer itself is conceived as the enemy on which
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him/herself by refusing to acknowledge that he/she does not want to eat. On the 
contrary Komazawa, as a child doctor, discovers himself that ‘with-treatment’ can 
ironically be even more successful for a favourable turn than ‘against-treatment’ in 
many cases.
In a nutshell, this thesis maintains that society requires ‘with-treatment’ rather than 
‘against-treatment’. For sure, it advocates that, despite being a mistranslation, the 
aphorism ‘money is the root of all evil’ may actually be more accurate that the 
original. It claims that money itself is incompatible with our ethical behaviour and 
human virtue. However, regardless of whether with a help of a stepping-stone or 
without, this thesis is skeptical towards any kinds of consequentialist effort to turn a 
bad state o f affairs into a good one. By changing our society so as to directly take a 
favourable turn (e.g. to turn a state with money into that without money) rather 
misguides us to be against the society by refusing that it subsists with the root of evil, 
and to be externalised from our own society. In contrast, this thesis offers a ‘with- 
treatment’ to society: we need neither externally to restore nor abolish money as the 
root of evil, but we can internally uncover the ontology of money and stop our 
dependence on it. So as money dependence to be healed, this thesis acknowledges that 
altruistic gift giving can internally make an effect with the society, as the sun 
acknowledges that heating can internally make an effect with a traveller. As the north 
wind fails to blow up a traveller’s cloth even with all its might, it is impossible that all 
currently held commercial exchanges are replaced for altruistic gift giving. It is 
possible, however, that each individual is concerned with their free activities, which 
do not enhance the negative freedom or ‘freedom from’ —  i.e. ‘the absence of 
external constraint’ —  but enhance positive freedom or ‘freedom to’ —  i.e. ‘the 
overcoming o f the external constraint’. If and when we achieve the fullest self- 
realisation of free social individuals through altruistic gift giving, we would discover 
that we can be less dependent on (or even independent from) money.
society wages war. It follows that a Western medical treatment refuses a state with cancer cells, and 
tries to turn it to a state without them, even though it damages other healthy cells.
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